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 Abstract 
This study examines Canada’s legal requirements and obligations for search 
and rescue (SAR) in the Canadian territory of Nunavut to determine the 
extent of Canada’s efforts in fulfilling its international duties with regards to 
search and rescue in the Arctic. This study determines that Canada has a 
longstanding and well-established national search and rescue program, and 
understands well the intricacies and difficulties of search and rescue in its 
Arctic region. Both hard law and due diligence efforts support this 
conclusion, and are analysed in this study along with guidelines, standard 
operating procedures and best practices to illustrate Canada’s holistic 
approach to their current and successful search and rescue program in 
Nunavut. Nevertheless, maritime traffic and activity in the Arctic waters of 
Nunavut are increasing. This study demonstrates that Canada’s Federal 
Arctic search and rescue program in Nunavut is lacking in certain critical 
areas, attributable foremost to Canada’s immense geographical scale and the 
difficulties of effectuating a comprehensive search and rescue program in the 
remote and challenging conditions of the Canadian Arctic. This thesis traces 
Canada’s Arctic search and rescue policy and program to its contemporary 
form, and culminates with an analysis of how Canada’s SAR program will 
cope in the changing decades to come.  
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 Preface 
The Canadian Arctic has long conjured up images of extreme hardship, 
desolation and exploration in the collective global memory. Historical 
expeditions from explorers such as John Franklin, Roald Amundson, John 
Rae and Viljalmur Stefansson painted the Canadian Arctic as a formidable, 
inhospitable place full of treacherous sailing conditions in the 17th and 18th 
centuries. Indeed, these tales illustrate the difficulties of navigation and 
operating in the Canadian Arctic experienced both then and now. Though 
maps, technology and institutional knowledge have improved, the Canadian 
Arctic still remains one of the most unforgiving maritime environments to 
traverse. However, there are those who have survived and thrived in such 
regions well before European explorers dared venture into Nunavut’s icy 
waterways. The Inuit peoples have endured for centuries in the Arctic 
environment of Nunavut, and continue to inhabit these areas by successfully 
utilising their traditional knowledge and culture, and adapting new 
technologies to their advantage. Today, Canada recognises their obligation to 
provide search and rescue not only to the various industries and foreign 
operators in Canadian waters, but also to the Canadian people residing and 
operating locally within Nunavut’s waters. As maritime traffic and interest in 
new industries (such as resource extractive industries and Arctic shipping) 
begin to increase, Canada’s search and rescue program faces new problems, 
and must be prepared to adapt to meet the challenges of the ever-growing 
presence of human activity in Nunavut’s dangerous waters. This study hopes 
to contribute to the greater body of emerging work on this subject, and help 
provide insight into answering the ultimate question: are we ready?  
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1 Introduction  
 
 
We primarily think of search and rescue (SAR) as the practical, real-time 
delivery of actual search and rescue services – the ‘operational’ side so to 
speak. Indeed, effective search and rescue operations are the end goal of all 
SAR programs, and the principle mechanism for dealing with real emergency 
incidents and situations. However, search and rescue operations are rather the 
final culmination of multiple components, and not solely SAR operations, 
such as prevention, forecasting and preparedness efforts. The bulk of these 
elements are in fact conceptual by nature, in that they exist in writing rather 
than in reality. These conceptual elements might include things such as 
institutional knowledge, policies and theoretical formulations or predictions. 
The Canadian Coast Guard (CCG) for example, utilises mathematical 
projections to forecast the trends in Arctic maritime traffic in assessing their 
operational capacity to handle emergencies within their North. Such forecasts 
help the Coast Guard decide where best to allocate future resources. These 
conceptual elements are the key drivers behind the formation of national 
SAR policies.1 However, what is the reasoning for countries to provide a 
search and rescue program to begin with? The foundation of national SAR 
programs and policies around the world is the legal basis for countries to 
provide search and rescue services. 
There are multiple international conventions which stipulate the duties 
of a member state to provide search and rescue services. Based on what 
conventions states are party to, they are required to institute SAR programs to 
satisfy their various obligations as parties. International conventions with 
search and rescue articles often outline only the basic requirements that states 
are to provide, rather than an exhaustive list of obligations to fulfil. As a 
result, there is a great variety in the extent and scope of national SAR 
 
1 Bernard Funston, ‘Emergency Preparedness in Canada’s North: An Examination of 
Community Capacity’ (2014) 6. 
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programs occurring between countries. Additionally, best practices and 
policies for states is unique to themselves, and they may thus determine how 
best to proceed with their program based on their own individual 
circumstances. Determining if a state has ‘met’ its legal obligations therefore 
becomes somewhat subjective.  
Normally, assessing the fulfilment by states of legal obligations within 
international law is challenging. Within domestic common law systems such 
as Canada (with the exception of Quebec), assessing critical gaps in the 
fulfilment of legal obligations may be done so by examining case law.  
Comparing cases in which participants have been found negligent or falling 
short of their legal obligations are then utilised as a comparative method to 
identify critical gaps and liability. Within Arctic search and rescue however, 
there are very few (if any) domestic or international cases concerned with the 
fulfilment of SAR obligations. Therefore, how do we assess whether an 
Arctic country is meeting its legal requirements to provide search and rescue 
in its area of responsibility (AOR)?  
To answer this question, the Arctic country of Canada will be 
examined. Since the author has encountered a deficit in precedents and case 
law regarding this topic, this study will instead examine Canada’s ‘efforts’ as 
a way to gauge the fulfilment of its legal responsibilities. These efforts will 
take form as two separate areas of study: (1) Canada’s domestic law and 
legislation, and (2) Canada’s due-diligence efforts and measures pertaining to 
Arctic search and rescue. 
Within the analysis section of this thesis, the author will also be 
utilising the legal concept of due diligence as a method to measure Canada's 
efforts. Employing due diligence as a yardstick will be a concept explored in 
this thesis in an effort to try and quantify Canada's effort for analysis. It 
should be noted that the depth in which due diligence can be explored is 
limited by the scope of this study.  
 First, Canada’s international legal responsibilities to provide search 
and rescue will be catalogued to illustrate the full extent of its international 
obligations. These various SAR treaties and articles will then be matched 
with Canada’s corresponding domestic laws and legislation to verify the 
extent of Canada’s formal ratification efforts. Establishing that domestic laws 
exist to corroborate Canada's ratification efforts is relatively straightforward. 
Much more difficult is establishing the adequate fulfilment of substantive 
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obligations. There are no standard measurements or thresholds to meet when 
determining sufficiency of fulfilment. Therefore, alternative measures must 
be utilised as indicators of Canada’s fulfilment of its legal obligations. For 
this reason, Canada’s due diligence efforts (policies, procedures and 
operational practices) regarding search and rescue will be analysed as a 
secondary component. As evidenced by other areas of international law, due 
diligence may serve as one component in determining the degree of a 
country’s efforts to fulfil its various legal obligations.2 
There is a difference between assessing Canada’s efforts to meet 
requirements and assessing the performance of Canada’s SAR regime.3 
Evaluating the performance of SAR regimes is concerned with the operative 
component of search and rescue, examining data, results and logistical 
information to determine the success of a particular SAR regime. Due to 
limitations on scope, this thesis will not examine the performance of 
Canada’s Arctic SAR program. Rather, this thesis will focus on the 
substantive (legal) component of Canada’s search and rescue program to 
simply answer the question: is Canada meeting its international requirements 
for providing search and rescue in the Arctic?  
This thesis will focus only on the maritime region of Nunavut. The 
SAR structure of Canada designates land-based emergencies to be addressed 
through provincial or territorial agencies, rather than federal operators. 
Search and Rescue in the maritime areas of the Canadian Arctic is governed 
and managed jointly by the Canadian Coast Guard (marine) and the Canadian 
Armed Forces (air). Although the Canadian Arctic features land and land-
based emergencies, this thesis will only address marine emergencies as they 
fall under federal jurisdiction. The two agencies examined in this study as it 
pertains to maritime search and rescue in Nunavut will be the Canadian Coast 
Guard (CCG) and the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF). Although aeronautical 
emergencies happen both on land and at sea in the Canadian Arctic, this 
thesis will focus exclusively on maritime emergencies and discuss only very 
briefly aeronautical emergencies if they are to occur in Nunavut’s maritime 
 
2 Due diligence is a generally accepted concept in areas of international law such as 
environmental law and human rights law. States must understand and manage 
possible hazards and initiate preventative action to prevent harm. Due diligence 
efforts are thus examples of intent of the state.  
3 A.K. Sydnes et al, ‘International Cooperation on Search and Rescue in the Arctic’ 
(2017) Arctic Review on Law and Politics 109, 126. 
 4
region. This thesis will be concerned with the field of air/sea search and 
rescue and disregard other types of search and rescue and terrains.  
For the purposes of restricting scope, this thesis will deal exclusively 
with SAR as the prevention of loss of human life. This study will not assess 
or address the environmental component of Arctic search and rescue or the 
various additional environmental conventions to which Canada is a party.  
There are a number of limitations to acknowledge regarding this study. 
The first is the amount of information analysed during the researching of this 
thesis. While the author is confident in the scope of documents examined and 
research conducted, constraints on the scale and time of this thesis project 
prevents an exhaustive scrutiny of all documents in existence pertaining to 
this topic.  
Secondly, due to limitations on scale, this thesis does not conduct an 
extensive nor comprehensive study into Canadian law and legal systems. 
This thesis is not meant as a legal tool or document to use in the overall 
examination of Canada’s legal conduct.  
The conclusions of this thesis cannot necessarily be applied to other search 
and rescue programs and are the subjective assessment of a single scholar.  
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2 Introduction: SAR in the Canadian 
Arctic  
 
2.1 What is Arctic SAR?  
 
Generally, search and rescue as it occurs around the world can be understood 
in its basic form as: "comprising the search for, and provision of aid to, 
persons, ships, and other craft which are, or are feared to be, in distress or 
imminent danger".4 There are numerous types of emergencies and terrain in 
which an emergency posing a threat to human life may occur. As a result, 
there are different types and sub-fields of search and rescue, including but not 
limited to: mountain search and rescue, ground search and rescue (including 
urban search and rescues), combat search and rescue on the battlefield and 
air-sea rescue on the water.5 For Canada, the main national search and rescue 
objective is to:  
 
"Prevent loss of life and injury through SAR alerting, responding and 
aiding activities that use public and private sources. Where possible 
and directly related thereto, reasonable efforts will be made to 
minimize damage to or loss of property. Through prevention measures 
focused on owners and operators most commonly involved in SAR 
incidents, the National SAR Program will attempt to reduce the 
number and severity of SAR incidents."6 
 
 
4 National Defence Fisheries Oceans Canada ‘National Search and Rescue Manual’ 
(2000) 3.  
5 National Defence Fisheries and Oceans Canada, ‘Canadian Aeronautical and 
Maritime Search and Rescue Manual’ (CAMSAR) (2014) Sec. I-1.01 (E) p.1 of 2.  
6 ibid.   
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How is Arctic search and rescue different from search and rescue in other 
regions of the world? Arctic search and rescue still has the same objective as 
other search and rescue systems globally – to prevent the loss of life. Arctic 
SAR features the same system of cooperation between national SAR 
programs found in all regions the world.  However, there are different factors 
within the Arctic that affect the functionality of Arctic SAR and how 
countries approach SAR in the North.  
The Arctic is a distinctive operating environment, and raises its own 
unique set of challenges regarding effective search and rescue. The Arctic 
region is a vast, geographical area spanning multiple countries to include 
both the Arctic Ocean and encircling northern land masses. There are 
multiple ways to define or delineate the boundaries of the Arctic; 
ecologically, politically or anthropologically for example (Figure 1). The 
Arctic defined by the ecological boundary is found at the 66 33’47.5N 
latitude, and is the common boundary to utilise in the scientific studying of 
the Arctic region.7 The political boundary however (known as the Arctic 
Circle) is usually employed in the social studies of the Arctic region. The 
territorial limits of which includes all water and land situated north of 66 
33'N.8 The Arctic area maintains a distinct climate, biology and ecology, 
separate from other regions found around the world.  
The Arctic region is most notably characterised by its cold climate and 
remoteness. For vessels, aircrafts and people operating in the Arctic, the 
North is fraught with difficulties and risks. Living, operating and working in 
the Arctic has always been difficult, and will continue to prove challenging 
due to winter darkness, remoteness, weather, limited infrastructure, under-
developed navigation and communication services, among other factors.9 
Due to these special challenges, Arctic search and rescue has evolved to meet 
these challenges, and features a greater cooperative effort between nations 
than elsewhere in the world. Recognizing the inherent uniqueness of polar 
conditions demands a different approach to search and rescue. As a result, 
nations, operators and SAR actors and have purpose-built a search and rescue 
 
7 As of February 28th 2019, the boundary of the Arctic Circle is 66 33’47.5.  
8 Arctic Council Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme (AMAP), ‘Arctic 
Boundaries’ (Arctic Council) <https://arctic-council.org/images/PDFattachments-
/Maps/boundaries.pdf> accessed 14 April 2019.  
9 Funston (n 1) 7, a comprehensive list of the risks facing Arctic operations and 
Arctic search and rescue is provided in the following section. 
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system to reflect the unique problems of SAR operations in the Arctic. As 
human activity in the Arctic increases, a large component of the Arctic search 
and rescue regime revolves around emergency preparedness, not only 
emergency response.  
 
 
 
Figure 1. The Various Arctic Boundaries 10 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The boundaries of the various definitions of the Arctic, including the 
'political' boundary (blue) the 'ecological boundary' (red) and the 'human' 
boundary (green). 
 
10 Arctic Council Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme (AMAP), 
‘Arctic Boundaries’ (Arctic Council) <https://arctic-council.org/images/PDF-
attachments/Maps/boundaries.pdf> accessed 14 April 2019.  
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In addition to environmental differences, Arctic search and rescue is unique 
in the respect that it features a regional search and rescue specific treaty. The 
Agreement on Cooperation on Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue 
in the Arctic (the Arctic SAR Agreement) considers the special 
circumstances of conducting SAR in the Arctic, and goes one step further 
than other international SAR conventions to adjust for Arctic challenges. 
Signed in Greenland in 2011, this supplementary convention was the first 
legally binding agreement negotiated under the auspices of the Arctic 
Council and addresses the ability of the parties to provide mutual assistance 
and conduct joint SAR operations.11 The Arctic Council SAR Agreement 
assigns an area of the Arctic for which each party member is responsible for 
assuming the lead on operations when responding to search and rescue 
incidents. Notably, the Arctic Council SAR Agreement also commits 
member states to address the growing SAR needs in the Arctic region. 12  
 
 
Types of Arctic Emergencies 
 
A large component of search and rescue is concerned with the safety of 
human life in emergency situations. Arctic emergencies can involve both 
local and outside operators. Arctic emergencies caused by the activities of 
community residents or other northern residents are usually dealt with by 
local services in the normal course of life within the North. The sorts of 
emergencies typically managed by local authorities and infrastructure include 
lost or stranded residents or tourists, small vessel rescues, medical 
emergencies as well as emergencies caused by weather or other natural 
events in or near communities.13 Such events are usually within the normal 
scope of incidents for northern communities, and their capacity to attend to 
these local incidents is generally by way of standard services already in 
 
11 Sydnes et al (n 3) 111. 
12 Arctic Council, ‘Task Force on Search and Rescue’ (Arctic Council, 1 January 
2016) <https://arctic-council.org/index.php/en/task-force/71-tf-sar> accessed 3 
November 2018.   
13 Funston (n 1) 8.  
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place.14 Even if improvements can be made, national search and rescue 
programs prepare for certain frequencies and scales of emergencies. 
Anything outside this realm risks taxing or, in some cases, far exceeding the 
local search and rescue capacities. In this regard, Arctic emergencies caused 
by non-residents or external operators are of far greater concern. Often ill-
equipped to address large-scale emergency events, local communities can be 
unable to effectively manage emergencies involving high amounts of people. 
Unfit to absorb large numbers of non-residents (say in the case of a cruise 
ship stranding), these events can cause food, shelter, and fuel shortages 
among other issues.15 The sudden appearance of stranded passengers in 
Kugluktuk from the grounded cruise ship Clipper Adventurer in 2010 is an 
example of this sort of “inundation event”. The stranding of Clipper 
Adventurer alerted Canadian authorities to the gap in the local capacity for 
dealing with such large-scale events from outside operators.16 In reference to 
this issue, the importance of maintaining an over-arching, effective national 
search and rescue program becomes apparent. There is a need for ice-breaker 
vessels, airplanes and national coordination services to fill the gaps in local 
capabilities. This is key to successfully address incidents of scale throughout 
the Canadian Arctic, especially those occurring far from existing services. 
Arctic countries are somewhat prepared for emergency situations in the 
Arctic region. There is high awareness of the challenges involved and 
contingency planning has been set in place for big events. Much of this 
comes from institutional/historical knowledge of SAR risks and operations in 
Arctic regions.17 However, all eight Arctic nations have agreed amongst 
themselves and gone on record to express the overall need for better search 
and rescue services in the Arctic.18 
In addition to marine accidents and local emergencies, other SAR 
emergencies that can occur in the Arctic may involve: industries (such as 
drilling platform accidents), aircraft accidents, or land based human activities 
 
14 ibid 19.   
15 Brad Judson, “Trends in Canadian Arctic Shipping Traffic-Myths and 
Rumours” (2010) In The Twentieth International Offshore and Polar Engineering 
Conference International Society of Offshore and Polar Engineers 5.  
16 Funston (n 1) 20.  
17 Emmi Ikonon, ‘Arctic Search and Rescue Capabilities Survey; Enhancing 
International Cooperation 2017’ (2017) Finnish Border Guard 11.    
18 ibid.   
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(such as land-based tourism). The combinations and types of emergencies are 
therefore endless, which is something that makes it difficult to be prepared.  
In Canada, emergencies are not always easy to define. In the context of 
search and rescue, the Government of Canada’s Quadrennial Search and 
Rescue Review recognizes that: 
 
"Information on the rate of search and rescue incidents, their nature, 
and the effectiveness of the National Search and Rescue Program 
response varies widely from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. At the most 
fundamental level, there is no commonly used definition of what 
constitutes a “SAR incident."19  
 
Nonetheless, for the purposes of this study, a SAR incident will be referred to 
as an emergency (marine, aeronautical or land-based) in which the safety of 
human life is directly threatened. As mentioned in the scope, this thesis will 
only address emergencies occurring in the marine territories of Nunavut. 
Arctic Operators and Risks  
Operators   
When discussing Arctic operations, we should recognize (1) the distinct types 
of operators in the region and (2) the varying levels of maritime activities 
throughout the different parts of the Arctic.  
Firstly, there are distinct types of maritime operators in the Arctic 
region. Overall, the primary sorts of operators in the Arctic are: tourism, 
transportation and destination shipping, resource extraction and exploration 
industries, science and research, military, and local operators such as 
domestic industry and resident activity. The corresponding vessels for each 
operator in the Arctic include tourism-related vessels, transport vessels such 
as liquefied natural gas (LNG) and oil tankers, bulk ships and container 
vessels, offshore service and exploration vessels, research vessels, naval 
fleets including submarines, and personal pleasure crafts (Figure 2).20  
Secondly, Arctic waters experience different types of activity 
depending on the possibilities of each economic area and corresponding 
 
19 Funston (n 1) 10. 
20 Ikonon (n 17) 4.    
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national interests.21 For example, the Russian Barents Sea experiences cargo 
and shipping traffic related to mining and oil and gas transport, in line with 
Russia’s vision of developing the Northern Sea Route (NSR), whereas 
Svalbard is experiencing an increase in tourism traffic, and Canada’s 
Northern waters are mainly traversed in order to re-supply communities and 
actively used for local fishing and hunting.22 Most of the determining factors 
of regional operator traffic and types are related to the environment, 
including factors such as sea-state conditions and sea ice affecting 
accessibility or navigability/bathymetry of particular sea routes. The sea 
conditions and climate of the Arctic region are far from uniform. The variety 
of regional differences in the Arctic is immense. In some areas of the Arctic, 
for example the Canadian Arctic, the extent of sea ice coverage and 
shallowness of the internal waterways make an it an unlikely area to develop 
for large-scale shipping, compared to the relatively deep and ice-free 
Northern Sea Route.23  
However, there are additional factors that determine where industry 
and maritime traffic occurs. Geopolitical and governance factors such as 
regulatory frameworks and environmental protection have influence. The 
recent moratorium on offshore oil and gas development in the Arctic by 
Canada for example, will temporarily prevent extractive industry build-up 
despite potential interest.24 The infrastructure factors and the speed with 
which new infrastructure develops will also dictate where marine traffic will 
occur. For the most part, marine operators require at least some basic 
infrastructure, despite being somewhat self-supporting. Ports to refuel and 
exchange goods are required to support certain shipping activities, along with 
rescue and support infrastructure to provide safety. In this sense, the degree 
of infrastructure in a particular region is connected to operator traffic in the 
different Arctic regions. Other external factors, such global market demands 
 
21 ibid 3.  
22 ibid 4.  
23 Ikonon (n 17) 4. 
24 Dan Healing, ‘Canada, U.S. to Ban Offshore Oil and Gas Licences in Arctic 
Waters’ (CTV News, 20 December 2016). 
<https://www.ctvnews.ca/canada/canada-u-s-to-ban-offshore-oil-and-gas-
licences-in-arctic-waters-1.3211436> accessed 3 November 2018  
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and financial profitability as well as sector specific demand, may also affect 
where nations establish infrastructure.25  
 
 
Figure 2. Description of Vessel Types Found in Arctic Canada  
 
 
 
 
Risks  
There are a series of key challenges that may affect maritime operations in all 
areas of the Arctic. These challenges are major risks for operating in polar 
waters and include long distances, severe and uncertainty of weather, 
remoteness, ice and cold conditions, poor communication networks, lack of 
infrastructure and a lack of search and rescue resources in the region. 
 
25 Ikonon (n 17) 4. 
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As a marine operational environment, the Arctic is often characterized 
as complex and risky. Despite the different regional environments, all parts 
of the Arctic can expect the presence of these challenges. However, there are 
differences in the degree and frequency in which these challenges may occur 
from region to region. The risk and incident types vary between different 
Arctic countries which all possess their own characteristics, such as their 
location, level of human activity, ice and weather conditions, uncharted 
waters and infrastructure in their Arctic region. For example, vessels sailing 
in Northern Norway or Svalbard in the summer can be fairly certain to sail in 
open seas, so being stranded by ice is less of a risk, whereas the risk of 
grounding, fire, and difficult weather should be carefully assessed. The risk 
of an oil spill from offshore oil and gas fields might also be more of a priority 
for Norway and Russia than for, say, Greenland. Then again, for Greenland, 
uncharted and shallow waters as well as ice conditions result in groundings, 
collisions with ice and, in many cases, hull damage to boats. As some parts of 
the Arctic, such as Northern Canada, have very little activity and sparse 
populations, the risk levels and possibilities of major incidents are also low. 
As another example, the Northern Baltic Sea is fairly busy, so the risk of 
colliding with other vessels and of fire on board is highly relevant.26     
Maritime Traffic  
Current Arctic Maritime Traffic  
In 2015, Canada’s international marine trade was valued at $205 billion.27 
With three distinct coastlines, Canada has and will likely remain heavily 
reliant upon marine trade and transport. Canada’s Arctic, consisting of 
remote communities and complex waterway networks, is heavily dependent 
on the marine transportation and shipping industry. Indeed, most of the cargo 
ships in Canada’s North are currently tasked with the resupplying of northern 
communities. However, many types of marine vessels currently operate in the 
Canadian Arctic, contributing to the overall marine traffic in the Canadian 
 
26  Ikonon (n 17) 10.  
27 Jackie Dawson, Larissa Pizzolato, Stephen Howell, Luke Copland, and 
Margaret E. Johnston, ‘Temporal and Spatial Patterns of Ship Traffic in the 
Canadian Arctic from 1990 to 2015’ (See Article Tools) (2018) Arctic 71 15-26, 
15.   
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Arctic. The fastest growing marine shipping sector in Arctic Canada, for 
example, is that of pleasure/passenger ships.  
 
 
Future Arctic Maritime Traffic  
Given the rapid warming of the Arctic region and the increased activity of 
operators, Arctic maritime traffic is expected to continuously increase. In 
order to plan safe shipping corridors, develop infrastructure, predict shipping 
trends and allocate resources accordingly, consistent data for marine traffic in 
Arctic Canada is required. Unfortunately, there exists very little in the way of 
temporal and special shipping data for Canada’s North. The lack of statistical 
information on this matter has, some argue, slowed pre-emptive development 
with regards to preparatory government action. Recognising this critical gap, 
researchers from the University of Calgary set out to document and publish 
ship traffic patterns in Canada’s Arctic from 1990 to 2015. Looking identify 
the trends and areas of future growth, this study determined that “the distance 
travelled by ships in Arctic Canada nearly tripled (from 364179km in 1990 to 
918266 km in 2015), that the largest proportion of ship traffic in the region is 
from general cargo vessels and government icebreakers (including research 
ships), and that the fastest growing vessel type by far is pleasure craft (private  
yachts).”28 The study was also able to link particular vessel traffic growth 
with specific geographical areas, noting that “spatial shifts in vessel activity 
over the last quarter century have favoured areas with active mine sites, as 
well as the southern route of the Northwest Passage. As a result, some 
communities, including Baker Lake, Chesterfield Inlet, Pond Inlet, and 
Cambridge Bay, are experiencing greater increases in ship traffic.”29 
The seasons for Arctic maritime operations, such as shipping and 
tourism, are not only extending in length but the accessibility of the Arctic 
for activities such as resource extraction and infrastructure build-up is also 
increasing. Additionally, new technological innovations and vessel designs 
offer icebreaking capacity to cargo ships, cruise vessels and research vessels, 
effectively extending their operational season and activity beyond what was 
their former range.30 Although perhaps the increased accessibility of the 
Arctic Ocean is the “new normal” to expect in the future of Arctic operations, 
 
28 Dawson, et al (n 27) 15. 
29 ibid. 
30 Ikonon (n 17) 13. 
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it is still a recent notion. The result is that suddenly, emergency preparedness 
authorities must be ready to extend their seasonal presence in parts of the 
region where the fleet might would otherwise be in service only during the 
summer.31 As search and rescue is primarily concerned with the safety of 
human life, the increase in cruise vessel traffic is one of the key concerns for 
many Arctic countries, especially as such vessels are growing in size and 
passenger counts. In the summer of 2016, the cruise liner MV Crystal 
Serenity sailed the Northwest Passage with more than 1000 passengers and 
some 500 crew. The unprecedented transit of a vessel this scale through the 
Passage was one of the most discussed and observed developments regarding 
Arctic maritime traffic.32 Since 2004, the Northwest Passage has seen a 166% 
increase in vessel traffic.33 Although contingency planning and emergency 
preparedness were carefully considered and rehearsed, the voyage still raised 
a great deal of concern for passenger safety and the environment. As the 
Crystal Serenity transit was a success, many have predicted a further increase 
in large cruise ships transiting through the Bearing Strait and Beaufort Sea. 
From a SAR perspective, the increase in tourism vessel traffic is probably the 
most worrying development in the Arctic. A large-scale emergency requiring 
a mass rescue operation (MRO) would be a worst possible scenario for Arctic 
nations, considering both the distances to the nearest coast guard stations and 
hospitals and the lack of shore-side services for rescued passengers.  
  
Challenges of Arctic Search and Rescue  
For the many risks to operators functioning in the Arctic regions, there is an 
equal number of challenges facing search and rescue in the Arctic. In 2017, 
the Arctic Coast Guard Forum (ACGF), a multi-national cooperative 
organization for Arctic search and rescue, conducted a survey that concluded 
a comprehensive list of challenges and problems of Arctic SAR (figure 3).   
 
 
 
31 Ikonon (n 17) 5. 
32 ibid 7. 
33 Harry Wilson, ‘Mapping Arctic Corridors’ (Canadian Geographic, 6 July 
2016) <https://www.canadiangeographic.ca/article/mapping-arctic-corridors> 
accessed 8 October 2018.  
 16 
 
 
Figure 3. Arctic Coast Guard Forum (ACGF) identified challenges of 
Arctic SAR 
 
1.  Long distances, limited presence of resources and lack of 
infrastructure pose the main challenges for Arctic 
maritime and aeronautical search and rescue, from both 
national and international perspectives. 
2.  Severe weather, darkness and ice conditions are an 
inevitable part of the Arctic operational environment, but 
create enhanced risks and challenge for Arctic SAR 
operations. 
3.  The gap in communications networks and connections is 
recognised. There is a need for a proper satellite 
broadband connection, satellite AIS, radio towers and 
other communications infrastructure to support SAR 
operations. From the perspective of international 
cooperation, this impedes situational awareness and 
efficient coordination during multinational operations. 
4.  The challenge involved in sharing information 
internationally, between authorities, and with other 
stakeholders, is identified. 
5.  The development of survival and rescue equipment for 
survival in Arctic conditions, particularly when 
abandoning ship in icy seas, should be further encouraged. 
6.  Most Arctic countries have limited capacity to host 
patients near possible accident locations. Related issues 
include hospital capacity, lack of medical help, patient 
registration, and the coordination of foreign patients, 
particularly if they do not share languages in common. 
7.  There is no comprehensive education plan specifically 
intended for Arctic SAR. Most Arctic countries are 
interested in developing joint courses and training specific 
to Arctic conditions. 
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8.  Knowledge of Arctic SAR capacities and the active 
participation of the industry in Arctic maritime safety 
issues could be improved. Greater cooperation with 
private operators would also leverage the understanding 
of well-planned Arctic shipping and tourism.34 
 
With respect to Arctic search and rescue, it is important to differentiate 
between the type and scale of incidents. Large cruise vessels are of the 
greatest concern to search and rescue authorities and, in the event of an 
incident would require extensive national and international efforts. Mass 
rescue operations (MROs) such as groundings or fires on board large cruise 
vessels often struggle to find enough resources to cope with the scale of the 
emergency situation.35 Due to their remoteness and small size, most Arctic 
communities have a limited capacity to host patients near possible accident 
locations. A lack of hospital capacity, lack of medical help, issues in 
registration of patients, and the coordination of foreign patients (particularly 
if they do not speak the same language) are all limitations to consider. Small 
communities rarely have large hospitals with the capacity to host an entire 
cruise ship full of passengers and so such mass rescue operations and major 
incidents near small communities in the Arctic could be overwhelming and 
take up communities’ own resources.36 
As maritime activity increases in the Arctic region, the risk of a major 
emergency event becomes more likely. If an MRO incident were to occur in 
the Arctic, the Arctic countries have acknowledged that any one country's 
SAR capabilities would not be adequate in handling the incident alone.37 
 Other types of incidents to occur in the Arctic may include smaller 
vessels and accidents or incidents occurring on sea ice.38 
 
 
 
34 Ikonon (n 17) 47. 
35 Ikonon (n 17) 21. 
36 ibid 23.   
37 ibid.  
38 Sea ice, while reflecting similar properties as land terrain, is for operational and 
legal purposes regarded water, thus the sea. As technically the sea, sea ice and 
incidents on sea ice fall under the jurisdiction of federal search and rescue.  
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2.2 Future Risks and Importance  
 
Arctic search and rescue has always been important, especially to those living 
and operating in Northern latitudes. For them, the accessibility and existence 
of an adequate search and rescue program is a critical component of life in 
the North. The involvement of indigenous peoples in the federal search and 
rescue program will be examined in a later section.  
Arctic coastal states recognize that the continuation of Arctic search 
and rescue programs are a necessity for the safety of their citizens, and 
improvements to the program are constantly being pursued and explored. 
Canada’s North, along with other nations, is experiencing an outflow of 
people from smaller communities to larger cities. With (often) young people 
pursuing opportunities in the larger metropolises, the population decline 
experienced by some small Arctic communities is acutely felt by way cultural 
loss and economic deterioration. Despite efforts to combat the loss of 
populations from rural areas of the Arctic, it is expected to continue into the 
foreseeable future.39 While smaller communities may be experiencing 
population loss, people may not necessarily be migrating out from the Arctic 
region itself. Although the rural populations of the Arctic are unlikely to 
increase, the distribution of where people are moving is not exactly uniform, 
nor easily predictable. Still, this does not imply that countries may get away 
with lesser search and rescue programs for their localities in the future. While 
reforms may be made to accommodate changes in population demographics, 
countries will always be required to provide an adequate SAR service so long 
as there are people living there.  
 Regardless of the changes in population distributions in the Arctic, the 
growing trend in the number and variety of outside operators in the Arctic is 
recognised and absolute. The Arctic SAR Agreement was meant to reflect the 
Arctic region’s growing economic significance as a result of its improved 
 
39 Gregory F. Finnegan, ‘Canadian interprovincial employees in the Canadian 
Arctic: a case study in fly-in/fly-out employment metrics, 2004-2009’ (2014) 
Polar Geography Vol. 38 175.  
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accessibility due to global warming.40 Although created in 2011 to address 
this growing trend, the 8 years since its conception has only seen a greater 
increase in Arctic economic activity.41 Now more than ever, the importance 
of adequate Arctic search and rescue is abundantly clear. National search and 
rescue programs require progress to accommodate this unparalleled regional 
growth.  
There are many ways in which coastal states are seeking to shore-up 
their Arctic search and rescue. Some countries have chosen to increase 
national expenditure, targeting domestic infrastructure and expanding 
budgets in the North as a method to address growing Arctic activities.42 Other 
countries are taking alternative approaches apart from straightforward capital 
spending. Canada, for example, has made large efforts to streamline its SAR 
operations and procedures in an effort to increase effectiveness, and have 
generated a huge body of “paperwork” to this effect.43 Each nation is 
experiencing separate and unique industry build-up within its Arctic borders. 
With potential revenues from the oil and gas sector as well as possibilities in 
shipping, tourism, research, mining and fisheries, these activities are growing 
as viable industries to increase operations across different Arctic maritime 
domains.44 The different approaches by nations to address this aside, all 
Arctic nations are firm on the same opinion that Arctic search and rescue 
needs to advance in order to address the growing concerns of an 
industrialized Arctic.45 To achieve this, Arctic nations have long recognised 
the need for international and regional collaboration. Not only to flesh out 
 
40 Farré Buixadé, Scott R. Albert, Linling Chen, Michael Czub, Ying Dai, Denis 
Demchev, Yaroslav Efimov, et al, ‘Commercial Arctic Shipping through the 
Northeast Passage: routes, resources, governance, technology, and infrastructure’ 
(2014) Polar Geography 37.4, 298-324. 
41 Arctic Council 2011, ‘Agreement on Cooperation on Aeronautical and 
Maritime Search and Rescue in the Arctic’ Arctic Council Secretariat, Tromsø; 
Norway, Art 2 (Arctic SAR Agreement) 
42 Jane Taber ‘Harper breaks ice on Arctic sovereignty’ (The Globe and Mail, 
Updated 22 April 2018) <https://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/national-
/harper-breaks-ice-on-arctic-soveriegnty/article991511/> accessed 22 September 
2018. 
43 Funston (n 1) 17.  
44 Ikonon (n 17) 1.  
45 Emmi Ikonan and Irene Andreassen, ‘Report from the Fourth Joint Arctic SAR 
Workshop and TTX’ (2019) Association of Arctic Expedition Cruise Operators 
(AECO).  
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any operational deficiencies for search and rescue incidents, but to contribute 
to the overall Arctic SAR regime and common institutional knowledge. This 
has resulted in several cooperative achievements being realised in the 
standardising and operation of Arctic search and rescue. Countries have 
committed efforts in a variety of forms to fortify Arctic SAR collaboration 
through information sharing and exercises which act as the centrepiece of 
practical cooperation.46  
 The rapidly changing Arctic environment is continuing to contribute 
significantly to major physical, ecological, social, and economic changes in 
the North. The trajectory of Arctic industry development is primarily the 
result of the changing physiology and accessibility of the Arctic ocean. The 
maritime areas in the Arctic region are experiencing an increase in the 
amount of marine and aeronautical traffic, as a report from the Arctic Coast 
Guard Forum (ACGF) surmises: “Not only during the summer season when 
the sea ice extent is decreasing, passages and lanes open up, the days are 
longer and the operating environment seems manageable, but also during the 
winter season.”47  
The Arctic Climate Impact Assessment (ACIA) found a 2 million 
square decrease in Arctic sea ice coverage in half of a century, with some 
climate change models predicting a plausible Arctic Ocean ice-free period 
during the summer season as early as 2040, if not sooner.48 The ACIA 
identifies rising Arctic temperatures to cause the melting of Arctic multi-year 
sea ice in addition to decreased first-year sea ice coverage and thickness.49 As 
a result, extended periods of navigation and increased access to sea routes in 
the Arctic ocean is projected, with the Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment 
(AMSA) concluding an increased feasibility and possibility of growing 
commercial shipping in the Arctic.50 The decrease in sea ice coverage has 
generated great interest in the possibility of new industries, such as the 
utilisation of new and existing shipping routes for shorter transit times in the 
interest of saving fuel and valuable time. The continuous loss of sea ice is 
 
46 Sydnes et al (n 3) 127. 
47 Ikonon (n 17) 10.  
48 Arctic Climate Impact Assessment, Impacts of a Warming Arctic-Arctic 
Climate Impact Assessment (first published 2004, Cambridge University Press) 
144. 
49 ibid.  
50 Arctic Council, 'Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment Report 2009' (2009). 
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predicted to yield an increased length of the summer navigation season, and a 
decrease in the coverage and thickness of first-year sea ice. Projections of 
changing conditions by the middle of the current century predict transpolar 
routes bypassing the North East Passage and Northwest Passage to become 
commercially viable.51  
However, despite the changing Arctic climate and its promise of 
increased accessibility, there are other operational risks that manifest 
alongside. The Arctic ocean, for example, is predicted to remain ice-infested 
with icebergs, bergy-bits and growlers in the summer months despite the term 
"ice-free". The decrease in sea ice is likely to increase the obstacles to ships, 
such as more volatile weather and storms, and unpredictable conditions 
especially with regards to shipping routes, which face increased remoteness 
and distance from search and rescue capabilities. While sea ice melt may 
present apparent opportunities in increased accessibility for current seas that 
are ice-prone, such as the coasts of Greenland, Canada and Russia, dramatic 
melt may contribute to new operational challenges.52 Sea ice increases ocean 
surface stability and its reduction is expected to result in larger waves due to 
increased fetch distances, likely causing an increase in severe storms while at 
sea, posing new hazards to Arctic maritime operations.53 
The increase in operations in the Arctic requires more competence and 
capabilities from the industry, governments and volunteer organizations 
regarding safety and preparedness in the Arctic region.54 Although the 
intensity of maritime traffic in the Arctic remains low, activity levels will 
increase as climate change and new technology offers more opportunities for 
vessel traffic in the region. The possibilities of incidents in the maritime 
Arctic will increase alongside this development. 
Another smaller but equally growing risk group involves adventure 
tourists attempting to cross Arctic waters or ice sheets on kayaks, skis and 
sometimes even jet skis, for example. In recent years, there have been cases 
involving kayakers in the Bearing Strait and a group attempting to cross the 
 
51 Charles Emmerson and Glada Lahn, ‘Arctic opening: Opportunity and risk in 
the high north’ (Lloyd’s, 2012) 31. 
52 Malte Humpert and Andreas Raspotnik, 'The future of Arctic shipping along 
the transpolar sea route', Arctic Year Book 2012(1), 281-307, 281. 
53 Emmerson and Lahn (n 51) 33. 
54 ibid.     
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Northwest Passage on jet skis. Both groups became stranded by ice and the 
Coast Guard was called out for rescue operations.55 56 
2.3 Nunavut’s SAR Challenges  
Nunavut’s Composition  
 
Canada’s coastline is the longest of any country in the world.57 58 The bulk of 
the Arctic coastline is covered by the territory of Nunavut, situated between 
the latitudes of 70.2998° N, 83.1076° W. Nunavut comprises 1,936,113 km2 
of land and 157,077 km2 of water in Canada’s North.59 The majority of 
Nunavut is comprised of national parks and reserves divided into three 
distinct physiographic regions, the Hudson Bay Lowlands, the Canadian 
Shield and the Arctic Lands.60 Nunavut’s Arctic archipelago contains 5 of the 
world’s 30 largest islands and an incredible variety of distinct marine 
environments (Figure 4). The Canadian Arctic has a vast and incredible 
coastline and marine territory to service.61 Although the second least 
 
55 Maisie Thomas, ‘Coast Guard Rescues British Explorer from Bering Strait 
Waters’ (The Nome Nugget, 14 March 2016) 
<www.nomenugget.com/news/coast-guard-rescues-british-explorers-bering-
strait-waters> accessed 14 February 2019.   
56 Tristin Hopper ‘Reality TV stars crossing Northwest Passage on jet skis forced 
to cancel Arctic trek after costly rescue’ (The National Post, 13 September 2013) 
<https://nationalpost.com/news/canada/crew-filming-reality-tv-show-forced-to-
cancel-trek-through-northwest-passage-on-jet-skis-after-costly-rescue> accessed 
14 February 2019.  
57 Canadian Coast Guard, ‘Arctic Coast Guard Forum, Member States: 
Canada’(Arctic Coast Guard Forum, 2017) <https://arcticcoastguardforum.com-
/member-country/canada> accessed 14 November 2018.    
58 Canada’s coastline is the world’s longest, measuring 243,042 km (including 
mainland coast and the coasts of offshore islands).  
59 Peter Kikkert, ‘Nunavut’ (The Canadian Encyclopedia, last edited 11 July 
2019) <https://thecanadianencyclopedia.ca/en/article/nunavut> accessed 15 July 
2019.  
60 ibid. 
61 Nunavut's large islands include: Baffin (the largest island in Canada and fifth 
largest in the world), Ellesmere, Devon, Axel Heiberg and Prince of 
Wales. Victoria and Melville islands, also among the largest 30 islands in the 
world, are split between Nunavut and the Northwest Territories. The Archipelago 
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populated region in Canada, Nunavut still maintains a population of 35,944 
residents, approximately 85 percent of which are Inuit distributed in 25 
communities across Nunavut.62 63 As mentioned earlier, Arctic communities 
are experiencing population declines, with residents migrating to larger 
localities for better opportunities. Nunavut is no exception, with smaller 
communities in the Arctic Archipelago of Canada experiencing an outflow of 
residents. While this continues to be the case, Nunavut does maintain the 
highest fertility rate in Canada (an average of 2.9 children per women) and 
the resulting increase in Nunavut’s population has also earned the distinction 
of the youngest populace in Canada.64 Many of the communities in Nunavut 
border the Arctic Ocean and are considered to be remote and isolated from 
large-scale amenities, accessible only by air and sea.65
 
is divided into northern and southern halves by the Parry Channel, which runs 
from Lancaster Sound on the eastern fringe to M’Clure Strait.  
62 Statistics Canada, ‘Census Profile, 2016 Census Nunavut and Canada’ 
(Statistics Canada, last modified 21 Jun 2019) <https://www12.statcan.gc.ca/-
census-recensement/2016/dp-pd/prof/details/Page.cfm?Lang=E&Geo1=PR&-
Code1=62&Geo2=&Code2=&Data=Count&SearchText=Nunavut&SearchType=
Begins&SearchPR=01&B1=All&GeoLevel=PR&GeoCode=62> accessed 15 
July 2019.  
63 The territory of Nunavut is dominated by National Parks and Reserves. 
Nunavut includes Auyuittuq National Park (19,089 km2), located near 
Pangnirtung on Baffin Island in the eastern Arctic; Quttinirpaaq National Park 
(37,775 km2), located on northern Ellesmere Island and formerly known as 
Ellesmere Island National Park Reserve; Sirmilik National Park (22,252 km2), 
located on the northern tip of Baffin Island near Pond Inlet; and Ukkusiksalik 
National Park (20,500 km2), located west of Repulse Bay. The NWT includes: 
Aulavik National Park (12,000 km2) located on Banks Island; Nááts'ihch'oh 
National Park Reserve (4,850 km2) adjoining Nahanni National Park Reserve to 
west; Nahanni National Park Reserve (30,050 km2), located in the southwest part 
of the Northwest Territories; Tuktut Nogait National Park (16,340 km2), located 
in the northeast corner of mainland Northwest Territories; Wood Buffalo 
National Park (44,807 km 2), Canada’s largest national park, straddling the 
NWT/Alberta border near Fort Smith, NWT; and the proposed Thaidene Nene 
National Park Reserve (30,000 km2), located at the east end of Great Slave Lake 
near Łutsel K’e. Yukon includes: Ivvavik National Park (10,168 km2), located in 
northern Yukon on the coast of the Beaufort Sea; Kluane National Park (22,013 
km2), located in southwestern Yukon; and Vuntut National Park (4,345 km2), 
located in northern Yukon adjacent to Ivvavik National Park. 
64 Kikkert (n 59).  
65 ibid. 
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Figure 4. Canada's Maritime Domains and Environments 
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Canada's Arctic Sovereignty Issue   
Canada's claim to sovereignty over its Arctic waters, although long-held 
(going back to at least 1969), is still the subject of controversy.66 Canada’s 
sovereignty claims over the terra firma in the Arctic Archipelago are 
uncontested. However, it also claims full sovereignty over the waters 
between the islands.67 Canada considers all of the water of the Canadian 
Arctic Archipelago as historic internal waters, including the Northwest 
Passage.68 In 1985, Canada drew strait baselines around its Arctic 
Archipelago, effectively declaring it all ‘internal waters’. The United States 
did not find any issue with Canada’s assertion per se. Rather, the United 
States argued that regardless of Canada’s declaration of internal waters, those 
waters contain ‘straits used for international navigation’. To this end, the 
status of the Northwest Passage was challenged by the United States. The 
United States protested by sending a ship through the Northwest Passage 
expressly to demonstrate their “freedom of navigation”. The United States 
argued for its designation as an international strait whereas Canada argues 
that the Northwest Passage should be under Canadian sovereignty as part of 
their internal waters.69 Following this disagreement, Canada proceeded to 
take the first step in shoring-up its claim to Arctic sovereignty by drawing 
straight baselines around its Arctic Archipelago in accordance with Articles 7 
and 46 of UNCLOS.70 While straight baselines would authorise complete 
Canadian sovereignty over the archipelago’s waters, they do not necessarily 
 
66 The dispute goes back to at least 1969, when Exxon Mobil, a US flagged 
company, sent a supertanker through the Canadian Arctic. During those times, 
territorial seas only extended 3 nautical miles from baselines. Also preceding the 
creation of Exclusive Economic Zones, the supertanker and US Northwind that 
was accompanying it were able to pass through under high seas jurisdiction. 
During that passage, the vessels encountered difficulties which led them into 
Canada’s 3 nautical mile territorial sea. Although Canada granted them 
permission after they had entered, this is generally acknowledged to mark the 
beginning of Canada’s concern over their Arctic sovereignty.  
67 Mark Killas, ‘The legality of Canada’s claims to the waters of its Arctic 
archipelago’ Ottawa L. Rev. 19 (1987) 95. 
68 Donat Pharand, ‘Canada’s Sovereignty Over the Northwest Passage’ (1989) 
Michigan Journal of International Law Vol.10(2) 653-678, 655.  
69 ibid 653. 
70 ibid.  
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exclude the Northwest Passage from being designated as an international 
strait. As an international straight, other states would have transit passage 
rights irrespective of Canada’s straight baselines.  
 Canada presents an alternative legal basis for its claims to full 
sovereignty over the Arctic Archipelago: land and waters undistinguished; 
historic title. This principle enables states to defend internal waters 
irrespective of geography if they can demonstrate state historical importance 
and use of the waters. Though not formally included in the Conventions, the 
legal requirements for the existence of historic waters are generally 
considered to be threefold: the exclusive exercise of State authority, long 
usage or the passage of time, and the acquiescence of foreign states.71 As 
Donat Pharand also remarks “there is the matter of burden of proof.”72 
Canada has recently made efforts to give evidence of its historic title to the 
Northwest Passage by mapping traditional Inuit trails throughout the area.73 
These historical trails predate the formations of the Law of the Sea treaties 
and have been employed by Canada (in addition to the trails of explorers, 
traders and trappers) to demonstrate its claim to this exception. Canada’s 
Inuit did not distinguish between land and sea ice in the use of these trails. 
More important is that fact that no one else was using it historically, thus 
precluding it as a strait that has been “used for international navigation” in 
the past.74 Although Canada may have drawn straight baselines arounds its 
Arctic Archipelago in 1985, it is upon the historic title that Canada basis its 
claim, pursuing the only exception that would ensure sole Canadian control 
of the Passage. This claim importantly safeguards Canada’s claim over the 
Northwest Passage regardless of whether Canada’s use of straight baselines is 
accepted or not. The disagreement between the United States and Canada on 
this matter has continued for a considerable time.  
The United States have long argued for the designation of the 
Northwest Passage through Canada's Arctic Archipelago as a strait used for 
international navigation in line with Part II of UNCLOS. Ships navigating 
designated international straits under UNCLOS article 38 would then enjoy 
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74 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (10 December 1982, EIF 16 
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the right of transit passage, despite transecting Canada's internal waters.75 It is 
within international straits that all countries have the guaranteed right to 
sail.76 Canada rejects the United States’ position that that passages constitute 
international straits, denying that they have ever been used for ‘international 
navigation’ as of right (i.e., openly and without the express consent of 
Canada). The US argues, however, that the potential of a strait for 
international navigation is sufficient for it to be deemed an international 
strait. The United States has continuously reiterated and vocalised its 
objection to Canada’s claim of historic title in an effort to avoid 
acquiescing.77  
 There are two provisions within UNCLOS that allow for the 
employing of straight baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea, 
the contiguous zone, the exclusive economic zone, and the continental shelf 
are to be measured.78 First is under article 7: if the coastline is "deeply 
indented and cut into, of if there is a fringe of islands along the coast."79 The 
second is under article 46 of UNCLOS: archipelagic states may draw straight 
archipelagic baselines to join the outermost islands and points of the 
archipelago, effectively encompassing the water within as internal waters.80 
Canada does not qualify as an archipelagic state, thus article 46 is not 
applicable in this case. Additionally, neither of these exceptions preclude the 
possibility of its containing international straits.  
 The use of straight baselines and the historic title claim by Canada are 
two separate legal arguments, each with its own controversies. 
Canada currently operates the Northwest Passage as an internal waterway, yet 
the legitimacy of Canada’s Arctic sovereignty and status of the Northwest 
Passage go essentially unanswered. 
 Taking note of the sovereignty issue of Canada's Arctic region, it is 
important to bear in mind the ways in which these debates have or may 
influence search and rescue policy and operations in Canada's North. In 2008, 
in light of Russia's planting of a titanium flag under the North Pole, the 
 
75 UNCLOS (n 74) Art 38.  
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Harper Government launched a hearty, comprehensive initiative to reiterate 
Canada's sovereignty over the Canadian Arctic Archipelago.81 Large 
investments into economic, military and infrastructure build-up, while 
politically driven, yielded certain ripple effects into other parts of Canada's 
Northern programs. The Northern Strategy saw a large expansion in the 
Canadian Coast Guard's budget and infrastructure, which had a significant 
impact on aspects such as the number of Coast Guard primary response units 
available in the Arctic. As a federal program and service, Arctic search and 
rescue will always have the possibility to be influenced by national policy 
and interests to some degree. Without going into exhaustive detail, the author 
encourages consideration of this throughout the remainder of this study.  
 
 
Nunavut’s SAR Challenges  
Nunavut’s communities have achieved progress in health, education and 
employment. However, challenges continue to severely reduce their standard 
of living. The Canadian Encyclopaedia lists these challenges as: the high 
price of food and other commodities, overcrowded housing and housing 
shortages, high construction costs, a shortage of healthcare providers in the 
smaller communities, inadequate internet access, slow economic growth, and 
most relevant to this thesis, problems delivering and accessing essential 
services.82 Search and rescue services are included in the latter. Nunavut’s 
large scale, remoteness and lack of infrastructure makes it difficult to 
effectuate proper SAR services in Canada’s North. Except for the major 
centres such as Inuvik and Iqaluit, most communities have only basic 
infrastructure and equipment for conducting local emergency measures. 
“While adequate to handle many small-scale local situations, most 
communities do not have the infrastructure, equipment or human capacity to 
manage or support large-scale or highly technical situations (e.g. major 
marine rescues, aviation accidents, hazardous materials containment, etc.)”83 
 
81 Taber (n 42).   
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A community capacity report regarding the emergency preparedness of 
Nunavut’s communities determined that small localities were not equipped to 
deal with large-scale aviation and marine disasters in their areas. This was 
especially the case when the disaster is followed by a large volume of people 
to support, causing a so-called “inundation event” in which rescued people 
would overwhelm the limited resources of the community.84  
Deficiencies in search and rescue capacities are exasperated by the 
high probability of incidents in Nunavut’s waters due to the extreme 
difficulties of navigating in Canada’s Arctic Archipelago. Marine bathymetry 
reveals the shallow nature of Nunavut’s Arctic waterways (Figure 5). A 
constant issue for maritime operations, Canada’s shoal ridden and 
unpredictable underwater profiles is unique to this region of the Arctic. This 
problem is made worse by the varying extensiveness and quality of 
navigational charts in addition to limited soundings. Indeed, this has been an 
issue for ships navigating in the past.85 In 2010, the expedition cruise vessel 
m/v Clipper Adventurer carrying 128 passengers and 57 crew grounded on a 
rock shoal near Kugluktuk in the Canadian Arctic. The Clipper Adventurer 
and its owners claimed that Canada failed to inform mariners about the shelf 
and subsequently sued the federal government for what they claimed was 
“improper charting”.86 Despite the case being dismissed in federal court, 
Canada still struggles to maintain a comprehensive and up to date collection 
of navigational information and charting of its Arctic regions.87 The Clipper 
Adventurer was not the first cruise ship to run aground in the shallow waters 
of Nunavut. In 1996, the expedition cruise ship Hanseatic went aground on a 
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sand bar in the Simpson Strait near Gjoa Haven Nunavut.88 A current and 
ongoing issue in Canada’s North, as recently as August 2018, the Akademik 
Ioffe ran aground in the western part of the Gulf of Boothia.89  
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Figure 5. Canada’s Arctic Bathymetry 90 
 
 
 
A Bathymetric Chart of Canada’s Arctic depicting the generally shallow 
nature of the Archipelago, with certain passages between islands extending 
as little as 5-20 meters in depth  
 
Cruise ships are not the sole types of vessels to run aground in navigation-
related incidents in Nunavut. In 2010, the Merchant Vessel Nanny ran 
aground on a sandbar near Gjoa Haven in the Simpson Strait.91 Vessels of 
different types and operators have felt the challenges of navigating in 
 
90 Canadian Ice Services, ‘Arctic Waters Depth Map’ 
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Nunavut’s waters equally. In the 2018 summer season, 15 Arctic based 
emergencies requiring the deployment of SAR assets occurred alone.92     
Nunavut’s marine activity has been mainly restricted to community 
resupplying, local subsistence harvesting, small-scale commercial fishing and 
adventure/expedition tourism.93 In spite of many successful transits of the 
Northwest Passage, it is unlikely that Nunavut will experience any significant 
build-up of transit shipping in the future. This is predominantly attributed to 
its seasonality, ice conditions, complex archipelago, chokepoint, restrictions, 
lack of adequate charts, sovereignty issues and operational costs. Rather, 
Nunavut's vessel traffic is expected to arise from community re-supply, 
fisheries, tourism, and research and government services as the ice conditions 
continue to diminish. As vessel traffic in Nunavut increases, the 
aforementioned issues are likely to have compounding effects, even if 
addressed. The fact remains that the Canadian Arctic experiences 
disproportionate challenges which directly undermine Arctic search and 
rescue efforts and prevention.   
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3 The Legal Basis for Search and Rescue  
 
3.1 International Conventions  
The duty to rescue the shipwrecked at sea is a historically respected principle 
that has been around since mariners first took to the sea. Now referred to as 
the duty to render assistance principle, it applies to all persons in distress 
without distinction. Nationality, legal status, or engagement in unlawful 
activity do not make a difference to their legal right to be saved.94 Enshrined 
into three separate international conventions, the duty to render assistance is 
now considered a reflection of customary international law.95 The duty to 
render assistance is therefore applicable to all states, independent of their 
being parties to the treaties.96 
 The duty to render assistance has been codified into several 
international conventions that, in addition to this principle, form the legal 
basis for coastal states to provide lifesaving and search and rescue services.97 
The main international conventions detailing search and rescue obligations 
include: The United Nations Convention for the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), 
1982, the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS), 
1974, and the International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue 
(SAR Agreement), 1979. These international agreements stipulate the rights 
and duties of parties relating to search and rescue and the operational steps to 
be followed in SAR incidents.98 The bulk of the legal obligations faced by 
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coastal states are captured and articulated by these three main conventions 
and form the legal basis for the lifesaving relationship between coastal state 
and shipmasters. In addition, they outline the legal requirements placed on 
both coastal states and shipmasters separately.99 Including these three main 
international conventions, there are other international agreements that also 
include provisions relating to search and rescue, such as the International 
Convention on Salvage, 1989 which articulates the duty to render assistance 
article as well.100 The various legal instruments for search and rescue 
articulate the international principles for SAR in which other 
regional/domestic search and rescue regimes and programs are nested.101 All 
coastal nations party to these international agreements experience the same 
SAR obligations. Some countries also encounter auxiliary obligations 
stemming from secondary regional treaties, often multi-lateral or bi-lateral in 
nature. The best example of such a regional agreement would be the 
Agreement on Cooperation on Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue 
in the Arctic, 2011 (The Arctic SAR Agreement). 
   
Substantive Obligations 
Search and rescue regimes are comprised of two separate components. First, 
the substantive component (principles, norms, and laws) that direct the 
obligations and cooperation of the parties. Substantive obligations are the 
legal basis of search and rescue regimes. Second is the operational 
component (procedures and programs) that direct the practical and operative 
cooperation among parties. In order to address the effectiveness of Canada in 
meeting its Arctic SAR obligations, this thesis will first explore the 
substantive obligations that treaty parties are subject to as coastal states. After 
these basic substantive obligations are discussed, other regional agreements 
will be examined to determine the additional substantive obligations placed 
on Arctic nations. A list of Canada’s primary SAR substantive obligations 
will subsequently be provided and discussed in Chapter 4.  
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 The core substantive obligations of search and rescue fall into two 
separate categories of one general principle: the duty to render assistance 
(also known as the duty to rescue). The duty to render assistance applies to 
both ships and coastal states and imposes the legal obligation onto both to 
rescue persons distressed at sea. The duty to render assistance serves as the 
foundation of search and rescue obligations for coastal states upon which all 
other search and rescue principles and activities expand upon.  
 
The Duty to Render Assistance at Sea  
The duty to render assistance is without doubt one of the best-established 
principles of international law of the sea.102 This principle is considered a 
reflection of customary international maritime law. As a result, states - both 
signatories and non-signatories alike - are equally subject to ensure that 
vessels and masters flying under their flags are legally required to render 
assistance when safe to do so.   
The duty to render assistance applies to both shipmasters and coastal 
states, and is a twofold principle. It is (1) the obligation for shipmasters to 
rescue/assist people in distress at sea, and for the obligation of coastal states 
to legislate the duty to rescue into domestic law for all masters of ships 
flagged under their jurisdiction, and (2) the obligation for coastal states to 
provide adequate search and rescue services in their regions. 
The duty to render assistance was first formally introduced into 
international law through the International Convention for the Safety of Life 
at Sea (SOLAS). The International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea 
(SOLAS) is one of the most important international conventions pertaining to 
the safety of merchant ships and people at sea.103 The first version adopted in 
1914 following the Titanic disaster was meant to address the severe lack of 
safety procedures in marine transportation and standardise basic minimum 
safety requirements to avoid similar future disasters.104 The current version 
known as SOLAS 1974 was ultimately adopted in 1980, and along with 
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additional amendments, now functions as the primary contemporary legal 
instrument upon which safety at sea is based and enacted.   
The first component of the duty to render assistance was initially articulated 
within SOLAS and can now be found under Regulation V/33 Distress 
Situations: Obligations and Procedures:  
 
Regulation V/33 Distress Situations: Obligations and Procedures  
 
1. The master of a ship at sea which is in a position to be able to 
provide assistance on receiving information from any source that 
persons are in distress at sea, is bound to proceed with all speed to their 
assistance, if possible informing them or the search and rescue service 
that the ship is doing so. This obligation to provide assistance applies 
regardless of the nationality or status of such persons or the 
circumstances in which they are found. If the ship receiving the 
distress alert is unable or, in the special circumstances of the case, 
considers it unreasonable or unnecessary to proceed to their assistance, 
the master must enter in the log-book the reason for failing to proceed 
to the assistance of the persons in distress, taking into account the 
recommendation of the Organization, to inform the appropriate search 
and rescue service accordingly.  
 
1.1 Contracting Governments shall co-ordinate and co-operate to 
ensure that masters of ships providing assistance by embarking persons 
in distress at sea are released from their obligations with minimum 
further deviation from the ships' intended voyage, provided that 
releasing the master of the ship from the obligations under the current 
regulation does not further endanger the safety of life at sea. The 
Contracting Government responsible for the search and rescue region 
in which such assistance is rendered shall exercise primary 
responsibility for ensuring such co-ordination and co-operation occurs, 
so that survivors assisted are disembarked from the assisting ship and 
delivered to a place of safety, taking into account the particular 
circumstances of the case and guidelines developed by the 
Organization. In these cases, the relevant Contracting Governments 
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shall arrange for such disembarkation to be effected as soon as 
reasonably practicable.105 
 
The secondary component of the duty to render assistance principle (the duty 
of coastal states to provide search and rescue services) is articulated in 
Regulation V/7 of UNCLOS 1974:  
 
 Regulation V/7 – Search and Rescue Services  
 
1. Each Contracting Government undertakes to ensure that 
necessary arrangements are made for distress communication 
and co-ordination in their area of responsibility and for the 
rescue of persons in distress at sea around its coasts. These 
arrangements shall include the establishment, operation and 
maintenance of such search and rescue facilities as are deemed 
practicable and necessary, having regard to the density of the 
seagoing traffic and the navigational dangers and shall, so far as 
possible, provide adequate means of locating and rescuing such 
persons 
 
 
Following SOLAS, the duty to render assistance principle was borrowed and 
implemented into Article 98 of the United Nations Convention for the Law of 
the Sea (UNCLOS): 
 
98(1) Duty to Render Assistance  
 
1. Every State shall require the master of a ship flying its flag, in 
so far as he can do so without serious danger to the ship, the 
crew or the passengers: 
(a) to render assistance to any person found at sea in danger of 
being lost; 
(b) to proceed with all possible speed to the rescue of persons in 
distress, if informed of their need of assistance, in so far as such 
action may reasonably be expected of him; 
 
105 International Convention for the Safety of Life At Sea (1 November 1974, EIF 
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(c) after a collision, to render assistance to the other ship, its 
crew and its passengers and, where possible, to inform the other 
ship of the name of his own ship, its port of registry and the 
nearest port at which it will call. 
 
2. Every coastal State shall promote the establishment, operation and 
maintenance of an adequate and effective search and rescue service 
regarding safety on and over the sea and, where circumstances so 
require, by way of mutual regional arrangement cooperate with 
neighbouring States for this purpose.106 
 
UNCLOS Article 98 renders the duty to render assistance obligation slightly 
more comprehensible and is thus commonly cited when referencing this 
concept. The author will also utilise UNCLOS Article 98 to further explain 
the concept below.  
Addressing first Art. 98(1), the duty for shipmasters to rescue is a 
“high seas” article, however, it applies to all maritime zones.107 The duty to 
render assistance applies to all vessels and ship masters. Military, state-
owned vessels and private vessels are not distinguished between in UNCLOS 
Art.98, including warships.108 Under the International Salvage Convention, 
warships may be excluded from complying with the duty to render assistance 
if involved in an engagement, however, peacetime has no such exception.109 
Generally, masters are only freed from their duty to render assistance in 
circumstances where the assisting vessel, crew, or passengers would be 
endangered as a result of rendering assistance.110  
In addition to UNCLOS and SOLAS, other international agreements 
iterate the duty to render assistance principle. Chapter 2.1.10 of the 
International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue requires treaty 
parties to ensure that assistance is provided to any persons in distress at sea, 
regardless of the nationality or status of such a person or the circumstances in 
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which that person is found (Appendix A).111 Finally, the duty to render 
assistance is further clarified in Article 10 of the International Convention on 
Salvage which addresses both the obligations of ship masters and states to 
effectuate the duty to render assistance (Appendix A).112 
The ratification of international treaties creates international 
obligations for Canada. As a country utilising a dualist legal system, Canada 
simply cannot become party to a treaty in order to give the obligations the 
force of law domestically; the treaty provisions must be incorporated into 
Canada's domestic legislation.113 Therefore, it is Canada's constitution that 
makes the rule. This is opposite from monist states in which international law 
does not need to be transferred into national law, rather is automatically self-
implementing. Coastal states have the responsibility to produce adequate 
legislation which upholds the duty to render assistance domestically. This is 
the component of the duty to render assistance principle which addresses 
compliance. Rather than situations in which shipmasters or vessels do not 
comply with their duty to render assistance giving rise to international 
responsibility of the state, it is rather the state that is responsible for ensuring 
that shipmasters are required to provide assistance.114 Shipmasters should 
face prosecution to the fullest extent of that state’s domestic law in any 
failures to comply with the duty to rescue. If the responsibility to render 
assistance was not present in domestic law, however, it is that which would 
give rise to the responsibility of the state. Separate delict – the state being 
responsible for its own conduct – is the legal premise being referenced, and 
essentially boils down to what the state does or does not do. Since states must 
take all measures to ensure that shipmasters render assistance, the duty to 
render assistance can also be understood as an obligation of due diligence. 
This will be further explored in a later section.  
Proper implementation of the international principle of the duty to 
render assistance into domestic law is central to its effectiveness. Shipmasters 
violating the duty to rescue has been occurring more frequently, especially 
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with regards to contemporary issues such as the migrant crisis in the 
Mediterranean Sea. Particular strain has been put upon the duty to rescue by 
the number of sea migrants and refugees at sea. In certain cases, pressure 
from states is building that threaten to prosecute rescuers for rescuing, 
especially regarding the delivery of rescued people to ports of safety. 
Shipmasters carrying rescued migrants fear being turned away by inundated 
coastal states, in which they would be left in the lurch with passengers they 
are legally bound to deliver to safety.115 As a result, cases in which 
shipmasters have elected not to rescue migrants found at sea have emerged. 
This tends to affect regions with large volumes of migrants in distress at sea, 
and has become a topic of concern within international search and rescue. 
Generally, however, the duty to render assistance is rarely violated by 
shipmasters in the Arctic region. Attributable to the lack of migrants (and 
people for that matter), Arctic search and rescue rather experiences possible 
gaps in the fulfilment of legal requirements for coastal states to provide 
adequate SAR services in their region due to the difficulties associated with 
Arctic conditions. While the duty to render assistance applies to Canadian 
ship masters as codified into Canadian domestic law, it importantly applies to 
Canadian shipmasters in any maritime jurisdiction, not just Canada. The 
same goes for non-Canadian ships operating in Canada's jurisdictions. They 
are under flag state jurisdiction and thus obliged to render assistance as per 
their state's own domestic laws. In the Canadian Arctic, where potential 
rescue vessels are widely distributed and scarce, this becomes an important 
safeguard in ensuring any and all shipmasters are duty-bound to assist.  
 The second part of UNCLOS Article 98 also refers to the duty to 
render assistance principle, however refers rather to the coastal state's 
responsibility to provide search and rescue services in its region. Coastal 
states must develop the SAR processes and procedures and provide the ships, 
boats, aircrafts and specialized personnel that conduct lifesaving operations at 
sea.116  
Article 98(2) also stipulates cooperation between neighbouring coastal 
states in the organising and effectuating of search and rescue in their regions. 
This cooperation can entail various activities, such as the sharing of SAR 
infrastructure or the execution of joint training exercises. However, 
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collaborative efforts between coastal states most commonly manifest in the 
form of regional agreements. These regional agreements, such as the 
Agreement for Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue in the Arctic 
for example, often detail the delineation of each SAR region and the 
collaborative efforts of the participating coastal states. However, UNCLOS 
Article 98(2) remains vague on what constitutes collaboration. In an effort to 
clarify the duty to coordinate with neighbouring states, the International 
Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue was established to systemize 
search and rescue on a global level.  
 
The International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue  
Large-scale disasters at sea in the early twentieth century (many involving 
significant loss of life) made it apparent that alone the duty to render 
assistance was insufficient; an international SAR system for organizing, 
coordinating and conducting rescues at sea was needed.117 In 1979, the 
International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue (SAR Convention) 
was created to satisfy this demand. The SAR Convention's purpose is three-
fold. First, it requires parties to establish ship-reporting systems under which 
ships report their position to coastal radio stations. This serves as a 
monitoring system to keep tabs on what ships are operating where in the 
event of an emergency. Second, the SAR Convention makes certain the 
establishment of rescue co-ordination centres and subcentres to coordinate 
rescue operations within a coastal state’s SAR region. Lastly, it provides the 
international framework for organizing and standardising SAR processes and 
procedures in the coordinating and conducting of lifesaving operations.118 119 
This is arguably the most crucial purpose of the 1979 SAR Convention in 
which the cooperation between governments and those participating in SAR 
operations at sea is facilitated. Per the SAR Convention, States are requested 
to agree upon the SAR regions for which they are required to provide 
"adequate shore-based communication infrastructure, efficient distress alert 
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routeing, and proper operational co-ordination to effectively support search 
and rescue services".120 
In accordance with the 1979 SAR Convention, the International 
Maritime Organization Maritime Safety Committee divided the world’s 
oceans into 13 SAR areas inside each of which the countries concerned have 
delimited the SAR regions for which they are responsible. To assist 
governments, the International Maritime Organisation established an 
International SAR Plan and published, in conjunction with International Civil 
Aviation Organisation (ICAO), the International Aeronautical and Maritime 
Search and Rescue Manual (IAMSAR).  
 
 
IAMSAR  
The International Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue Manual is 
the series of technical instructions for carrying out and organising search and 
rescue around the world. Created to assist states in the development and 
harmonisation of their respective aeronautical and maritime SAR 
organisations, it also articulates the obligations they have accepted under the 
Convention on International Civil Aviation, the International Convention on 
Maritime Search and Rescue and the International Convention for the Safety 
of Life at Sea (SOLAS). 121 
 A non-binding instrument, IAMSAR serves as a technical "how-to" 
manual for states, doing so in 3 separate volumes. IAMSAR manual Volume 
I addresses the organisation and management of the global SAR system, 
promoting the establishment and improvement of national and regional SAR 
systems and international cooperation.122 Volume II is centred around 
mission coordination and provides guidance and guidelines for those who 
plan and coordinate SAR operations and exercises.123 Volume III is intended 
for carriage on board vessels and aircrafts, “to help with performance of a 
search, rescue, or on scene coordinator function and with aspects of SAR that 
pertain to their own emergencies.”124 For Arctic states, the IAMSAR manual 
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also provides additional guidelines on the implementation the Arctic SAR 
agreement.125  
 
3.2 Regional Agreements  
In many regions of the world, coastal states have long realised that effective 
SAR services cannot be provided independently.126 Huge volumes of 
infrastructure and investment are necessary for high-functioning search and 
rescue programs. Many states have also recognised the cost-saving and 
efficiency results of neighbourly cooperation and resource sharing. Thus, 
coastal states often work frequently together to develop regional agreements. 
Cooperative agreements that articulate the parameters of these relationships 
increase SAR effectiveness and simultaneously fulfil the substantive duties of 
the coastal state found in Chapter 3.1.5 of the SAR Agreement and Article 98 
(2) of UNCLOS which requires states to provide adequate search and rescue 
“by way of mutual regional arrangements and cooperate with neighbouring 
States for this purpose”.127 Most of the cooperative agreements now in force 
pertain to particular regions. Generally, coastal states of these regions face 
similar challenges based on shared factors, say the environment or common 
industries. The agreements come in multiple legal forms, from non-binding 
Memorandums of Understanding (MOUs) to bilateral, trilateral, and even 
multilateral legally binding treaties. The regional agreement governing the 
Arctic region is the Agreement on the Cooperation on Aeronautical and 
Maritime Search and Rescue in the Arctic (Arctic SAR Agreement).  
 
 
The Agreement on Cooperation on Aeronautical and Maritime Search 
and Rescue in the Arctic   
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The increased difficulties of search and rescue operations in the Arctic have 
long been a continuous area of concern for Arctic countries. Resources for 
SAR operations in the Arctic are limited in terms of both capacity and current 
technology. In an effort to address these deficits, Arctic states took initiative 
through the auspices of the Arctic Council to pursue actionable solutions. At 
a ministerial meeting in Tromsø, the Arctic Council established a Task Force 
to develop an international instrument for SAR cooperation in the Arctic.128 
Several bi-lateral and multilateral agreements covering various parts of 
Arctic and its activities existed prior to these efforts. Building upon these pre-
existing agreements, the Task Force concluded with the signing of a pan-
Arctic specific search and rescue treaty; the Agreement on the Cooperation 
on Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue in the Arctic.129 Signed by 
the eight Arctic states and entering into force in 2013, the Arctic SAR 
Agreement was concluded in accordance with the 1979 SAR Convention to 
satisfy the request for cooperative arrangements for regional search and 
rescue.130  
The Arctic SAR Agreement contains 20 Articles, one Annex and three 
Appendixes whose primary objective is to “strengthen aeronautical and 
maritime search and rescue cooperation and coordination in the Arctic.”  131 
The Arctic SAR agreement does not generate any new substantive 
obligations for coastal states. Rather, the articles of the agreement shore up 
pre-existing international law and substantive obligations and help facilitate 
inter-state cooperation.132 The Agreement can be thought of as the creation of 
a framework to improve capacity to meet substantive obligations, rather than 
creating new ones. Article 7(3b) of the Arctic SAR Agreement, for example, 
reiterates the duty to render assistance, where Article 8 instructs parties on 
the procedure for requesting entry into territories of another party for the 
purposes of search and rescue operations.133 134 The essence of the regional 
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agreement is stated in Article 9, which offers a comprehensive overview of 
possible collaborative efforts to achieve mutual SAR cooperation, including 
the:  
(a)  exchange of experience;  
(b)  sharing of real-time meteorological and oceanographic observations, 
analyses, forecasts, and warnings;  
(c)  arranging exchanges of visits between search and rescue personnel;  
(d)  carrying out joint search and rescue exercises and training;  
(e)  using ship reporting systems for search and rescue purposes;  
(f)  sharing information systems, search and rescue procedures, 
techniques, equipment, and facilities;  
(g)  providing services in support of search and rescue operations;  
(h)  sharing national positions on search and rescue issues of mutual 
interest within the scope of this Agreement;  
(i)  supporting and implementing joint research and development 
initiatives aimed, inter alia, at reducing search time, improving rescue 
effectiveness, and minimizing risk to search and rescue personnel; and  
(j)  conducting regular communications checks and exercises, including 
the use of alternative means of communications for handling 
communication overloads during major search and rescue operations.135  
The actual working of SAR itself is a national responsibility, however the 
Arctic SAR agreement creates an Arctic SAR regime as a whole emergency 
response system. Central to this regime is the ability of the parties to provide 
 
134 The Arctic SAR agreement specifies that SAR operations shall not prejudice 
the sovereignty of the coastal state(s). The parties must ‘‘request permission to 
enter the territory of a Party or Parties for search and rescue purposes.’’ 
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mutual assistance and to conduct joint operations.136 In the interest of 
establishing this regime and streamlining communications, the Arctic SAR 
agreement outlines the competent authorities of the parties, agencies 
responsible for search and rescue, and rescue coordination's centres in the 
Appendixes.137  
The Arctic SAR agreement importantly divides up the areas and 
responsibilities for search and rescue of each party. Each member-state is 
responsible for a particular SAR area (this is in accordance with the 1979 
SAR Convention) and the geographical scope of this is specified in the Arctic 
SAR Agreement Annex (Figure 6).138 The agreement areas are not related to 
any boundaries between States, or their sovereignty, sovereign rights or 
jurisdiction.139 Any neighbouring parties with adjacent SAR regions may 
amend information on the delineation of SAR regions relevant to the 
Agreement. They must, however, do so by way of mutual agreement.140  
There are a number of criticisms regarding the Arctic SAR agreement. 
The Arctic SAR agreement mandates that, within their areas, members are 
required to "promote the establishment, operation and maintenance of an 
adequate and effective SAR capability".141 However, this begs the question: 
“What constitutes adequate and effective”? Additionally, the Arctic SAR 
agreement does not specify the resources that parties are obligated to provide 
and stipulates only that the “implementation of this Agreement shall be 
subject to the availability of relevant resources".142 To what "relevant 
resources" is referring to is not articulated. This is an example of a variable 
standard, in which the obligations depend on capacity. Variable standards are 
an element of due diligence in which the thresholds to meet are somewhat 
flexible dependent the standards of international law. Due diligence standards 
may also vary depending on the norm in question or at stake.143  
Finally, the Arctic SAR regime is criticised for having no formal 
decision-making body and offers only direct negotiations as a means of 
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settling disputes between parties that precluding final dispute settlements 
through a court or arbitration panel. Thus, there is no sanctioned means of 
enforcement.  
 
 
Figure 6. Arctic Search and Rescue Regions 144  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The different regions of responsibility for Arctic search and rescue, as 
articulated in the Agreement on Cooperation on Aeronautical and Maritime 
Search and Rescue in the Arctic 
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3.3 The Global SAR system  
The 1979 SAR Convention imposed considerable substantial obligations on 
contracting members. A revised Annex of the SAR convention was adopted 
in 1998 to help clarify the responsibilities of governments and once again 
emphasize regional approaches.145 As a result of the foundation provided 
through the SAR convention, each country develops policies, procedures, 
practices and programs for search and rescue, thus creating a global and 
intertwined maritime SAR system.146 The development of a global, full 
coverage SAR system with the allocation of SAR regions ensures that states 
are not required to provide SAR services for their own citizens wherever they 
travel.147 Today, the global SAR system is still based on the original 
Convention, however, it has grown to feature a myriad of other layers 
pertaining to search and rescue, including operational guidelines, best 
practices, and other legally binding procedures. Many of these additional 
aspects originated through the umbrella of the International Maritime 
Organisation and the International Civil Aviation Organisation. The 
contemporary workings of the global SAR system are predominantly 
influenced by these two organisations.148  
 The Annex to the SAR Convention requires the establishment of one 
Rescue Coordination Centre (RCC) and Rescue Sub-centre (RSC) for each 
maritime search and rescue region.149 The coastal state’s RCC and RSCs are 
the backbone of the global SAR system. They are responsible for the 
organisation of SAR services and the coordination of rescue services in the 
maritime region in the event of an emergency incident.150 The Rescue 
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Coordination Centre should be located in an area where it can perform its 
function to the highest capabilities. They also require round the clock 
availability, highly trained staff and personnel, have the ability to receive 
distress alerts, and maintain plans of operation for different types of distress 
scenarios. Rescue Coordination Centres are the authority on the capabilities 
of the state’s rescue infrastructure and agencies, and employ this expertise in 
the deployment of rescue services.151 RCCs have a huge volume of 
requirements and best practices they are required to fulfil to be considered 
effective to the fullest degree (Annex 2).  
In certain situations, coastal states’ SAR agencies may choose to establish 
Joint Rescue Coordination Centres (JRCC) within each search and rescue 
region (SRR). JRCCs serve the purpose of coordinating and controlling 
aeronautical and maritime SAR operations in each region. For countries such 
as Canada, where maritime and aeronautical SAR services are provided by 
different state agencies, JRCCs are critical for overseeing the overall 
provision of joint services between air and marine agencies during a rescue 
operation. Joint Rescue Coordination Centres will coordinate SAR units’ 
response to rescue incidents in accordance with national and regional policy 
and directives.152 In Canada, where national, provincial and territorial 
governments maintain separate yet intertwined SAR programs, JRCCs 
remain functionally necessary (Appendix B). 
Under the influence of the IMO and ICAO, the global SAR system 
defines the different personnel roles and responsibilities related to RCCs and 
JRCCs for efficient organisation and implementation of a coastal state’s 
national SAR system. The roles include: 
 
(1) SAR coordinator (SC) - person/agency responsible for management 
and oversight of a coastal state's SAR organization  
(2) SAR mission coordinator (SMC) - Official temporarily assigned to 
coordinate, direct, and supervise a SAR Operation  
(3) On scene coordinator (OSC) - may be assigned by the SMC to 
coordinate SAR operations on scene when multiple resources are 
working together within specified area.  
 
151 ibid.  
152 CAMSAR (n 5) Sec. 2.05(E) p.1 of 8. 
 50 
(4) Aircraft coordinator (ACO) can also be assigned by the SCM or 
OSC in a SAR operation of the response involves multiple aircraft. 
ACO is responsible for flight safety and effective use of the aircraft in 
the conduct of the operation153   
 
 
3.4 Arctic SAR actors  
While national governments form the nucleus of the Arctic SAR regime, 
there are other actors that are involved in Arctic search and rescue. Some of 
these actors provide operational support and expertise, others provide a 
platform for nations and operators to come together and facilitate the creation 
of guidelines, standard operating procedures and legal instruments. Together, 
they contribute wide-ranging value to the Arctic SAR regime as a whole. 
This is especially significant when acknowledging the Arctic’s unique 
challenges and how the collaborative movement towards overcoming them is 
key. 
Within Arctic SAR, there are numerous actors who feature in the 
multiple different aspects of search and rescue, from operations and rescues, 
to law and policy makers, influencers and stakeholders. Each actor plays an 
important role in the overall development of Arctic SAR, not to mention the 
general maintenance of SAR regimes. In helping organise and direct matters, 
the Arctic SAR Agreement consists of agreed upon principles, norms, rules, 
procedures and programs that govern the interaction of actors in a specific 
issue area.154 
National SAR Actors (Competent Authorities, Agencies and Rescue 
Coordination Centres)  
The global SAR system applies to all areas of the world, including the Arctic. 
Under this structure, the eight Arctic nations make up the backbone of Arctic 
search and rescue. Each coastal state organises its maritime SAR authorities 
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and organisation on the basis of its available SAR resources, unique 
geographical challenges, political considerations, cultural influences, 
available funding and domestic SAR legal framework.155 To achieve this, 
national search and rescue programs are spearheaded by a competent 
authority that sanctions the various search and rescue agencies of that 
country. The Arctic SAR Agreement lists the competent authorities for each 
nation and its corresponding agencies. Also listed in the Appendixes are the 
Rescue Coordination Centres for the member states (Appendix C). To further 
clarify, the appendixes set out the three national layers of the decision-
making hierarchy pertaining to Arctic SAR. As per the Agreement 
Appendixes, ‘‘competent authorities” represent the political level, 
‘‘agencies’’ are government units with a specific functional and/or territorial 
competence, and ‘‘rescue coordination centres’’ are the units which have 
overall operational responsibility during Arctic SAR operations.156 For 
example, the United States Coast Guard is named as the competent authority 
for the United States, the Coast Guard and the Department of Defence are 
named as agencies and the American rescue coordination centres listed in 
Appendix III are the Joint Rescue Coordination Centre Juneau (JRCC 
Juneau) and the Aviation Rescue Coordination Centre Elmendorf (ARCC 
Elmendorf). 
Together, the competent authorities, agencies, and rescue coordination 
centres make-up the domestic search and rescue program, and are those 
involved in actual search and rescue situations. Additionally, these three 
components generate the so-called “documentation” for the SAR policies and 
practices of that nation. This is done through the creation of guidelines, best-
practices, manuals, policy papers, and legislation. The set-up of each national 
program is unique and countries will organise their programs as they 
determined best. Sometimes, nations might place search and rescue programs 
under the jurisdiction of multiple (or sometimes seemingly unrelated) 
agencies. Canada and the United States both allocate their SAR programs to 
the military and coast guard, whereas Denmark has it placed under the 
Danish Maritime Authority, the Danish Transport Authority, and (in the case 
of the Faroe Islands) the Ministry of Fisheries. The main point to take away 
from the differences between national search and rescue programs is the 
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relative freedom afforded to countries regarding the structure of their SAR 
programs. Indeed, the SAR Convention and the Arctic SAR Agreement 
require basic requirements for each party member, however, there is a 
significant degree of variation in the ways in which countries go about 
meeting these specifications. 
There are advantages to this flexibility. States are able to take 
measures that best coincide with their legal systems, geography and budget. 
Fixed or prescriptive regulations can be constricting, and quickly become out 
of date. Outcome-based regulations gives way to a flexibility which has its 
merits, especially concerning the unique challenges of Arctic SAR. Of 
course, this flexibility makes it difficult to measure if a state is really meeting 
its requirements. It is in examining the ways in which countries configure 
their SAR programs that the extent of their efforts may be determined.  
 
 
The Arctic Council (PAME, EPPR, SAR Expert Group)  
The Arctic Council, although containing Arctic nations as members, serves as 
an intergovernmental forum that functions as a place for dialogue in Arctic 
governance politics between Arctic states and indigenous peoples.157 A 
platform for coordination and co-operation between the Arctic states on a 
range of matters, the Arctic Council comprises of the eight Arctic states 
(Canada, Kingdom of Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russian 
Federation, Sweden, United States), six permanent participants who represent 
the various indigenous groups across the Arctic, and observers, who may be 
non-Arctic states, inter-governmental organisations and fora, and non-
governmental organisations (NGOs).158 159 The Arctic Council has six 
working groups which cover a broad field of subjects, from climate change to 
emergency response, yet excluding security; Arctic Contaminants Action 
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Program (ACAP), Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme (AMAP), 
Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna (CAFF), Protection of the Arctic 
Marine Environment (PAME), Sustainable Development Working Groups 
and Emergency Prevention, Preparedness and Response working group 
(EPPR). EPPR is the working group most closely involved in Arctic search 
and rescue.  
 The six indigenous permanent participants include Aleut International 
Association, Arctic Athabaskan Council, Gwich'in International Council, 
Inuit Circumpolar Council, Russian Association of Indigenous Peoples of the 
North, and the Saami Council. Indigenous people are closely involved in 
Arctic SAR matters. Often first on scene and participating in rescue 
operations, indigenous people (with their traditional knowledge, 
environmental savviness and general local expertise) are invaluable to the 
operation of search and rescue and the prevention of emergency disasters. 
Certain countries (such as Canada), have recognised the value added by 
indigenous people, and have systematically involved them within their SAR 
program. Seeing as how the impacts of Arctic emergencies can fall directly to 
indigenous communities, the inclusion of indigenous peoples within Arctic 
search and rescue development and prevention is essential.    
Emergency Prevention, Preparedness and Response Working Group 
The EPPR working group’s official mandate is to “contribute to the 
prevention, preparedness and response to environmental and other 
emergencies, accidents and search and rescue.”160 What this may encompass 
is rather broad and can be interpreted in several ways. The EPPR is not an 
operational response organisation (this is left up to member states), nor does 
it have any formal authority to instruct on SAR operations or practices. In 
this regard, the EPPR has very little sanctioned power. That is not to say it 
doesn’t have significant influence. The EPPR operates as a third party within 
the space between national governments to share information, collect data, 
address gaps and prepare strategies relating to Arctic search and rescue. The 
EPPR brokers cooperation among the many Arctic actors to streamline 
collaboration on various SAR projects pertaining to: development of 
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guidance and risk assessment methodologies, coordination of response 
exercises and training, and the exchange of information on best practices with 
regards to the prevention, preparedness and response to accidents and 
threats.161 Since 2015, search and rescue issues have been part of the EPPR’s 
mandate. The EPPR supports the Arctic SAR agreement by collecting data in 
establishing national level procedures.162 This includes the planning, 
execution and reporting of SAR activities with follow-up on the Artic SAR 
agreement and addressing relevant findings from SAR exercises.163   
 
The SAR Expert Group  
In 2015, the EPPR Search and Rescue Expert Group was established to 
follow up on the implementation of Articles 9 (Cooperation Among the 
Parties) and 10 (Meetings of the Parties) of the Arctic SAR Agreement.164 
The SAR Expert Group facilitates support for those that deal with SAR 
issues, with the specific aim to “identify key lessons of Artic incidents and 
exercises and communicate/disseminate effective practices and necessary 
mitigation or remedial actions to the ministerial level, member states and 
other relevant international bodies".165 As their title suggest, they are the 
“experts” on Arctic SAR, and maintain databases for knowledge and lessons 
learned, establishing a cross-border SAR asset database and other supporting 
projects.166 
The Arctic Coast Guard Forum  
While the EPPR SAR Expert Group works to provide expert advice and 
expertise regarding Arctic search and rescue, it does not thoroughly address 
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the cooperation between the agencies of the member states; most notably the 
various national Coast Guards. Resources and infrastructure in the Arctic are 
scarce. Pooling resources can lead to increased situational awareness and 
increased safety. Recognizing the inherent benefits of cooperation amongst 
national Coast Guards, the 8 Arctic nations signed a joint statement 
establishing the Arctic Coast Guard Forum (ACGF) in 2015. The ACGF was 
created as "an operationally focused, consensus-based organization that 
leverages collective resources to foster safe, secure and environmentally 
responsible maritime activity in the Arctic.”167  The member-states of the 
ACGF have worked together to develop 10 strategic goals to guide the work 
of the forum. The 10 strategic goals, which focus on practical Coast Guard 
collaboration, also overlap with the aims of the Arctic Council SAR Expert 
Group in trying to better Arctic SAR across all levels: 
 
 
1. Strengthen multilateral cooperation and coordination within the 
Arctic maritime domain, and existing and future multilateral 
agreements 
2. Seek common solutions to maritime issues related to the agencies 
fulfilling the functions of coast guards within the region 
3. Collaborate with the Arctic Council through the sharing of 
information 
4. Facilitate safe and secure maritime activity in the Arctic region, with 
sustainable development to be promoted as appropriate 
5. Contribute to a stable, predictable, and transparent maritime 
environment 
6. Build a common operational picture to ensure proper protocols for 
emergency response coordination, and safe navigation 
7. Work collaboratively to advance the protection of the marine 
environment 
8. Maximize the potential for Arctic maritime activities to positively 
impact the communities, lives, and culture of Arctic communities 
including indigenous peoples 
9. Integrate scientific research in support of Coast Guard operations as 
appropriate 
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10. Support high standards of operations and sustainable activities in the 
Arctic through the sharing of information, including best practices 
and technological solutions to address threats and risks 168 
 
Non-Governmental Organisations 
Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs), while not directly involved in 
Arctic search and rescue, still remain involved in the greater discussions and 
topics of Arctic SAR, often in an advisory capacity where they provide 
information and expertise. The University of the Arctic and International 
Arctic Science Committee, for example, are NGOs with observer status 
within the Arctic Council. Both of these NGOs provide scientific information 
and institutional knowledge regarding Arctic matters, which can inform and 
impact Arctic search and rescue operations and policies. The World-Wide 
Fund for Nature (WWF) is representative of other NGOs who maintain 
specific agendas and targets. Their conservation mandate and interest in 
disaster prevention, for instance, drives their involvement in Arctic matters. 
Although they are primarily concerned with environmental aspect of Arctic 
search and rescue, their input may have impacts on Arctic SAR developments 
that overlap with the “loss of life aspect”. There are thirteen non-
governmental organisations with observer status in the Arctic Council, and as 
observers they have no decision-making power. However, NGOs may make 
relevant contributions during Arctic Council meetings.  
In addition to the thirteen NGOs with observer status at the Arctic 
Council, there are a myriad of other NGOs active in the Arctic which cover 
all manner of interests such as environmental protection, social justice and 
welfare, indigenous rights, human rights. Indeed, NGOs hold little decision-
making power, especially in institutions such as the Arctic Council. 
However, the real strength of NGOs is their ability to affect change through 
lobbying efforts and public involvement. NGOs often lobby governments and 
other stakeholders that have in the past led to real change. In 2016 for 
example, after three years of lobbying and public campaigns, Greenpeace 
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Canada along with indigenous objectors (Clyde River Hamlet), managed to 
achieve a legal stop on seismic blasting in the Canadian Arctic.169  Although 
some NGOs may be seen as radical, NGOs in general can sometimes manage 
to achieve significant impact on the various actors of the Arctic, even 
including powerful nation states.  
Recognising the reach of their influence, NGOs have also teamed-up 
with other NGOs and actors to maximizes their clout and seek solutions to 
common problems.170 In 2011, the Arctic NGO Forum was created for NGOs 
involved in Arctic matters to come together, exchange ideas and perspectives. 
This platform allows NGOs “the possibility to strengthen their positions and 
gain access to policy makers”.171 
 
Arctic SAR Stakeholders  
Arctic SAR stakeholders (who usually have a vested interested in Arctic 
search and rescue for business reasons) are also influential actors when it 
comes to developing Arctic SAR. Arctic oil and gas industry stakeholders 
who are operating in the Arctic often require comprehensive Arctic disaster 
prevention and response plans simply to be granted licensing.172 These plans 
serve to safeguard investments and infrastructure, and are also utilised by 
stakeholders to combat criticisms or concerns of Arctic extraction activities 
from governments and the general public. Many of the stakeholders in the oil 
and gas industry oblige the “standard” SAR requirements when carrying-out 
extraction activities, such as having adequate Arctic emergency response 
plans.173 Some companies, however, voluntarily strengthen their emergency 
prevention and response efforts past the common benchmarks. The 
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Norwegian oil and gas mogul Equinor, for example, has taken additional 
measures to upgrade its emergency preparedness during its new Barents Sea 
extraction operation. Recognizing the dangers of far offshore oil exploration 
(and perhaps trying to quell public concerns), Equinor has implemented the 
use of standby vessels with towing capacities, supply vessels, man overboard 
rescue boats, a SAR camera and SAR helicopter and helipad on its project’s 
oil rig.174 Indeed, these additional safety efforts may also be utilised by 
Equinor to marketing effect, however, this is unrelated to the end result of 
greater Arctic industry SAR build-up.  
The other industry stakeholders heavily involved in Arctic SAR are 
shipping companies and groups. The Arctic is experiencing critical ice loss, 
and although this leads to longer shipping seasons and the possibilities of 
new shipping routes, shipping and cruise companies still experience 
significant safety issues when navigating northern waters. Shipping 
companies have substantial laws and requirements imposed upon them 
regarding safety, however there are also Arctic-specific agreements (such as 
the IMO’s International Code for Ships Operating in Polar Waters) which 
stipulate certain SAR requirements for all vessels in the Arctic and Antarctic. 
Shipping companies have long recognised the perils and dangers of Arctic 
shipping and, as a result, have developed a culture of sharing information and 
best practices amongst one another. The industry has also produced various 
groups and forums to facilitate the cooperation between the various 
stakeholders of Arctic shipping, such as the Arctic Shipping Forum North 
America, which often address Arctic shipping topics. 
Environmental issues tend to dominate both the oil and gas and the 
Arctic shipping industry’s efforts; however, search and rescue topics are also 
regarded. As a result of stakeholder initiative and input, much of Arctic 
search and rescue has been refined and improved.  
As those most heavily involved with maritime operations, these two 
industries remain the most impactful stakeholders on Arctic SAR. Other 
Arctic search and rescue stakeholders exist although some operate more on 
land than at sea. Regardless, they may still occasionally overlap with marine 
environments, such as Arctic infrastructure industries, the Arctic tourism 
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industry, Arctic fisheries and the Arctic transportation industry. These 
stakeholders also have a place at the table when it comes to Arctic search and 
rescue development, albeit to varying degrees.  
 
 
3.5 The Arctic SAR Regime 
Having explored the substantive obligations of Arctic search and rescue, the 
various actors involved and the difficulties of Arctic SAR, we may now 
better understand how these parts fit together to create an overall Arctic SAR 
regime. The “Arctic SAR Regime” is the cooperative program that SAR 
Agreements and efforts jointly create in the Arctic. The basic function of the 
Arctic SAR regime requires that nations adequately perform their own search 
and rescue duties in their areas of responsibility. Upon this is built other 
collaborative efforts. Party members to the Arctic SAR agreement have taken 
steps to make the regime operational, participating in information and 
resource sharing, not to mention collaborative politics and operations. Arctic 
nations solidify their operational collaboration predominantly through the 
conducting of joint exercises. Exercises seem to be the centrepiece of 
practical cooperation. Exercises are used to "test" SAR agreement 
implementation and to gauge its effectiveness as a regime.  
Operative collaboration between the parties has long been developing 
through a series of joint exercises, which often uncover areas of deficiencies 
and challenges of the regime to be addressed collectively. Following the 
Arctic Zephyr table top exercise in 2015 for example, it was discovered that 
the Arctic SAR agreement does not provide an effective mechanism for 
fulfilling Article 9 on Cooperation among Parties.175 Made apparent by the 
Arctic Zephyr exercise, A.K Sydnes (et al) noted in their article 
"International Cooperation on Search and Rescue in the Arctic" that codified 
methods for the coordination of operational SAR activities were lacking, as 
were standardised processes for sharing lessons learned.176  
 
175 Sydnes et al (n 3) 120.  
176 ibid.   
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Over the years, Arctic nations have together participated in over ten 
live and table top joint exercises, with more currently planned. Serving to 
train for real Arctic emergencies, nations commit their forces and fleets to 
these efforts, and it contributes greatly to the overall running of the actual 
SAR regime.  
 
The "Live" Arctic SAR Regime  
Bearing in mind the many moving parts and high levels of planning and 
effort present in Arctic search and rescue, how would a real emergency in the 
Arctic play out?  
Each emergency situation and subsequent rescue is unique and no two 
are ever the same. The variation in the scale, type, and location of Arctic 
emergencies will determine the SAR operations and processes employed, 
thus no "standard" rescue exists. However, many of the components and 
plans of the Arctic SAR regime are utilised each time. The domestic response 
system of the various Arctic nations, for example, all follow the same steps in 
the registering and managing of the rescue efforts and the coordinating and 
deploying of rescue units.  When an emergency is first registered by national 
authorities, usually by way of distress calls or emergency notification 
systems, rescue coordination centres are responsible for leading search and 
rescue operations and coordinating the various national agencies. While the 
decisions of the RCCs may differ between countries based on the different 
national SAR structures, each RCC will follow the same minimum 
international documentation for SAR operational purposes.177 The 
documentation referenced by RCCs and JRCCs include the various SAR 
agreements, the IAMSAR manual, and additional IMO Codes and Manuals 
on subjects of signalling, dangerous goods and standard marine 
communications. While this list does not cover other non-SAR related tasks 
that RCC’s may be required to perform, it does to an extent standardise 
 
177 International Maritime Organization, ‘Radiocommunications and Search and 
Rescue’ (International Maritime Organization, 22 February 2017) 
<http://www.imo.org/en/OurWork/Safety/RadioCommunicationsAndSearchAnd
Rescue/SearchAndRescue/Pages/IMO-documents-relevant-to-SAR.aspx> 
accessed 13 October 2018.  
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national search and coordination procedure for RCCs across all countries, 
including Arctic nations.  
 From this point, RCCs will defer to their own national policies and 
instructions to execute rescues, coordinating their various SAR agencies and 
deploying units to conduct rescues in their areas of responsibility. In doing 
so, RCCs may also choose to request assistance from other neighbouring 
states or vessels that may be in the area of distress. For these cases, and also 
in the case of emergencies bordering multiple SAR boundaries, countries 
have demonstrated the importance of drilling joint rescues. As the likelihood 
of large-scale emergencies grow with the increasing accessibility of the 
Arctic, the prospect of requiring the resources from multiple nations 
increases as well. Depending on the nature and location of the emergency, 
RCCs may also designate lead coordination responsibilities to their joint 
rescue coordination centres. In Canada, for example, the responsibility for 
launching an air or maritime response in Canada’s North generally rests with 
the JRCC in the region where the response is needed.178 This was designed in 
response to the vast distances in the Canadian Arctic and the very real 
probability of requiring air units in support of the marine units for the long 
distances they need to travel while en-route to an emergency.  
 
 
178 Department of National Defence, ‘Search and Rescue (SAR) in the North’ 
(Government of Canada, Department of National Defence, Last modified 2018) 
<http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/operations-canada-north-america-current/north-
sar.page> accessed 12 October 2018.  
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4 Canada’s Search and Rescue System 
 
4.1 Canada’s SAR History and Policy 
In 1978, Canada acceded to the SOLAS Convention, thus undertaking the 
necessary arrangements for coastal watching and for the rescue of persons in 
distress at sea.179 Later, in 1982, Canada also signed the UNCLOS (high seas) 
and ratified in 2003, wherein they were bound to maintain adequate and 
effective SAR services under Article 12 (2).180 In 1979, Canada also defined 
its commitments and responsibilities through the ratifying of the international 
SAR agreement.  
Together, with the implementation of additional recommendations and 
best practice guidelines from organisations such as the IMO and ICAO, these 
requirements formed the various parts which converged to create Canada's 
search and rescue program. Prior to this, however, a singular, systematic 
approach to national SAR was generally lacking in earlier years. This became 
apparent following the 1982 Ocean Ranger disaster, the sinking of a semi-
submersible mobile offshore drilling unit in the Canadian waters of 
Newfoundland, in which all 84 crew members perished.181 The 1986 Ottawa-
Newfoundland led commission following the event exposed serious 
deficiencies in the way in which the Canadian government approached search 
and rescue services and organisation. The commission was critical of the 
federal government's search and rescue response, principally its reliance on 
old search and rescue infrastructure, such as 20-year old helicopters which 
were ill-equipped for off-shore rescue. In response to the commission's 
 
179 CAMSAR (n 5) Sec. I-1.07 (E) p.1 of 2. 
180 ibid. 
181 Robert D. Pitt, ‘Ocean Ranger’ (The Canadian Encyclopedia, Last edited 4 
March 2015) <https://www.thecandianencyclopedia.ca/en/article/ocean-ranger> 
accessed 8 March 2019.    
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report, the Canadian government bolstered SAR infrastructure, carrying on to 
surpass the commission's recommendations by centralising Canada's SAR 
program under one administrative department in 1986, giving birth to the 
National Search and Rescue Program (NSP).  
The National Search and Rescue Program of Canada was established 
as the national coordinating authority for Canada's search and rescue 
policy.182 The NSP, which until 2015 was administered by the National 
Search and Rescue Secretariat, is the amalgamation of all of Canada's 
collective domestic search and rescue activities.183 In 2015, the NSP was 
absorbed into the Emergency Management and Programs Branch of Public 
Safety Canada.184 
Since then, Canada's commitment to domestic search and rescue has 
been further reflected in subsequent Cabinet decisions and legislations, such 
as the Canada Shipping Act (2001) and the Oceans Act. (1997), as well as 
non-binding documents, such as Guidelines for the Operation of Passenger 
Vessels in Canadian Arctic Waters.185 There is no shortage in the amount of 
literature on processes for emergency management and preparedness 
produced by the various Canadian government systems. This literature 
includes checklists and templates for identifying hazards, preparing 
emergency plans, creating emergency asset inventories, and establishing 
emergency networks and partnerships.186 187 At the federal level, SAR policy 
is co-ordinated under the National Search and Rescue Program.  
 
 
182 Public Safety Canada, ‘National Search and Rescue Program’ (Government of 
Canada, Last modified 27 September 2017) 
<https://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/mrgnc-mngmnt/rspndng-mrgnc-
vnts/nss/index-en.aspx> accessed 8 October 2018.  
183 Department of National Defence, ‘About Search and Rescue (SAR)’ 
(Government of Canada, Last modified 11 November 2018) 
<https://www.canada.ca/en/department-national-defence/services/operations/-
military-operations/search-rescue.html> accessed 8 December 2018.  
184 Public Safety Canada, ‘National Search and Rescue Program’ (n 182).  
185 CAMSAR (5) Sec. I-1.07 (E) p.1 of 2. 
186 Funston (n 1) 17. 
187 This literature can be found by visiting: 
https://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/mrgnc-mngmnt/rspndng-mrgnc-
vnts/nss/index-en.aspx. 
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4.2 The National Search and Rescue Program 
 
With Canada's participation in the International Civil Aviation Organization 
and the International Maritime Organization, Canada has adopted search and 
rescue standards and practices in accordance with the treaties of these various 
organisations. As previously discussed, this is achieved primarily through the 
implementation of convention articles and recommendations into domestic 
law and best practice guidelines.  
Today, Canada's SAR program functions through the complex partitioning 
of search and rescue regions by geography and jurisdiction. The critical 
importance of search and rescue is reflected by a multi-jurisdictional 
approach in which the National SAR program functions as a cooperative 
effort by federal, provincial and municipal governments along with other 
SAR organisations.188 Despite the various jurisdictions, the NSP attempts to 
bridge the efforts of the federal, provincial, territorial and local search and 
rescue authorities in the realising of Canada's formal objective: [to] "save 
lives by enhancing SAR prevention and provide effective and affordable 
SAR services in Canada's SAR area of responsibility."189 
4.3 The Organisation of Canada’s Arctic SAR  
Canada's SAR Structure  
Federal Departments Responsible for SAR  
In Canada, search and rescue (SAR) is a shared responsibility. Various 
federal departments and authorities are involved due to the country’s 
immense size, range of terrain and weather.190  
 Canada is divided into provinces and territories, both featuring very 
different governance structures. Territories, as per the Constitution Act of 
1867, are under federal control and receive their legislative authority from the 
 
188 CAMSAR (n 5) Sec. I-1.07 (E) p.1 of 2. 
189 ibid. 
190 Coast Guard and Fisheries and Oceans Canada ‘SAR Seamanship Reference 
Manual’ (1st edn Canadian Government Publishing 2000) 3. 
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federal government through the process of devolution.  Provinces, on the 
other hand, receive their authority to govern from the Constitution.   
In 1999, under the Nunavut Act and via the Nunavut Land Claims 
Agreement Act, Nunavut separated from the Northwest Territories and 
officially became a territory of Canada.191 The agreement allowed for the 
Inuit of the central and eastern Northwest Territories to form their separate 
territory in which they had certain features, such as Inuit land titles, rights to 
resources and the establishment of federally funded national parks.192 
Search and rescue can be understood in three components: ground, 
maritime and air. In Canada, in order to distribute the burden and pool 
resources, these components are divided between multiple departments and 
agencies.  
Ground search and rescue is the responsibility of provinces and 
territories, and in this case does not involve federal participation apart from 
occasional support from the Canadian Rangers (a division of the Federal 
Canadian Armed Forces). Usually, ground search and rescue will be 
delegated to the police force of the SAR incident's jurisdiction, such as Royal 
Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), Peace Officers or municipal police. Each 
province or territory requires emergency search and rescue strategies and 
programs to initiate in a given SAR incident on land, or in Canada's internal 
waters. Nunavut utilises the RCMP and local police for its ground SAR. They 
also use civilian volunteers and can also request further assistance from the 
Canadian Rangers for additional support if necessary.193 
Maritime and air search and rescue on the other hand, is the 
responsibility of the Canadian federal government. Coordinating SAR 
services for these two components falls under the organisational umbrella of 
two separate, yet collaborating federal departments. 
  The two federal departments involved in Canada's search and rescue 
system are the Department of National Defence (DND) and the Department 
of Fisheries and Oceans Canada (DFO). The Department of National Defence 
is responsible for aeronautical search and rescue, and the Department of 
Fisheries and Oceans is responsible for maritime search and rescue (DFO) 
anywhere within Canada's designated area of responsibility.  
 
191 Kikkert (n 59).  
192 Nunavut Land Claims Agreement Act, SC 1993, c29.   
193 SAR Seamanship Reference Manual (n 190).  
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 Figure 7. Canada's Search and Rescue Response Authorities194  
 
 
194 Public Safety Canada, ‘Quadrennial Search and Rescue Review’ [2013] 11 
(Quadrennial Search and Rescue Review 2013)   
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Figure 8. The Canadian National Search and Rescue Program195  
 
 
 
 
 
 
195 Quadrennial Search and Rescue Review 2013 (n 194).  
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The lead minister for search and rescue (LMSAR) serves as head of the 
Department of National Defence. At the national level. The LMSAR is 
designated as the competent authority responsible for search and rescue in 
Canada. Together, with the Department of Fisheries and Oceans, the 
Department of National Defence is responsible for the coordination of the 
National Search and Rescue Program and the development of national SAR 
policy.  
The Departments of National Defence and Fisheries and Oceans 
provide the administration and organisation for Canada's search and rescue 
program. However, they are not equipped with the force, fleet, or operational 
knowledge to conduct search and rescue activities. The DND and the DFO 
have corresponding agencies who perform the actual SAR operations.  
 
 
Federal Agencies Responsible for SAR  
The Department of National Defence employs the Canadian Armed Forces 
(CAF) to act as the lead authority responsible for aeronautical SAR. To do 
this, the CAF utilises the Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF), its aircrafts, and 
infrastructure. The Department of National Defence also coordinates the 
activities of the Civil Air Search and Rescue Association (CASARA), a 
volunteer-based organisation which supports the CAF during SAR operations 
with the use of certified civilian pilots trained for searching and 
reconnaissance operations.196 
The Canadian Coast Guard, on the other hand, is a special operating 
agency of the Department of Fisheries and Oceans, and detects maritime 
incidents, works with the Canadian Armed Forces in the coordination and 
delivery of maritime SAR response within areas of federal responsibility, 
provides maritime resources to assist with aeronautical SAR operations as 
necessary, and when and where available, provides SAR resources to assist in 
humanitarian incidents within provincial/territorial jurisdiction. The 
Canadian Coast Guard also supports the Canadian Coast Guard Auxiliary, 
who similar to the Civil Air Search and Rescue Association, are specialised 
volunteers trained to provide and assist in maritime search and rescue.   
 
 
196 CAMSAR (n 5) Sec.I-2.13 (E) p. 1 of 2. 
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Scope of Operation  
For aeronautical and maritime search and rescue, Canada's area of 
responsibility has been defined by the International Civil Aviation 
Organization (ICAO) agreements for aeronautical SAR, and the International 
Maritime Organization (IMO) agreements for maritime SAR.197 This area has 
been further solidified by the Arctic SAR agreement, and reiterates the extent 
of Canada's jurisdiction all the way to the geographical North Pole at 90.198 
In accordance with the IMO SAR Plan and ICAO Regional Air Navigation 
Plans, the Canadian federal SAR area of responsibility has been divided into 
three search and rescue regions (SRRs) for maritime and aeronautical SAR 
coordination."199 The three SRRs are Victoria, Trenton and Halifax. These 
regions have been specifically delineated with regards to where SAR assets 
are located across the country, and the response times of their various 
assets.200 
Each SRRs is headed by a joint rescue coordination centre. In fulfilling 
the requirements of the international SAR agreement to provide rescue 
coordination centres, Canada established joint co-ordination centres in each 
region to systematise a regional based federal SAR program.201 
  Regarding Arctic search and rescue, responsibility for launching an air 
or marine SAR response in Canada’s North generally rests with the Joint 
Rescue Coordination Centre (JRCC) in the region where the response is 
needed.202 Especially if the rescue in question requires air and marine 
assistance. Under the SAR program, the DND and CCG coordinates the 
response to air and maritime SAR incidents through jointly staffed JRCCs. 
JRCC Victoria provides the primary SAR response to the Yukon Territory, 
JRCC Trenton covers the Northwest Territories and Nunavut, including the 
north of Baffin Island, JRCC Halifax covers the southern half of Baffin 
Island (Figure 9). As a side point, JRCC Halifax has been designated as the 
“Canadian Point of Contact for Maritime SAR” for the international 
community, entailing that JRCC Halifax guarantees assistance on request to 
foreign rescue coordination centres Canadian vessels in foreign waters.  
 
197 CAMSAR (n 5) Sec. I-1.04 (e) p.1 of 4. 
198 The Arctic Institute (n 144).  
199 CAMSAR (n 5) Sec. I-1.04 (e) p.1 of 4. 
200 Department of National Defence (n 183).   
201 Sydnes et al (n 3) 114.  
202 Department of National Defence (n 183).   
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Despite the differences in the search and rescue regions, the JRCCs all 
operate under the same procedures and direction of the National SAR 
Program, which in turn systemises SAR across the three regions.203  
 As of October 2018, the Department of Fisheries and Oceans Canada 
and the Canadian Coast Guard jointly announced the creation of a new, 
standalone Arctic administrative region. This fourth Coast Guard Region will 
encompass Nunavut, and areas of the Northwest Territories, Northern 
Quebec and Labrador. At the time of this thesis, no further information has 
been disclosed regarding the delineation of this area. No official re-drawn 
map of the regions has been made available as of this date. For the interim, 
and bearing in mind this development, this thesis will continue to utilise 
Canada’s current structuring as a basis for analysis. The establishment of this 
new region may have positive impacts on critical gaps that are discussed later 
in this study.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
203 Public Safety Canada (n 182).  
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Figure 9. Canada's 3 Search and Rescue Regions204 205 
 
 
The boundaries of the three search and rescue regions206 
 
204 ibid. 
205 Administrative and operational regions for search and rescue in Canada as of 
August 1st 2019; the announcement of the new CCG and DFO Arctic region 
notwithstanding.  
206 Victoria SRR – 54°42.5’N 130°36.5’W, along the Alaska/Canada border to 
the Beaufort Sea, east along the shoreline to the Yukon/North West Territory 
border, south along the Yukon/North West Territory border to 60°00’N, east 
along 60°00’N to the British Columbia/Alberta border, south along the British 
Columbia/Alberta border to the Canada/United States border, west along the 
Canada/United States border to 48°30’N 124°45’W, 48°30’N 125°00’W, 
48°20’N 128°00’W, 48°20’N 145°00’W, 54°40’N 140°00’W, 54°40’N 
136°00’W, 54°00’N 136°00’W, 54°13’N 134°57’W, 54°39.45’N 132°41’W and 
54°42.5’N 130°36.5’W. 
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The Canadian Armed Forces  
The Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) have the main responsibility for 
providing SAR from the air. They also coordinate the national response for 
air and maritime SAR under the authority of the Department of National 
Defence. In 1951, the Canadian Cabinet delegated the responsibility for 
maritime SAR coordination to the Royal Canadian Air Force.207 The CAF is 
subsumed into and follows military command structure. Heading this 
hierarchy is the Canadian Joint Operations Command (CJOC) (Figure 8). 
On average, CAF assets are tasked to respond to about 1000 SAR missions 
every year.208 The SAR activities of the CAF are extensive. However, the 
basic SAR tasks include: 209  
 
Trenton SRR – 70°00’N 080°00’W, 64°00’N 080°00’W, 62°00’N 070°00’W, 
46°42’N 070°00’W, westerly along the Canada/United States border to the 
Alberta/British Columbia border, north along the Alberta/British Columbia 
border to 60°00’N 120°00’W, westerly to 60°00’N 124°00’W, north along the 
Yukon/North West Territory border to the Beaufort Sea, westerly along the coast 
to the Canada/Alaska border, north along 141°00’W to the North Pole, south to 
82°00’N 060°00’W, 78°00’N 075°00’W, 76°00’N 076°00’W, 70°00’N 
063°00’W and west to 70°00’N 080°00’W. 
 Halifax SRR – 64°00’N 080°00’W, 70°00’N 080°00’W, 70°00’N 063°00’W, 
65°00’N 057°45’W, 63°00’N 055°40’W, 58°30’N 050°00’W, 58°30’N 
030°00’W, 45°00’N 030°00’W, 45°00’N 053°00’W, 43°36’N 060°00’W, 
41°52’N 067°00’W, 44°30’N 067°00’W, north to the Canada/United States 
border, westerly along the Canada/United States border to the 70th meridian, 
north along the 70th meridian to 62°00’N 070°00’W and north-west to 64°00’N 
080°00’W 206. 
207 CAMSAR (n 5) Sec. 1.06 (E) p.1 of 4. 
208 Department of National Defence (n 183).   
209 The entire list of CAF search and rescue activities are: the provision of SAR 
aircraft in response to aeronautical SAR incidents within the Canadian AOR; the 
setting of priorities pertaining to the allocation of SRUs to SAR operations; the 
provision of ground SAR and humanitarian assistance, as a complementary 
tasking; the formulation and promulgation of SAR policy (in collaboration with 
ICSAR); the establishment of operating standards and the provision of SAR 
training for the coordinated SAR system in collaboration (when appropriate) with 
CCG authorities; the evaluation of SAR equipment and procedures in 
collaboration (when appropriate) with CCG authorities; the review of SAR 
services, facilities and SRUs in collaboration (when appropriate) with CCG; the 
evaluation of CASARA capabilities and readiness, and coordination of CASARA 
operational activities; and the efficient operation of the Canadian components of 
the COSPAS-SARSAT system including CMCC and associated ground stations 
(local user terminals). 
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1. To coordinate, control and conduct SAR operations in relation to 
aeronautical SAR incidents within the Canadian area of 
responsibility 
 
2. Provide search and rescue units (SRUs) in support of the 
prosecution of maritime SAR operations and to exercise ultimate 
authority in the allocation of all SRUs during a SAR incident 
 
3.  To conduct and/or coordinate ground searches in relation to 
aeronautical SAR incidents. 
 
4. To provide the resources to operate the Canadian components of 
the COSPAS- SARSAT system 
 
5. The efficient operation of the aeronautical and maritime 
components of the coordinated SAR system 
 
6. The provision and operation of the JRCCs, CMCC and other SAR 
installations, in conjunction with the CCG 
 
7. The coordination, control, and conduct of aeronautical SAR 
operations within the Canadian AOR and between Canada and 
other countries, in accordance with existing agreements.210 
 
Additionally, the CAF may also assist with ground SAR efforts, medical 
evacuations and other incidents where people are in distress. However, this 
assistance is done so upon the request of provincial, territorial or municipal 
authorities.211 
 
The Civil Air Search and Rescue Association (CASARA)  
The Canadian Armed Forces assumes responsibility for sponsoring and 
funding the Civil Air Search and Rescue Association (CASARA). This 
volunteer organization was established in 1985 helps the CAF respond to 
incidents that involve air SAR. CASARA utilises civilian/private aircrafts 
and trained volunteer crews for SAR missions. They engage in search 
activities and also provide communications services."212 
 
 
210 CAMSAR (n 5) Sec. 1.06 (E) p.3 of 4. 
211 Department of National Defence (n 183).   
212 Department of National Defence (n 183).   
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Figure 10. Canadian Armed Forces SAR Management Structure213  
 
 
213 Department of National Defence (n 183).   
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The Canadian Coast Guard  
The Canadian Coast Guard plays a critical role in Canada's search and rescue; 
they have the primary responsibility for the provision of the maritime 
operational component of the federal SAR program. For this purpose, the 
CCG has the basic SAR tasks to214: (1) detect maritime incidents and, in 
collaboration with the CAF, coordinate, control and conduct SAR operations 
relating to maritime SAR incidents within the Canadian area of federal 
responsibility and (2) provide maritime units and communications in support 
of the prosecution of aeronautical SAR operations where applicable.215 
 The Coast Guard is also assigned complementary tasks, such as the 
provision of search and rescue units during humanitarian incidents and to 
support Transport Canada in SAR prevention through participation and 
educational programs. The CCG is a leading authority on maritime 
operations (especially in the Arctic). In addition to providing search and 
rescue services, the CCG also provides services regarding boating safety, 
environmental response, icebreaking, marine navigation services, and marine 
 
214 The entire list of the Canadian Coast Guards SAR tasks are: the provision of 
and participation in the maritime component of the joint rescue coordination 
centres (JRCCs) as well as the provision, operation and equipping of the Quebec 
Maritime Rescue Sub-Centres (MRSC) and other SAR installations, in 
cooperation with the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF); in collaboration with the 
CAF, the coordination, control and conduct of maritime SAR operations within 
the Canadian area of responsibility (AOR); the provision of maritime advice and 
assistance to the CAF in the coordination of aeronautical SAR and other 
emergencies which may require the use of maritime facilities; the provision of 
maritime SAR units (SRUs) in response to SAR incidents within the Canadian 
AOR, the activities of which SRUs are coordinated by JRCCs and Quebec 
MRSC; the provision of humanitarian assistance, as a secondary task, when such 
is deemed best provided by CCG SRUs; the formulation and promulgation of 
federal SAR policy (in collaboration with the Interdepartmental Committee on 
Search and Rescue); the establishment of levels of service, performance and 
operating standards; the provision of maritime SAR training for the coordinated 
SAR system in collaboration (when appropriate) with the CAF; the organization, 
coordination and administration of Canadian Coast Guard Auxiliary activities; the 
evaluation of SAR services, equipment and procedures, in collaboration with the 
CAF; the review of SAR services, installations and units, in collaboration with 
the CAF; and the provision of maritime distress and safety communications and 
alerting services. 
215 CAMSAR (n 5) Sec. I-1.07 (E) p.2 of 2. 
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communication and traffic services.216 As a result, the Coast Guard has 
inadvertently become the go-to agency regarding Arctic marine activities and 
operational knowledge, and are   constantly advising agencies and actors 
engaged in SAR operations to this effect.217  
The CCG SAR program includes four elements: management and 
monitoring, operations, prevention, and volunteers.218  
  
 
The Canadian Coast Guard Auxiliary  
The Canadian Coast Guard oversees the activities of the Canadian Coast 
Guard Auxiliary (CCGA), a highly effective, Canada-wide volunteer 
organisation that provides additional support to the Canadian Coast Guard. 
CCGA members and vessels have a limited authority to assist the CCG 
during SAR response and prevention activities219 
 The Government of Canada contributes financial support to CCGA in 
line with their contractual agreement to cover certain expenses, such as 
insurance while it is engaged in authorised SAR operations an activity. The 
CCGA was created in address a deficit in SAR vessels and personnel, 
without having to radically increase budgets or infrastructure. The Canadian 
Coast Guard assists Auxiliary members with the specialised SAR training 
necessary to become members. In return, the CCG can rely on some 5,000 
civilian volunteer members and 1,500 vessels to supplement its maritime 
SAR capabilities.220 Whereas members of the Civil Air Search and Rescue 
Association are authorized and trained in reporting and surveillance 
operations, the Canadian Coast Guard Auxiliary assists and performs actual 
maritime search and rescue operations.   
 The Canadian Coast Guard Auxiliary has proved a successful program 
in the past. In recognition of this, the Canadian Coast Guard have doubled 
down on its drafting and training targets, especially in the Northern waters of 
Canada.  
 
216 SAR Seamanship Reference Manual (1-3).  
217 CAMSAR (n 5) Sec. I-1.07 (E) p.2 of 2. 
218 SAR Seamanship Reference Manual (1-3).  
219 CAMSAR (n 5) Sec.I-2.13 (E) p. 1 of 2. 
220 SAR Seamanship Reference Manual (n 190) 1-3. 
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Canada's SAR Force and Fleet  
Force  
Canada's search and rescue aeronautical force is comprised of (1) primary 
rotary-wing aircrafts (helicopters) and (2) primary fixed-wing aircrafts 
(airplanes).  
The RCAF employs CH-149 Cormorant and CH-146 Griffon 
helicopters to respond to SAR incidents. Helicopters offer the advantage of 
swift response times, hovering, landing and hoisting capabilities. However, 
their range is limited. Airplanes on the other hand, are able to cover long 
distances. The RCAF uses CC-115 Buffalo and CC-130 Hercules fixed-wing 
aircrafts to supplement their SAR force. These airplanes, despite being able 
to drop crucial survival equipment, also have their drawbacks, such as 
requiring airstrips for take-off and landing. Ideally, a SAR force that features 
both aircraft types is best. The Canadian Armed Forces has (in total) 
available to them:  
• 14 x CC-130 Hercules Aircraft; 
• 6 x CC-115 Buffalo Aircraft  
• 14 x CH-149 Cormorant Helicopters;  
• 5 x CH-146 Griffon Helicopters221  
 
The aircraft units dedicated to SAR activities are stationed at regional RCAF 
bases scattered across the country (Figures 11,12). Accompanying every 
SAR aircraft are Canadian Armed Forces SAR technicians; specialised 
personnel trained in rescue techniques, including Arctic rescue. The CAF 
have 140 SAR technicians who provide pre-hospital medical care and rescue 
for aviators, mariners and others in distress. They are specially trained in 
parachuting, diving, mountain climbing and helicopter rescue.222
 
221 Quadrennial Search and Rescue Review 2013 (n 194). 
222 Department of National Defence (n 183).  
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Figure 11. The Royal Canadian Airforce Base Location223  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
223 Quadrennial Search and Rescue Review 2013 (n 194) 10. 
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Figure 12. The Royal Canadian Airforce SAR Resource Distribution224 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
224 Office of the Auditor General of Canada, ‘2013 Spring Report of the Auditor General Canada’, Chapter 7 – Federal Search and 
Rescue Activities [2013] (2013 Auditor General Report).  
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Fleet  
Canada's Search and rescue fleet is comprised of primary SAR vessels, multi-
tasked SAR vessels, secondary SAR vessels and Canadian Coast Guard 
Auxiliary vessels.  
 Primary SAR vessels are specifically designed and tasked with search 
and rescue duties, and are specially equipped and supplied with trained crew 
for this purpose. Primary SAR vessels display the words 
"RESCUE/SAUVETAGE" and are painted red and white in accordance with 
Canadian Coast Guard colours. Due to their expertise, primary SAR vessels 
are generally stationed in areas with the highest risk of SAR incidents.225 The 
Canadian Coast Guard maintains a fleet of 15 icebreakers as primary vessels 
stationed in Eastern Canada and the Arctic: 2 heavy icebreakers, 4 medium 
icebreakers, and 9 multi-purpose vessels.226 However, most of these vessels 
are positioned in Eastern Canada in order to keep important shipping lanes 
such as the St. Lawrence clear of ice during the winter. According to the 
Canadian Coast Guard (under average ice conditions) an icebreaker will be 
on scene to provide icebreaking services within 10 hours in the Canadian 
Arctic.227 The Canadian Coast Guard also follows a self-imposed SAR policy 
in which all primary vessels maintain a maximum 20-minute state readiness, 
meaning they require mobilisation and dispatch to the incident within 20 
minutes.228 
 Multi-tasked SAR vessels are also CCG vessels; however, they are 
normally charged in carrying out other Coast Guard tasks as their primary 
directive. Multi-tasked SAR vessels nonetheless uphold regular SAR 
operational standards and can be employed to carry out or support SAR 
activities. Multi-tasked SAR vessels are usually relegated to their specific 
SAR area and can stand in for primary SAR vessels when required. 229    
 
225 Canadian Coast Guard, ‘Maritime Search and Rescue (SAR) in Canada’ 
(Government of Canada, Last modified 27 April 2018) <http://www.ccg-
gcc.gc.ca/eng/CCG/SAR_Maritime_Sar> accessed 14 October 2018.  
226 Canadian Coast Guard, ‘Icebreaking operations services’ (Government of 
Canada, Last modified 30 April 2019) <www.ccg-gcc.gc.ca/icebreaking/home> 
accessed 14 October 2018.    
227 ibid. 
228 SAR Seamanship Reference Manual (n 190) 1-4. 
229 Canadian Coast Guard (n 226).  
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 Secondary vessels refer to all other government vessels, and may also 
be utilised for SAR activities. However secondary vessels lack the 
exceptionally high level of search and rescue proficiency provided by 
primary vessels.  
 At the disposal of the Canadian Coast Guard are all vessels registered 
and trained by the Canadian Coast Guard Auxiliary. This totals some 1,133 
vessels across Canada.230 
 While not a formal part of the fleet, the CCG may still count on and 
utilise vessels of opportunity to assist during distress incidents. Vessels of 
opportunity can be any vessel in the vicinity of an emergency, and under 
international law must assist to the best of their capacity. The obligations of 
vessels to aid is further codified in the Canada Shipping Act.231 
Canada's Arctic SAR  
The distribution of search and rescue cases in Canada tends to correlate with 
the density of people across the country. Most of the SAR incidents within 
Canada happen along the coasts and the southern regions bordering the 
United States, where the highest numbers of people reside.232 Comparatively 
few SAR incidents happen in the Canadian Arctic (Figure 13). However, the 
harsh environments, remoteness and limited available infrastructure 
compounds Arctic SAR incidents and response times, leading to higher risk 
of injury, death, or damage of property than in other areas.  
 
 
 
230 ibid. 
231 Canada Shipping Act, SC 2001, c26.   
232 Quadrennial Search and Rescue Review 2013 (n 194).    
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Figure 13. The Distribution of Canada's SAR Incidents in 2014  
 
 
Canada's Arctic falls into two separate search and rescue regions, with the 
Yukon under the jurisdiction of JRCC Victoria and the Northwest Territories 
and Nunavut under JRCC Trenton. The Arctic is a unique region and presents 
its own challenges, yet the management of Arctic search and rescue occurs at 
facilities in the South far away from the Arctic itself. JRCC Trenton and its 
SAR assets for example, are approximately 2917 km from the Arctic 
community of Gjø Haven, 3183 km from Pond Inlet, 3513 km from Resolute, 
and 3426 km from Kugluktuk. 233 For context, 3500 km is the approximate 
distance between London, England and Cairo, Egypt. As per the Arctic SAR 
strategy, these are all communities that fall under the management of JRCC 
Trenton. Although a JRCC can call on any SAR squadron to respond to a 
 
233 Calculated for approximation by Author with use of Google Earth.  
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distress call in the North, in addition to be able request the support of any 
nearby military asset, there still remains a large deficit in SAR facilities and 
units in the Arctic (Figure 14).234 Is this deficit impacting Canada's SAR 
overall SAR responsibilities?   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
234 Department of National Defence (n 183). 
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Figure 14. Central and Arctic SAR Staff and Facilities  
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Considering most of Canada's Arctic Archipelago is surrounded by water, the 
Canadian Coast Guard generally plays a larger role in Arctic SAR than the 
Canadian Armed Forces. While the CCG does not maintain Northerly land-
based facilities, there are numerous primary SAR vessels operating within 
Arctic waters throughout the entirety of the year. All of these CCG vessels 
have the ability to assist when necessary.  
 
Incident Plan 
Given the intricacies of the Canadian SAR program and system, it is 
worthwhile explaining how a real rescue in the Canadian Arctic would unfold 
under the current structure.  
In the event of an emergency in the Canadian Arctic, a JRCC would be 
notified that a person or vessel may be in danger by either (1) a call from a 
ship radio or telephone or (2) a distress signal transmitted from emergency 
locating beacons on aircrafts or marine vessels. Canadian domestic law 
requires all vessels and aircrafts operating in Canada's area of responsibility 
to maintain the emergency contact information of the respective JRCC's of 
that region. JRCCs will continue to receive distress alerts transmitted by 
vessels and relayed from Canada's Marine Communications and Traffic 
Services (who monitor emergency radio frequencies) or by Canada's 
COSPAR/SARSAT network; a SAR satellite system used to detect and locate 
signals from distress beacons. Although Canada requires carriage 
requirements for equipment pertaining to the Global Marine Distress and 
Safety System (GMDSS) (a digital electronic communications system which 
sends distress and safety information), Canada's Arctic has been designated 
as a Sea Area A4; an area outside GMDSS coverage.235 As a result, Canada's 
JRCCs rely on radio distress calls, beacons and COSPAR/SARSAT for 
detecting and alerting in the Canadian Arctic.236 JRCCs are also able to 
monitor marine traffic in the Arctic through a reporting system known as the 
Arctic Canada Traffic System (NORDREG). Under the Canada Shipping 
Act, vessels are required to report their movements when operating in areas 
north of 60N, including the Northwest Passage. NORDREG allows Canada 
(and the JRCCs) to keep a finger on the pulse of Arctic marine activity for 
which emergency response can be quickly mobilised if need be.  
 
235 Northern Canada Vessel Traffic Services Zone Regulations SOR/2010-127.  
236 Canadian Coast Guard (n 226)  
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Once a distress alert is received, the JRCC would task search and rescue 
units to respond. Joint Rescue Co-ordination Centres maintain current 
location information on all of the various primary, secondary and multi-
tasking SAR vessels and aircrafts usable to them.  
In response to Arctic marine emergencies, the Canadian Coast Guard 
vessels are usually designated as "On Scene Commander". This allows the 
CCG vessel to make use of the best available information and resources to 
develop appropriate search patterns and evacuation plans. The On Scene 
Commander is able to request additional support from the JRCC, and would 
always conduct SAR operations in discussion with the lead JRCC. The JRCC 
supplies important information to the On Scene Commander. The JRCC is 
able to determine and direct rescuers to places of safety, in addition to 
providing critical operational updates from modelling programs to determine 
things such as drift rates from a last known position.  
The On Scene Commander would be responsible for co-ordinating and 
conduction the search and rescue operations.  
Indigenous Involvement  
Comprising the majority of the local population in the Canadian Arctic, 
indigenous peoples are often involved in search and rescue; whether as 
victims, or as the first to observe and respond to an emergency in their 
territory.237  
The Canadian Coast Guard is often active around Canada's northern 
communities, usually by way of helping supply vessels to reach isolated 
towns. Federal agencies and local communities are involved as allies in 
Arctic SAR.  
Indigenous people's traditional, ecological and local knowledge has 
long been recognised for its inherent value, and the formal integration and 
utilisation of this knowledge is becoming increasingly included into Canada's 
search and rescue system. In using local indigenous knowledge in the 
planning and response to Arctic emergencies, it has been determined that 
initial response times have reduced in most cases.238 
 
237 Arctic Council Emergency Prevention, Preparedness and Response, ‘Arctic 
Environmental Hazards and National Mitigation Programs’ (2015) 10. 
238 ibid 11. 
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 The Canadian Coast Guard often utilises local knowledge in rescue 
situations. Additionally, the Department of Fisheries and Oceans has 
launched new initiatives and funding to train and include northern 
communities into the Canadian Coast Guard Auxiliary, even providing 
training and materials in local Inuktitut language.239    
 Northern communities are also invested in bolstering search and rescue 
services for their areas. Climate change, economic and industry growth is a 
pervasive issue for many residents of Canada's north. The rapid changes in 
habitats and ecosystems, in addition to an added influx in people have 
challenged the abilities of northerners to respond to emergencies in their own 
localities. With these changes, traditional indigenous knowledge and ways of 
life begin to become undermined, and the likelihood of search and rescue 
incidents increases, for which northerners will bear the brunt of the 
consequences.240  
   Indigenous involvement can serve to contribute to the overall 
effectiveness of Canada’s Arctic SAR. As experts on Arctic environments, 
indigenous people have unparalleled knowledge and expertise to lend 
throughout various processes such as SOP drafting, table top exercises, best 
practices and other documentation, all of which articulate the parameters of 
Canada’s SAR program and operations to be used as evidence of their due 
diligence. Often overlooked, indigenous and indigenous knowledge is a 
remarkable resource, not only for its inherent value but also in the 
contributing to Canada’s SAR program - keeping indigenous in mind as one 
of the primary users of Arctic SAR services.   
  
  
 
 
 
239 Nunatsiaq News, ‘Canadian Coast Guard Auxiliary grows to six Nunavik 
communities’ (Nunatsiaq News, 9 November 2017) 
<https://nunatsiaq.com/stories/article/6567canadian_coast_guard_auxiliary_grow
s_to_six_nunavik_communities/> accessed 17 July 2019.    
240 Funston (n 1) 7.  
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5  Canada’s Efforts  
5.1 Canada’s Substantive Obligations for Arctic 
SAR  
Canada's legal obligations to provide search and rescue services are based 
upon its participation in various international organisations and international 
treaties.  The bulk of Canada's primary obligations to provide search and 
rescue in the Arctic are articulated in five international agreements: The 
Convention on International Civil Aviation, the International Convention for 
the Safety of Life at Sea, the International Convention on Maritime Search 
and Rescue, the Agreement on Cooperation on Aeronautical and Maritime 
Search and Rescue, and the Agreement on Cooperation on Aeronautical and 
Maritime SAR in the Arctic (2011).  
 Canada has generated and modified search and rescue services and 
principles to satisfy the articles of these treaties as a party member. The treaty 
articles centred on search and rescue found within these five agreements 
reiterate the duty to render assistance from shipmasters and coastal states 
alike. However, other articles within these treaties exist that can be made 
applicable to safety, and therefore search and rescue. Articles such as vessel 
specifications, navigation practices and state to state cooperation to name a 
few. While there are many provisions to be applied to Canada's search and 
rescue responsibilities, the full list of applicable SAR articles, resolutions and 
annexes is broad and sizeable - far too sizeable for the purposes of this study. 
Thus, to illustrate the main responsibilities, primary SAR substantive 
obligations of these five main treaties are set out in the below table. The 
"primary" obligations refer to articles that (1) directly articulate the coastal 
state's duty to provide search and rescue facilities and (2) require the 
codification of the duty of shipmasters to render assistance into domestic law. 
In short, the obligations set out in 98(1) and 98(2) of UNCLOS. Canada is a 
party member to each of these international and regional agreements (Figure 
15).
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Figure 15. Canada's Substantive Obligations 
 
 
Category of Legal 
Document  
Legal Source Article Number 
United Nations 
International Treaty  
United Nations 
Convention on the Law 
of the Sea (1982)  
Articles 
98 (1) Duty to Render Assistance  
98 (2) Duty to Render Assistance  
International Maritime 
Organisation Maritime 
Treaty  
International Convention 
on Salvage (1989)  
Articles 
10 (1) Duty to Render Assistance  
10 (2) Duty to Render Assistance  
10 (3) Duty to Render Assistance  
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International Maritime 
Organisation Maritime 
Treaty  
International Convention 
for the Safety of Life At 
Sea (1974)  
Regulations 
33 (1) Distress Situations: Obligations and 
Procedures  
33 (1.1): Distress Situations: Obligations and 
Procedures  
Regulation 33 (2): Distress Situations: Obligations 
and Procedures  
Regulation 33 (3): Distress Situations: Obligations 
and Procedures  
Regulation 33 (4): Distress Situations: Obligations 
and Procedures  
Regulation 33 (6): Distress Situations: Obligations 
and Procedures  
 
Regulation 7 (1): Search and Rescue Services  
Regulation 7 (2): Search and Rescue Services  
 
Reg. V/21: IAMSAR Carriage Requirement   
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International Maritime 
Organisation Maritime 
Treaty   
International Convention 
for Maritime Search and 
Rescue (1979)  
Annex Chapter 2-5   
Regional Agreement  Agreement on 
Cooperation on 
Aeronautical and 
Maritime Search and 
Rescue in the Arctic 
(2011)  
Article 
3 (3) Scope of Application of this Agreement  
7 (3b) Scope of Application of this Agreement  
7 (3f) Scope of Application of this Agreement  
International Civil 
Aviation Organisation; 
International Treaty  
Convention on 
International Civil 
Aviation (1944)  
Article 25 
Aircraft in Distress  
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5.2 Canada's Fulfilment of Substantive 
Obligations 
 
Canada has two methods in fulfilling its substantive obligations for search 
and rescue: through the use of hard law, and through measures taken to 
implement that law, for example, guidelines, practices and operative 
procedures. The implementation of the law is subject to a due diligence 
standard: in other words, the authorities must take adequate care in carrying 
out their duties. Both methods will be examined in the below section.  
 
Hard Law  
In Canada, as a dualist system, becoming party to an international treaty does 
not make that treaty part of domestic law. To have full effect, Canada must 
take further measures to implement treaty articles into domestic law in order 
to uphold the agreement's provisions and intentions.  
Canada has by all accounts translated the basic primary obligations of 
the various SAR treaties into domestic Canadian law. The duty to render 
assistance by both shipmasters and coastal states is thoroughly addressed 
within Canadian domestic law, established mainly through the Canada 
Shipping Act (2001).     
 
 
Fulfilling the Duty to Render Assistance: Shipmasters  
The Duty to Render Assistance Article 98 (1) of UNCLOS is a concept found 
in many other subsequent treaties, as seen in the above legal matrix (figure 
15). Canada has codified the duty to render assistance into Federal Law by 
placing masters under the positive duty to assist those in distress at sea. This 
is found primarily within the domestic legislation of the Canada Shipping 
Act. Section 131 regarding the answering of distress signals articulates: 
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Section 131  
(1) Subject to this section, the master of a vessel in Canadian waters 
and every qualified person who is the master of a vessel in any waters, 
on receiving a signal from any source that a person, a vessel or an 
aircraft is in distress, shall proceed with all speed to render assistance 
and shall, if possible, inform the persons in distress or the sender of the 
signal.241 
 
Section 131 expands upon this duty later in the section, detailing the 
conditions in which a master may be released from their obligation to assist 
in addition to the parameters of requisition of assistance from other vessels.  
Section 132 of the Act imposes a parallel obligation on masters upon 
finding a person in danger at sea, stating: "The master of a vessel in Canadian 
waters and every qualified person who is the master of a vessel in any waters 
shall render assistance to every person who is found at sea."242 
Canada has criminalised the failure to comply with sections 131 or 132 
of the Canada Shipping Act, exposing a master of a vessel to significant 
criminal consequences including: (1) Fine up to $1,000,000 and or (2) 
imprisonment for up to 18 months or both.243  
Pursuant to the Canada Criminal Code, masters of vessels may also 
face imprisonment for up to 5 years for failing to render assistance if he/she 
is involved in an accident, which extends to accidents involving another 
person, vehicle, vessel, or aircraft.244  
In this regard, Canada has quite effectively fulfilled its duty to ensure 
that masters of vessels comply with their duty to render assistance by 
criminalizing the failure to do so. A voluntary IMO member state audit was 
undertaken by the United States, Germany, and Panama to determine if 
Canada substantially meets its obligations in respect of the mandatory IMO 
instruments to which it is a party. The audit determined that Canada overall 
meets these obligations, in which SOLAS (and its SAR provisions) were 
included in the scope of the audit.245   
 
 
241 Canada Shipping Act (n 231) Section 131.  
242 ibid Section 132. 
243 ibid Section 137.  
244 Canada Criminal Code, RSC 1985, c C-26.  
245 2013 Auditor General Report (n 224).  
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Fulfilling the Duty to Render Assistance: Coastal State  
While the implementation of the duty of shipmasters to render assistance is 
quite clear and relatively straightforward, part (2) of Article 98 (regarding the 
operation and establishment of adequate coastal SAR services) is much more 
difficult to implement into domestic legislation. This concept is articulated 
several different ways within the language of the various conventions, 
however the core of this duty is best articulated by UNCLOS Article 98(2). 
As it is written: "Every coastal State shall promote the establishment, 
operation and maintenance of an adequate and effective search and rescue 
service regarding safety on and over the sea and, where circumstances so 
require, by way of mutual regional arrangements cooperate with 
neighbouring States for this purpose."246  
Canada has made legislative efforts to accommodate this provision. 
The Oceans Act and the Canada Shipping Act sanction the authority of 
Fisheries and Oceans Canada to delegate maritime search and rescue 
coordination and set-up.247 Essentially, empowering the JRCCs and SAR co-
ordinator to operate and carry out SAR operations.  
Canada has also acted in line with second part of article 98(2) to enter 
into cooperative agreements by establishing a regional SAR agreement for 
the Arctic.248  
Canada (in addition to its hard law efforts) has agreed to and 
implemented various Arctic SAR related soft-law instruments with other 
states.  Soft law describes the variety of non-legally binding instruments used 
by states and organisations within international law and relations, and 
generally include quasi-legal instruments such as resolutions, agreements, 
and memorandums of understanding (MOUs). While not legally binding per 
se, soft law can nonetheless be involved in the production of normative 
legitimacy. Canada has adopted a variety of soft-law instruments to help 
achieve this.  
Canada uses agreements or Memorandums of Understanding (MOUs) for 
search and rescue between various countries in order to strengthen 
 
246 UNCLOS Art 98(2).  
247 Fisheries and Oceans Canada, Notice to Mariners 1 to 46 Annual Edition 
2019, Section D – Search and Rescue in Canadian and Adjacent Waters 
(Canadian Coast Guard DFO/2019-2020) 1.   
248 Sydnes et al (n 3) 126. 
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cooperative search and rescue and help flesh-out any deficiencies Canada 
may have in its SAR services. The Agreement between the Government of 
Canada and the Government of the United States of America on Emergency 
Management Cooperation, for example, allows CAF SAR coordination 
centres to provide and give control of assets, such as aircrafts, for U.S. SAR 
missions when they require, and vice-versa.249 Canada is also part of the 
MOU Co-Operation Among Canada, US, UK Concerning SAR. These two 
soft-law agreements help perpetrate collaboration of SAR practices, and is 
evidence of Canada's intention towards fulfilling the duty to render assistance 
by way of cooperative SAR application. Joint Agreements are also in line 
with the intentions of the Arctic SAR Agreement in which co-operation is 
encouraged by a comprehensive overview of possible collaborative efforts to 
facilitate mutual SAR cooperation outlined in Art. 9. Utilising foreign units 
in situations requiring international cooperation depends on the location of 
the accident. For countries such as Sweden, Finland, Norway and Western 
Russia, which are relatively close to another, utilising foreign units could 
potentially be fairly efficient. The other Arctic countries are far apart and, 
even if bilateral cooperation would otherwise be fluent, the distance and 
response times would limit the use of closest neighbours' assets.250 This may 
be the outcome and reality of a collaborative rescue under the joint bi-lateral 
agreements, however that is relatively beside the legal point. The effort of 
creating such agreements, regardless of their effectiveness (to an extent) is 
still within the parameters of "reasonable measures".  
  Apart from bestowing authority onto the various branches of Canada's 
SAR operators for functionality purposes and entering into cooperative 
agreements, there are no other acts or pieces of legislation that codify Article 
98 (2) into Canadian domestic law. This may be chalked up to the ambiguity 
of Article 98(2); the article lacks specificity. What is "adequate" or 
"effective" for a search and rescue program? Apart from enacting legislation 
to "set-up" Canada's SAR program, how are the other aspects of an 
"adequate" and "effective" search and rescue program codified - such as 
infrastructure, resources, response times and policy?    
 
249 Dawnieca Palma (Canadian Joint Operations Command Public Affairs), 
‘Teamwork beyond borders: Canadian and U.S search and rescue teams work 
together’ (The Maple Leaf, Government of Canada, Last modified 20 April 2018) 
<https://ml-fd.caf-fac.ca/en.2018/04/12469> accessed 2 January 2019.  
250 Ikonon (n 17) 8. 
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While UNCLOS Article 98(2) omits any further details, the 
international SAR Convention does feature an Annex which imposes 
considerable obligations on parties, such as the setting up the shore 
installations. As a result, during the time of its inception, the SAR 
Convention was not ratified by as many countries as other treaties. To 
address this, the Annex was amended, so that "a coastal state does not require 
to have all the SAR resources necessary to respond to a distress signal within 
its entire maritime region."251 Once again, this leaves room for significant 
interpretation and variation.252 In fact, this was purposefully done in order to 
account for the different capabilities of states, similar to the environmental 
principle of common but differentiated responsibilities in environmental law.  
  Apart from the Annex to the International SAR treaty and the 
IAMSAR manual which helps States with the operational (rather than legal) 
implementation the international SAR treaty, Canada has no other official 
direction pertaining to its SAR program's legal extent or scope.  
The obligation of coastal states to provide a SAR program found in 
UNCLOS Article 98 (2) is also found across other SAR related treaties - and 
is similarly vague. Sometimes vague language is utilised in treaty drafting to 
encourage higher numbers of state signatories, and as such international 
treaties are sometimes criticised for being non-specific in the ways in which 
they direct member conduct in the ratification process. The term "distress", 
for example, is not defined in the SOLAS convention. As a result, the degree 
to and way in which articles are ratified are left to the discretion of the 
varying states. As discussed earlier, this flexibility has its benefits and 
drawbacks.  
Indeed, states attempt to ratify to an adequate extent to both fulfil the 
treaty's objective and to avoid potential legal recourse. Most of the time, 
blatant ratification gaps are infrequent. If states believe they will encounter 
difficulties in ratifying certain provisions, they may make reservations or 
abstain from ratification altogether. However, with no overarching treaty 
authority to ensure "adequate" ratification, the end result varies. Therefore, 
how do we analyse the extent of Canada's implementation of this provision?  
Usually, identifying gaps of inadequacies in the ratification efforts of 
parties is done so by examining legal precedence and other similar cases in 
 
251 Button (n 95) 30. 
252 International Maritime Organization (n 145).  
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which countries were found negligent or not having taken steps to adequately 
implement treaty obligations. In the case of Arctic search and rescue, there is 
a serious absence of any such cases or legal analysis.  
Therefore, in trying to investigate the strength of Canada's legal SAR 
program, one may study Canada's so-called "efforts" as proof of intent to 
uphold the article in its own interpretation – Canada’s due diligence. We can 
examine the practical implementation of Canada's SAR program to the effect 
of determining Canada's demonstration of due diligence.  
 
Due Diligence   
Due diligence is a concept in international law that pertains to a state's 
responsibility to exert efforts to secure or hinder a particular outcome.253 As a 
series of positive obligations, due diligence commonly features in 
international human rights law in which states are responsible for aspects 
such as prevention, protection, prosecution, and punishment regarding human 
rights and violations to human rights. For example, the state has a 
responsibility to prevent acts of violence against women to a reasonable 
extent. States may do this through hard law in ensuring they have reflected 
this positive obligation within domestic law, however they may also achieve 
this in other ways, such as the implementation of soft-law, guidelines, 
policies and procedural methods. Due diligence is trying to establish a 
threshold or minimum standard to meet in order to satiate the obligation. The 
standard of due diligence to meet however, is variable and usually undefined, 
with obligations directing states to take "reasonable measures" or “all 
appropriate measures”.254 How do states determine the standard of due 
diligence to be paid? There is no exact method, however tools such as 
judicial rulings and case law can be used to establish a standard. However, 
this becomes difficult when there is a general absence of cases pertaining to 
 
253 Joanna Kulesza, Due diligence in international law (Brill 2016) 148. 
254 ibid 149. 
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the subject matter.255 This is the case for Arctic search and rescue. While the 
due diligence standard for fulfilling Arctic search and rescue obligations 
remains unclear, states have still taken measures to try and demonstrate their 
efforts to discharge liability. This is where Canada's efforts are examined as 
evidence of its due diligence measures.  
As readily as it may be used to prove a State's efforts in fulfilling its 
obligations, (lack of) due diligence may also be used to establish a state's 
failure to act. If a state fails to comply with the standard of due diligence, the 
state may be ascribed legal responsibility for failing to exercise due diligence.  
In examining Canada's Arctic SAR due diligence, we will be 
determining (1) the efforts and measures taken by Canada and (2) the 
standard of Arctic SAR due diligence for Canada to meet. Whether Canada 
has met that standard will be addressed in Chapter 6: Analysis.  
 
 
Canada's Efforts/Measures 
In addition to hard law and soft law, there is another category of measures 
that states can take as evidence of their due diligence entirely. Though neither 
hard nor soft law, these efforts can still make strong evidentiary points when 
determining state responsibility. These "other efforts" describe measures 
taken by Canada (both independently and in cooperation with other states and 
organisations) and include guidelines and recommendations, policy, and 
standard operating procedures (SOPs).  
 
Other Efforts  
 
Recommendations/Guidelines  
Some international organisations are involved in the production of non-
legally binding instruments. The IMO, for example, often produces 
recommendations through party consensus to voluntarily adopt. Canada has 
agreed to adopt recommendations and guidelines pertaining to Arctic SAR 
from a broad range of organisations, such as IACO, IMO, the Arctic Council 
 
255 An increasing body of international case law pertaining to the standard of due 
diligence in human rights is emerging. The Human Rights Committee and the 
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights have been consistently 
producing literature towards clarifying and identifying the reasonable measures 
that satiate due diligence. However, in the area of search and rescue, particularly 
Arctic search and rescue, there is a clear absence and deficit.  
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and the Arctic Coast Guard Forum. Accepting and implementing 
recommendations from expert organisations is common practice across states 
in order to meet their substantive requirements, and increase the efficiency 
and effectiveness of their SAR programs.  
 Guidelines from the IMO Maritime Safety Committee are also 
included in this category. The IMO's Guidelines for Preparing Plans for Co-
Operation Between Search and Rescue Services and Passenger Ships, for 
example, serves the purpose of standardising the establishment of plans for 
co-operation between passenger ships and SAR services.256 The Canadian 
government will often reference these many guidelines in its program and 
process. In certain cases, Transport Canada will even implement such 
guidelines into new legislation or require carriage of them by certain 
vessels.257 
 Canada has made efforts regarding the implementation of general SAR 
recommendations and guidelines, serving as important evidence of intent 
when identifying Canada's efforts. However, what Arctic specific 
recommendations and guidelines has Canada adopted?  
Canada has long recognised the unique challenges and vulnerabilities 
of Arctic search and rescue, and in response often seek to adopt guidelines 
created from expert organisations.  
The Arctic Coast Guard Forum, for example, works to promote key 
elements of preparedness and awareness for maritime safety in the Arctic. 
The ACGF has produced a series of best practices, recommendations and 
guidelines for Arctic SAR, mainly through the conducting of joint exercises. 
These recommendations fall outside of legal requirements, yet identify key 
areas for improvement and vulnerabilities; and it is in this area that 
documents generated by the ACGF may be used to fulfil operational 
obligations and demonstrate Canada's Arctic efforts.258  
The current recommendations pertaining to Arctic SAR produced by 
the ACGF are the product of reports following joint national SAR exercises. 
 
256 International Maritime Organization, Guidelines for Preparing Plans for Co-
Operation Between Search and Rescue Services and Passenger Ships 
MSC/Circ.1079 (2003).  
257 Transport Canada maintains an extensive list of regulations for which carriage 
requirements are applicable. For a full list of Transport Canada regulations, see 
https://www.tc.gc.ca/eng/acts-regulations/regulations.html. 
258 Ikonon (n 17) 11. 
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Exercises between countries and stakeholders seem to be the centrepiece of 
practical cooperation, and function to "test" the SAR agreement 
implementation and gauge its effectiveness as a regime.  
 While the ACGF has facilitated a number of these exercises, joint 
Arctic SAR exercises have been taking place since 2012, and involve 
multiple countries and topics. As many as 16 live and table top exercises 
have been conducted with the participation of various or all eight Arctic 
nations (Figure 16). Canada has participated in 8 of the 16 Arctic exercises.  
The reports produced from findings following these joint exercises 
offer recommendations on search and rescue operations, such as evacuation 
procedures, personnel training, national cooperation and disaster prevention 
to mention a few.259 For the most part, the joint exercises focus on particular 
geographic areas of the Arctic, and produce recommendations that are 
actionable by the various government's involved in the management of that 
area. The SARex Greenland 2013 for example, focused its recommendations 
on infrastructure and capabilities build up in Greenland by the Danish 
government. The report did recommend that the responsibility for future 
SAREX should follow the Arctic Council chairmanship, which was "well 
received by Canada, the incoming chair of the Arctic Council" according to 
the report.260  
The two exercises focused on Canada's Arctic areas were the Crystal 
Serenity live exercise (2016) and the Northwest Passage Table top exercise 
(2016). The Crystal Serenity exercise was in preparation for the Serenity's 
untried voyage through Canada's Northwest Passage. The purpose of the 
exercise was to explore a coordinated response to a large cruise ship incident 
involving more than 1,600 passengers and crew in the Arctic near the 
Canada-US border. The exercise identified a number of critical gaps in 
Canada's ability to deal with a mass rescue operation (MRO) in the Arctic, 
such as the lack of lifesaving facilities and navigational difficulties. In 
addition to a number of other recommendations that Canada implemented, 
the exercise recommended the use of an escort icebreaker to accompany the 
cruise vessel. The Canadian Coast Guard vessel the Ernest Shackleton was 
utilised for this purpose.   
 
259 Sydnes et al (n 3) 120. 
260 Joint Arctic Command, SAREX GREENLAND SEA 2013 Final Exercise 
Report (FER) 2013, 6.  
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Figure 16. International Arctic SAR Exercises  
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The Arctic Council, as an intergovernmental forum for cooperation rather 
than an international organisation, does not have the authority legally to 
adopt binding resolutions that the IMO can. However, recommendations and 
guidelines from the various working groups can be considered an appropriate 
source that may inform states’ SAR practices. In 2009, the Arctic Council 
Working Group PAME (Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment) issued 
a comprehensive report known as the Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment 
(AMSA).261 Along with evaluating each aspect of the growing Arctic 
shipping industry, AMSA developed various recommendations for states to 
take in the furtherance of environmental protection and sustainable 
development. In 2015, countries provided updates on the status on 
implementation of the 2009 AMSA recommendations. By 2015, Canada had 
made wholehearted strides in the implementation of the AMSA 
recommendations. Most of the recommendations were focused on 
environmental protection. However, there were some that were concerned 
with shipping and search and rescue safety to which Canada made the 
following efforts:  
 
 
AMSA Recommendations 
Pertaining to Search and Rescue 
Canada's Efforts 
I(A). Linking with the IMO  Canada is delivering meteorological 
and navigational warning services 
for the two MET/NAV areas of the 
Arctic Ocean for which it accepted 
responsibility (MET/NAV areas 
XVII and XVIII) to promote safe 
navigation in Arctic waters. 
Through this initiative Canada has 
put in place year-round 
standardized and coordinated 
coverage of these areas and has 
coordinated with international 
partners who are responsible for the 
three adjacent Arctic MET/NAV 
 
261 Arctic Council, 'Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment Report 2009' (2009). 
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areas.  
 
I(D). Strengthening Passenger Ship 
Safety in Arctic Waters 
Member governments (incl. 
Canada) submitted information 
papers to PAME’s February 2014 
meeting on their domestic rules and 
policies pertaining to Arctic cruise 
tourism as background and context 
for the AMTP.  
A Transport Canada commissioned 
report entitled “Strategies for 
Managing Arctic Pleasure Craft 
Tourism: A Scoping Study” was 
released in August 2013.  
 
II(B). Engagement with Arctic 
Communities  
The Canadian Ice Service is 
engaged in a three-year pilot project 
examining the requirements for 
enhanced community-based ice 
information for the purposes of 
reducing the incidence of SAR 
cases as well as assisting 
community members with their 
decision making regarding their 
work, life and cultural events on 
and around the fast ice surrounding 
their community. 
III(A). Addressing the 
Infrastructure Deficit (including 
Canada) 
The five Arctic Ocean littoral States 
submitted an information paper 
(NCSR 1/27/3, 25 April 2014) to 
the 1st session of the IMO’s Sub-
Committee on Navigation, 
Communications and Search and 
Rescue providing information on 
the World Meteorological 
Organization (WMO) Voluntary 
Observing Ship (VOS) Scheme in 
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the Arctic and encouraging 
increased participation in the VOS 
Scheme by all flag States. 
III(B). Arctic Marine Traffic 
System 
Canada and Norway submitted 
papers to PAME’s February 2014 
meeting on the effectiveness of their 
routing and reporting measures in 
the Arctic Region. 
Canada and Norway submitted 
information on their present and 
planned satellite (AIS, radar and 
optical) and shore-based AIS 
capabilities to PAME’s February 
2014 meeting. 
 
 
 
 
Canada also adopts institution recommendations pertaining to SAR from the 
IMO, such as The IMO Recommendations & Guidelines document Enhanced 
Contingency Planning Guidance for Passenger Ships Operating in Areas 
Remote from SAR Facilities. The recommendation prompts passenger ships 
to create contingency plans for passenger ships considered to be remote from 
SAR facilities.262   
 In addition to accepting recommendations from outside organisations 
like the ACGF and the Arctic Council, the Canadian government has also 
reflected consistent implementation of recommendations from audits and 
reports from its own agencies and committees. In 2013, the Canadian 
Government ordered and performed an internal audit which assessed three 
aspects of Canada's federal search and rescue program: whether federal 
organisations adequately oversee search and rescue activities, are ready to 
respond to SAR incidents, and have implemented prevention activities to 
reduce the number of severity of SAR incidents.263 The audit found that 
 
262 International Maritime Organization, Guidelines for Preparing Plans for Co-
Operation Between Search and Rescue Services and Passenger Ships 
MSC/Circ.1079 (2003) 
263 2013 Auditor General Report (n 224). 
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overall, "federal search and rescue activities met the established minimum 
standards of readiness to respond when people in distress need assistance".264 
265  
Despite this, there were two factors that the Canadian government found to 
pose a significant risk to readiness: 
 
"The continued availability of sufficient numbers of trained search and 
rescue personnel, and the maintenance of aging equipment. Significant 
improvements are needed if the Canadian Forces and the Canadian 
Coast Guard are going to continue to adequately respond and provide 
the necessary personnel, equipment and information systems to deliver 
SAR activities effectively."266  
 
The Auditor General Report highlighted the aging search and rescue aircraft 
force a major area of concern for Canada's overall SAR program. In 2016, the 
Canadian Liberal government committed $2.3 billion for the purchase of 16 
new CAF SAR aircrafts to address this finding. The contract for the new 
aircrafts were awarded to European firm Airbus Defence and Space and will 
provide "a complete, modern and technologically advanced search and rescue 
solution, including maintenance and support services up to 2043".267 This is 
not to say that there are not gaps in capacity.  
 In addition to the general findings form the Auditor General Report, 
the Canadian government made efforts to fulfil an Arctic specific 
recommendation produced by a committee which, after reviewing Canada's 
Northern Policy and Canadian Coast Guard Report, recommended: "Inuit, 
with their unique knowledge of the region, be recruited for the Canadian 
Coast Guard whenever possible".  
 To satisfy this, the Government of Canada launched the Indigenous 
Community Boat Volunteer Pilot Program in 2018 which was spearheaded 
by the Canadian Coast Guard. As a trained and qualified united of the 
 
264 2013 Auditor General Report (n 224). 
265 More information regarding the specifications of the audit findings are 
detailed in the Canada Auditor General Report Chapter 7 at: http://www.oag-
bvg.gc.ca/internet/English/parl_oag_201304_07_e_38192.html. 
266 2013 Auditor General Report (n 224). 
267 International Maritime Organization, Guidelines for Preparing Plans for Co-
Operation Between Search and Rescue Services and Passenger Ships 
MSC/Circ.1079 (2003). 
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Canadian Coast Guard Auxiliary, four Arctic indigenous communities 
received $1M of federal funding to buy search and rescue capable boats and 
related equipment. The four communities to receive funding were Rankin 
Inlet, Cambridge Bay, Gjoa Haven and Ulukhaktok. Canada has recently 
made considerable efforts to engage and collaborate with the Arctic Inuit 
communities to strengthen marine safety and SAR capabilities. The 
Honourable Dominic Leblanc, Minster of Fisheries and Oceans and the 
Canadian Coast Guard commented on the program:  
 
"Members of Arctic Indigenous communities possess indispensable 
knowledge of local waters, and have a long history of being the first on 
the scene to respond to marine search and rescue incidents. Through 
the Indigenous Community Boat Volunteer Pilot Program, we are 
ensuring these communities have the tools they need to respond to 
emergencies, and recognizing them with a formal role 
in Canada's marine search and rescue system."268 
 
Engaging Inuit as Canadian Coast Guard Auxiliary volunteers with is a 
clever way to both utilise traditional knowledge and expand the able SAR 
services in Canada's North. As already stands, the CCGA as a result of its 
volunteers and vessels handles 24% of maritime SAR taskings.269 
 In 2017, the Department of National Defence also conducted a further 
evaluation of the DND and CAF contribution to the National Search and 
Rescue Program. The evaluation produced 19 Key Findings and 10 
Recommendations. Most of the key findings and recommendations were 
based upon the current distribution of SAR incidents and thus not directly 
relating to Canada's Arctic SAR. However, one key finding was the distance 
 
268 Fisheries and Oceans Central & Arctic Region, ‘Government of Canada 
Working with Arctic Indigenous Communities to Enhance Local Marine Search 
and Rescue’ (CISION, 3 July 2018) <https://www.newswire.ca/news-
releases/government-of-canada-working-with-arctic-indigenous-communities-to-
enhance-local-marine-search-and-rescue-687249231.html> accessed 15 
September 2018.   
269 Department of National Defence, ‘Evaluation of the Search and Rescue 
Services Program – Evaluation Summary’ (Department of National Defence) 
<https://www.dfo-mpo.gc/ae-ve/evaluations/16-17/6B183-summary-eng.pdf> 
accessed 19 December 2018   
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and travel time between CAF aircraft bases and any potential Northern SAR 
incidents. The report did not directly recommend a solution to this problem. 
However, it should be evident that the Canadian government is aware of the 
challenges and issues within its own SAR program. In 2013, Canada has 
order three large-scale reviews of its SAR program; OAG Audit Report 
(2013), the Quadrennial SAR Review, the SAR Posture Review.  
 
 
Policy and SOPs 
In reflecting Canada's efforts, SAR policy originating from the Canadian 
government may also be assessed to determine if it meets internationally 
expected standards of due diligence. SAR policy is co-ordinated at the federal 
level under the National Search and Rescue Program. The NSP is founded on 
two pillars, prevention and response with the following vision:  
 
"A Canada where the critical importance of Search and Rescue is 
reflected in a multi-jurisdictional approach to promoting individual, 
collective and organizational behaviour that minimizes the risk of 
injury or loss of life while maintaining timely and effective response 
services."270 
  
Canada produces a vast quantity of internal standard operating procedures 
(SOPs), guidelines and best practices for its own search and rescue activities. 
The various branches and industries involved in Canada's search and rescue 
system pay attention to these self-imposed norms; using them to adjust and 
direct operations. The SOPs that Canada establishes are always based upon 
the NSP policy. The final amalgamation of maritime operational knowledge 
by the NSP is best represented by the Canadian SAR Seamanship Reference 
Manual. The Manual presents the common procedures, techniques and 
terminology that Canada has developed to enhance and conduct SAR 
operations by any combination of SAR forces.271 The Manual also centres 
around standardisation, aiming to bring together under one manual all the 
best-known operational procedures and practices that apply to vessels 
involved in a SAR mission.272 In 2014, the Canadian Aeronautical and 
 
270 Public Safety Canada, ‘National Search and Rescue Program’ (n 182). 
271 SAR Seamanship Reference Manual (n 190).   
272 ibid. 
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Maritime Search and Rescue Manual (CAMSAR) was published to achieve a 
similar effect. CAMSAR provides national guidelines and standard operating 
procedures specific to the Canadian Federal Aeronautical and Maritime 
Search and Rescue system.273 The manuals are supported by information 
from the Search and Rescue Knowledge Management System that captures 
incident data from as many SAR stakeholder systems as possible.274 
The SOP's employed by Canada’s search and rescue program has a 
normative impact on the overall functioning of its Arctic SAR.   
 Canada's SAR policy is always evolving in an effort to improve search 
and rescue function. However, there are political pressures and forces that 
can impact search and rescue in the Arctic, in both negative and positive 
capacities. While not thoroughly considered in this thesis due to restrictions 
on scope, the impacts of funding, political changes and government interests 
can't be completely ignored. Government spending, for example, can have a 
marketed impact on Canada's search and rescue efforts, especially if spending 
is directed at Arctic specific projects.  
For the most part, it is up to the individual state, and therefore state's 
government, to decide on the appropriate level of resources designed to 
Arctic SAR. Changes in government may result in different initiatives, 
spending and consideration towards the Arctic. In 2005, the Conservative 
Government under Prime Minister Stephen Harper launched an Arctic policy 
that placed Arctic sovereignty at the heart of the initiative. Investment into 
military build-up in the Arctic to help assert Canadian sovereignty over the 
hotly disputed Northwest Passage resulted into strategies for an Arctic naval 
base at the Nunavut community of Nanisivik, the building of eight Arctic 
Offshore Patrol Ships, and the building of the Inuvik to Tuktoyaktuk 
 
273 CAMSAR (n 5).  
274 The Search and Rescue Management System is meant to: “promote effective 
and efficient national Search and Rescue programs by the continuous 
improvement in the quality and integrity of shared Search and Rescue (SAR) 
information across Canada. Operationalizing this mission translates into working 
in partnership with SAR stakeholders to consolidate, aggregate, and analyse data 
in order to build useful tools to assist stakeholders in identifying opportunities to 
improve their capabilities”. The system can be accessed at: https://sarkms-
rssgc.hre-ehr.gc.ca/_layouts/15/SARKMS.SignIn/Custom-
Signin.aspx?ReturnUrl=%2f_layouts%2f15%2fAuthenticate.aspx%3fSource%3d
%252F. 
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highway, which connects the Arctic Ocean to the rest of Canada's road 
network year-round.275 The Department of Defence committed to the 
acquisition of six Arctic Offshore Patrol Ships and the Nanisivik Arctic 
Naval Facility is to finish its base completion in 2019.276 Both military 
projects may have possibilities for Arctic search and rescue build-up. 
Although military patrol vessels and base, military vessels still maintain 
rescue capabilities and training to assist in possible SAR situations. 
Additionally, Canadian Coast Guard ships would also be able to utilise the 
Nanisivik facility to re-supply and SAR support if required.  
The current Liberal Government under Justin Trudeau has too made 
commitments and efforts towards Arctic projects that may also have search 
and rescue results. Canada's defence policy Strong, Secure, Engaged, 
launched in 2017 commits defence to increasing focus on the Arctic. Through 
an investment of $133M, the Canadian government is launching a 
surveillance regarding awareness of air, maritime surface and sub-surface 
approaches to Canada, particularly in the Arctic. The All Domain Situational 
Awareness aims to (in addition to surveillance) provide a "greater whole-of 
government awareness of safety and security issues, transportation and 
commercial activity in Canada's Arctic".277  
 
 
 
 
 
275 Steven Chase, ‘Myth versus reality in Stephen Harper’s northern strategy’ 
(The Globe and Mail, 17 January 2014) 
<https://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/national/the-north/myth-versus-reality-
in-stephen-harpers-northern-strategy/article16397458/> accessed 8 November 
2018.  
276 The Maritime Executive, ‘Construction Begins for Canada’s Next Ice-Classed 
Naval Vessel’ (The Maritime Executive, 3 May 2019) < https://www.maritime-
executive.com/article/construction-begins-for-canada-s-next-icebreaking-naval-
vessel> accessed 2 July 2019.  
277 Government of Canada, ‘All Domain Situational Awareness S&T Program’ 
<https://www.canada.ca/en/defence-research-development/programs/all-domain-
situational-awareness-program.html> accessed 18 April 2019.  
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6 Analysis 
 
Having now examined all aspects of the Arctic SAR regime and Canada's 
Arctic SAR efforts, we have now a general understanding regarding Canada's 
Arctic SAR program. How do Canada's efforts fare? Do they fulfil the 
substantive obligations required of Arctic states?  
 This final chapter will analyse Canada's efforts in an attempt to answer 
these questions. Tracing first how Canada’s Arctic search and program 
measures up to its legal responsibilities to exploring critical gaps, this section 
will try to determine the extent to which Canada’s efforts have fulfilled its 
substantive counterparts through hard law and due diligence.   
 As mentioned earlier, Canada has taken the basic, necessary steps to 
codify its SAR duties into domestic hard law through the Canada Shipping 
Act, The Criminal Code, and The Oceans Act. Since no obvious gaps were 
identified regarding its ratification of international SAR obligations, one may 
conclude that Canada is meeting its substantive obligations by this 
measurement at the very least. Indeed, it would be difficult to argue 
otherwise based on the fact that there is a general absence of legal action and 
lawsuits pertaining to potential violations of Canada’s domestic SAR hard 
law upon which to gauge implementation. While this may change in the 
future, this author argues that Canada’s hard law efforts are relatively 
buttoned-up. 
However, we know that Canada must also demonstrate its due 
diligence in ensuring they have taken all reasonable measures to provide 
search and rescue measures beyond hard law implementation. It is in 
studying Canada’s due diligence efforts that more evidence and precedence is 
provided for a more comprehensive conclusion.    
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6.1 The Standard of Due Diligence  
 
In the wake of numerous maritime accidents connected to the contemporary 
migrant crisis, European governments and intergovernmental organisations 
such as the United Nations Refugee Agency have recently begun producing 
more literature to clarify the responsibility of states in the provision of search 
and rescue. As a result, we possess some cases and writings to fall back on 
when trying to determine the standard of due diligence that must be paid by 
states to fully satiate their substantive obligations.  However, most of the 
prior examples and criterion illustrating this standard pertains almost 
exclusively to the topic of rescuing of refugees in busy waterways. For 
example, in addition to the duty to render assistance and rescue persons in 
distress at sea, Resolutions from the IMO Maritime Safety Committee have 
articulated a “residual” due diligence obligation of states to ensure that 
rescued refugees are subsequently delivered to and disembarked in a place of 
safety. Workings on the standard of due diligence of states to provide search 
and rescue in the Arctic, however, are noticeably absent.  
While the heightened risk of needing Arctic search and rescue is well 
known and documented, there has been little to no formal workings to 
specify the standard of due diligence for states to achieve with regards to 
Arctic search and rescue. Essentially, there are still too many unanswered 
questions and variables, despite future trends, predictions and current 
operational knowledge. For example, a general lack of shipping in the area 
makes SAR even more difficult, as there is a shortage of vessels of 
opportunity to assist. Should Canada therefore look to encourage shipping? 
Or would doing so increase the chances of a SAR event happening? These 
unanswered questions may be perhaps due to the relatively low frequency of 
Arctic SAR events in which these gaps are made apparent. The Arctic, for 
example, is not experiencing a refugee crisis that would normally prompt 
increased SAR workings and articulations. However, parallels between the 
European migrant crisis and Arctic search and rescue are still relevant. The 
most notable connection would be the unequal strain placed on the SAR 
regimes of the countries involved. Certain search and rescue areas of 
responsibility are experiencing greater usage by maritime traffic, and thus 
greater number of marine accidents occur. The strain placed on the states 
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responsible for search and rescue in these regions (such as the Mediterranean 
Sea) can cause difficulties in ensuing that states are meeting the increasing 
SAR demands to an adequate degree. The rising demand for search and 
rescue in these regions can see existing national SAR programs falling short. 
For Canada, the strain experienced pertains more to the difficulties of vast 
distances and sheer enormity of Canada’s SAR region rather than the number 
of incidents requiring SAR assistance. The requirement of being ready and 
set-up to execute a SAR operation at any given moment at any place within 
Canada’s SAR area of responsibility is taxing enough in itself, regardless of 
whether it is frequently needed. Bearing in mind Canada’s unique SAR 
situation, perhaps we may think of the standard of due diligence of Arctic 
SAR for Canada to meet as flexible rather than stationary. Perhaps the 
standard is fluid and should account for such unique variables as Canada’s 
substantial geography. By context, lots of international due diligence 
obligations are flexible, and vary by time, local conditions and state capacity.  
Indeed, we see the notion of a flexible standard in the concept of 
common but differentiated responsibilities within other areas of legal studies, 
such as environmental law. The principle holds, for example, that although 
all countries are responsible for global climate change, each state has a 
different set of capabilities that they are able to contribute. Some of these 
limitations to capabilities are economic and financial (such as that of 
developing nations), whereas others limitations are based more on tangible 
causes such as limitations in infrastructure. As a result, some countries have 
different standards than others based on their capabilities.278 Regardless of 
being a concept of environmental law, a similar approach (or at least 
consideration) could be made regarding Canada’s responsibility for its Arctic 
SAR.  
Quite often, a standard of due diligence may be determined through 
comparing the efforts of two different states that share similar characteristics. 
Comparing how Sweden and Finland’s Arctic search and rescue programs 
stack up against one another, for example, may be used to conclude a 
standard of due diligence that both countries should be able to meet, or at 
least in theory. Since both have similar economic, geographic and political 
 
278 The Rio Declaration on Environment and Development 1992, Envir. Conserv., 
19(04), p.366. 
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attributes, deciding what is reasonable as a standard for due diligence to be 
met may be done through a comparison of the two states. If one country is 
able to achieve a certain level, the other should be able to theoretically do so 
as well. At least this is the technique often used by governments, 
organisations and legal experts to determine the responsibility of the state. 
However, this author argues that Canada’s Arctic, particularly Nunavut, is 
incomparable in such a manner. In fact, this author argues that there is no 
internationally-defined standard of due diligence for Canada to meet with 
regards to its Arctic SAR due to the fact that Canada’s Arctic is so unique; 
there is no comparator.  
6.2 Canada’s Performance  
No Other Arctic Comparator 
As discussed earlier, we are aware of the many different ways in which 
Canada’s Arctic is unique with regards to SAR operations. Nunavut’s 
geography, environment and constitution are so distinct that there is simply 
no comparable likeness with other Arctic states for which to compare Arctic 
SAR abilities. The closest likeness is perhaps between Canada’s Northwest 
Passage (NWP) and Russia’s Northeast Passage (NEP).  
Both Passages exist as sea routes and pass within national territorial 
seas thus subject to domestic jurisdiction. Also, both Passages connect the 
Bering Sea with the Barents Sea (although taking opposite routes). Similar 
distances, navigational challenges, sea-state conditions, and operational risks 
all contribute to the notion that Russia’s Northeast Passage might be a 
comparable example to Canada’s Northwest Passage upon which to judge the 
feasibility of search and rescue standards, or how much due diligence is 
reasonable. Despite these similarities however, Canada’s Northwest Passage 
has additional characteristics that may prove that these two Passages may not 
be so alike after all.  
 The Northeast Passage has been used for cargo shipping for a century, 
with infrastructure built-up along its course for support. Deep and navigable 
for a surprisingly long season despite its northerly latitude, the Northeast 
Passage has, and remains, the favoured commercial route of the Arctic. The 
development of the Northeast Passage has had a long head start on that of the 
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Northwest Passage, and heavy Soviet and Russian investment into shipping 
infrastructure has also led to an increase of extra SAR capabilities, such as 
better bathymetric surveying and charting, increased SAR monitoring 
programs and operations, military build-up (functioning sometimes as SAR 
units) and better communication services. Canada’s NWP on the other hand, 
has barely been used commercially and has little to no infrastructure along its 
course that can provide search and rescue to the same extent. This also re-
introduces the legal status issue, as Canada does not want to encourage 
navigation of foreign vessels and build-up as it may establish the Northwest 
Passage as an international strait.  In the history of its entire existence, only 
some 290 ships (compared to the 27 ships transiting the Northern Sea Route 
in 2018 alone) have sailed the full Northwest Passage, for the most part alone 
and unassisted from federal services (with some icebreaker support 
notwithstanding).279 280 Despite similarities in latitudes and ecology, the two 
Passages have very distinct regional variations that contribute to differences 
in environmental conditions between them. The NWP experiences a much 
higher degree of sea-ice coverage, a shorter operational season, shallow and 
poorly charted areas, and little to no supporting infrastructure - all which 
make it less than ideal for commercial shipping compared to Russia’s 
Northeast Passage. The Northeast Passage is also fuelled by Russia’s policy 
in wanting to market the Northeast Passage as a navigable route with 
supporting services and infrastructure along the way. With the development 
of mining and hydrocarbons in the Russian Arctic, a means to move products 
and goods is thus necessary.  
In addition to existing as a unique route operationally, the Northwest 
Passage is also politically unique. Due to the historical dramas of the 19th and 
20th century exploration era, its debated contemporary status as an internal 
waterway, and its perpetual use and importance by Canada’s Arctic Inuit, the 
Northwest Passage has become a symbol of Canada’s Arctic for many years. 
As a result, Arctic policy from Canada’s past and present federal 
governments has often centred around it. Federal programs and policy that 
may relate to Arctic SAR are thus sometimes tinged with the additional 
 
279 R.K Headland and colleagues, ‘Transits of the Northwest Passage to End of 
the 2018 Navigation Season’ (2018) Scott Polar Research Institute.  
280 Northern Sea Route Information Office, ‘Transit Statistics 2018’ (Nord 
University, 20 February 2019) <www.arctic-lio/transit-statistics-2018/> accessed 
22 July 2018.     
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motivation seeking to double as sovereignty initiatives (see section Canada’s 
Arctic Sovereignty Issue). This is not to say that the rest of Canada’s Arctic 
issues fall by the wayside, rather that Canadian federal policy for the Arctic is 
influenced significantly by international relations, for which the challenging 
of the legal status of Canada’s Northwest Passage is a primary example.   
 Regardless of being the closest comparable Arctic area to other Arctic 
states, the Northwest Passage still maintains distinct enough characteristics to 
make difficult its utilisation in the determining of an adequate standard of due 
diligence for Arctic SAR. Even then, the Northwest Passage is only one small 
section of the vast Canadian Arctic. The entire extent of the Canadian Arctic 
should be considered when trying to illustrate how difficult Arctic SAR is to 
facilitate in Canada compared to other Arctic states. The Canadian Arctic has 
no other similar or parallel Arctic region; it is a labyrinth of waterways 
fraught with ice and harsh conditions.  
  
 
Meeting a “Reasonable” Extent  
Aware that search and rescue in Canada’s Arctic cannot be compared to the 
SAR programs of other Arctic states in order to determine the level of state 
responsibility and the standard of due diligence to be paid, we must then 
consider what is “reasonable” for Canada. Canada has still to maintain all 
other substantive commitments in its Arctic in addition to SAR obligations 
(such as social and health facilities, communication services, defence, 
education, and policing for example).  
 With no benchmarks or guidance to determine what is a reasonable 
level of due diligence for Canada, the author must fall back on Canada’s due 
diligence efforts as proof of its SAR capacity and intent. We have already 
examined the efforts that Canada has taken in this regard in an earlier section, 
studying the various procedures, guidelines, policies and soft-law in addition 
to its hard law efforts. Outlining the many ways in which Canada has 
amassed a technical and operational SAR body of work to reflect the extent 
its due diligence in meeting its legal obligations, the author has concluded 
that Canada: (1) recognises the difficulties and increased activity in its Arctic 
(2) recognises the need for more Arctic SAR services, and (3) takes 
considerable internal and external action to not only achieve the minimum 
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standards for SAR, but strives to achieve the highest standards for Arctic 
SAR according to its capabilities and limitations.  
Naturally, gaps in Canada’s Arctic SAR system will always exist, and 
improvements can be made. However, based on Canada’s tendencies to self-
monitor, troubleshoot, and seek out reviews on its SAR performance, such 
gaps are usually short-lived. Bearing in mind the limitations of this study, this 
author argues that Canada is demonstrating due diligence, and that due 
diligence is a reasonableness standard.  Indeed, this is corroborated by the 
singular precedential search and rescue case concerned with a potential 
failure of Canada to demonstrate due diligence in the Arctic.  
In August of 2010, the expedition cruise vessel M/v Clipper 
Adventurer steamed full speed onto an uncharted submerged shoal in 
Nunavut while en route from Port Epworth to Kugluktuk, and became 
grounded.281 The passengers and crew were rescued by the Canadian Ice 
Breaker Amundsen, and the Clipper Adventurer was subsequently refloated 
and underwent repairs in Poland. Afterwards, the owners of the Clipper 
Adventurer sued the Canadian Government on the basis of the claim that Her 
Majesty, more particularly the Canadian Coast Guard and the Canadian 
Hydrographic Service, knowing of the presence of the shoal, had a duty to 
warn and failed to do so. The Canadian government denied liability, 
admitting that they had knowledge of the shoal some three years before the 
grounding. However, they denied that any duty was owed to the Clipper 
Adventurer to give warning. Nevertheless, warning was given both by means 
of a Notice to Shipping and by a Navigational Area Warning, arguing that the 
casualty was caused by the Clipper Adventurer’s failure to update Canadian 
Hydrographic Chart 7777. The judgement dismissed the plaintiff’s action and 
ordered the owners of the Clipper Adventurer to pay $445,361.64.282 The 
Court determined that the fault of the incident lay with the master of vessel 
for failing to seek out the notice to shipping and update the corresponding 
onboard charts, rather than that of the government for a failure to provide 
adequate hydrographical information as the owners alleged.  
 Interestingly, the Canadian Federal Court recognised the lack of 
navigational charting in the area, noting that “less than 10 percent of the vast 
Arctic waters of Canada have been surveyed to modern standards”. However, 
 
281 Adventurer Owner Ltd. v. Canada, 2018 FCA 34. 
282 ibid. 
  
117 
the Court goes on to acknowledge that this is due to limitations on Canada’s 
capabilities, specifying that “most of the surveying done in the Arctic is 
opportunistic by nature. The prime role of Canadian icebreakers during the 
short summer navigation season is, as the name implies, to act as icebreakers 
and to carry out search and rescue missions. Hydrographers are welcome 
aboard, but their surveys are not of the highest priority.” This statement 
discharges the Canadian government from the legal responsibility to have 
exhaustive charting and mapping of its Arctic, which as we know, is beyond 
its capabilities due to Canada’s scale and limitations to resources.  
Despite the Court ruling that the Coast Guard did not have the duty to warn 
the Clipper Adventurer of the NOTSHIP updates regarding the shoal (the 
master should have sought out the available information rather than waiting 
to be told), the CCG Marine Communication and Traffic Service Station in 
Iqaluit still continuously posted the information later than the minimum 14-
day broadcast, which they had no legal responsibility to do. Additionally, 
following the grounding, the Canadian Coast Guard committed to providing 
all vessels entering Canadian Arctic waters with safety information via its 
NORDREG vessel reporting system as of June 2012. The Canadian 
Hydrographic Service also established procedure so that navigational charts 
for Canada’s Arctic are marked with reported hazards to navigation.283  
This case tells us what the Federal Court of Canada deems as an 
acceptable level of due diligence on certain SAR matters. In this case, it was 
the level of charting necessary and communications of hazards.  
While this singular ruling does not define all aspects of Canada’s 
standard of due diligence for Arctic SAR, it does make two important 
conclusions. First, the Federal Court upholds the notion that Canada has a 
very distinct and challenging Arctic, and cannot be legally expected to have 
achieved the same standards of charting as other states that do not have 
similarly extreme conditions, or even the same standards as Southern Canada. 
Although this pertains to charting, this case still echoes the understanding 
that due diligence is a variable and contextual standard. Second, this case 
demonstrates that Canada is aware of the limitations to its capabilities, yet 
 
283 Nunatsiaq News, ‘Clipper Adventurer grounding leads to better Arctic charter: 
TSB report’ (Nunatsiaq News, 26 April 2012) 
<https://nunatsiaq.com/stories/article/65674clipper_adventurer_grounding_leads_
to_improved_arctic_charting_tsb_/> accessed 27 April 2019.  
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still exhibits efforts to surpass the baseline standards. In a way, 
demonstrating what it believes to be the requirements of due diligence as the 
authorities on SAR in its own Arctic. Taking cues from Canada to determine 
what it itself deems a reasonable extent may be a way to help identify the 
standards of due diligence for Canada in the future.   
 One may additionally argue that Canada is at the very least not 
demonstrating regression on any of its obligations; an important factor to 
prove Canada’s intent. Taking steps to continuously improve and adapt to the 
changing demands of its substantive obligations.  
 
 
6.3 Critical Gaps  
 
On the basis of this research, this author concludes that Canada has 
adequately fulfilled its substantive obligations through hard law and through 
the taking of due diligence measures to a reasonable extent.  
No matter the degree to which this is true however, critical gaps in 
Canada’s Arctic SAR program still exist, and can be areas of concern both 
now and in the future. Throughout the length of this study, certain critical 
gaps have been identified and are worth mentioning in order to identify (1) 
where critical gaps may give rise to consequences and (2) how Canada could 
proceed with respects to preparing for the future of Arctic SAR.  
 
Legal Gaps 
The duty to render assistance is primarily concerned with the requirement to 
provide rescue assistance to those in distress at sea. However, increasingly 
discussed in present SAR conversations is what follows a successful rescue. 
Where are rescued people disembarked? And is there a residual obligation to 
deliver people to safety following a rescue for both ship masters and coastal 
states? In 2006, the IMO Maritime Safety Committee adopted two 
resolutions that amended both SOLAS and SAR Conventions to ensure 
rescued people are disembarked safely. The Resolutions specify that 
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“carrying out SAR operations does not completely exhaust the duty to render 
assistance, which extends to the disembarkation of the rescued persons in a 
place of safety”.284  
 These Resolutions were mostly brought about following concerns 
regarding the safe delivery of rescued refugees, and to ensure that states are 
responsible for accepting refugees and that they support ship masters in the 
disembarking of rescued passengers. Certain cases were recorded as having 
states turn away ships carrying rescued passengers for which the master is 
then left holding the bag. Although born out of a human rights concern, the 
residual obligation for states to deliver people to safety may still have bearing 
on Arctic search and rescue.  
 Take for instance the incident of the Clipper Adventurer, when 120 
passengers rescued by the Canadian Coast Guard were unexpectedly 
disembarked into Kugluktuk in the middle of the night. Almost everyone in 
the town of 1,400 people had gone fishing. Without enough hotel rooms, the 
passengers had to be sheltered in the community hall with locals giving up 
extra blankets, pillows and food from the local store in order to accommodate 
the arrivals. Though only 120 extra people, the residents of Kugluktuk still 
had difficulties in receiving the passengers.  
 When news of the Crystal Serenity’s impending Northwest Passage 
cruise was first revealed, many of Canada’s northern communities voiced 
concern over the risks associated with a vessel of such a size. One such risk 
was the inability for small Inuit villages and towns to accommodate and 
safely shelter a potential mass inundation of 1092 passengers and some 700 
crew. Some of these villages that maintain populations as low as 120 people 
would be unable to serve as a place of safety due to the severe shortages in 
shelter and food that would accompany a 1300% increase in population 
overnight.  
Towns in the Canadian Arctic are already greatly spread out and few in 
number. With the potential inabilities to find nearby towns that can 
accommodate rescued passengers, or if passengers are disembarked in these 
towns regardless of capacity deficits, how can Canada ensure they are 
meeting the obligation to deliver people to places of safety? While Canada 
may not be able to accomplish complete infrastructure build-up across the 
 
284 Maritime Safety Committee Resolution MSC.167(78) Guidelines on the 
Treatment of Persons Rescued at Sea (2004).    
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Arctic or additional rescue services in order to fulfil this residual obligation, 
they do have the ability to deny permission to large vessels with high 
passenger counts from undertaking such a voyage (if the Northwest Passage 
contains only internal waters without any international straits, as per 
Canada’s position). With complete national jurisdiction and authority over 
the Northwest Passage, the Canadian government could have restricted 
voyages to smaller vessels for which they may have better contingency plans 
in effect in the event of a rescue situation. The Crystal Serenity was granted 
permission despite a critical gap in safety should an incident have unfolded. 
Even so, Crystal Cruise Lines was required to meet Canada’s permitting 
standards for all 117 licences required of them. One of which required 
Crystal Cruise Line to employ a Coast Guard icebreaker escort to try and 
alleviate some of the concerns as a potential backup failsafe. However, with 
the increase in size, frequency and numbers of passenger vessels operating in 
the Canadian Arctic, how can Canada ensure it is fulfilling its full obligation 
to deliver rescued people to safety in accordance with the IMO Resolution? Is 
the current state of planning and preparing adequate enough for Canada to 
avoid possible state responsibility in such instances? In what way could the 
law assist? Perhaps stricter laws regarding the parameters of vessels in the 
Arctic could help quell such concerns. Should laws restricting the size of 
passenger vessels in the Arctic apply, for example, it may address the issue of 
meeting the IMO Resolution requiring the delivery of passengers to places of 
safety.  
  
Operational Gaps  
Arctic State of Readiness  
The 2013 Auditor General federal search and rescue report determined that 
Canada’s SAR system across the nation are stretched. Deficits in personnel 
and search and rescue assets were among the noted areas for improvement. 
The audit made note of what Canada’s operational capacities are, and one 
glaring critical gap apparent in Canada’s SAR organisation is the lack of 
search and rescue centres and assets in any of Canada’s North. As it stands, 
large air and marine resources are rarely positioned in Canada’s Arctic 
region. Indeed, this is partially due to the difference in incident rates between 
the North and South of Canada. The incident rates in the northern areas 
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(above 60 degrees north) have remained steady at relatively low levels, 
reflecting the low level of activity in the North. Hence the southerly 
positioning of Canada’s SAR assets. Just by the numbers, the saturation of 
Canada’s south with the majority of Canada’s SAR is practical. However,  
this reflects low levels of activities, not low levels of risk, and does not take 
into consideration the severity of the Arctic conditions, even if the occurrence 
of SAR events is considerably lower in the North than the South of Canada.  
People and ships in distress in the Arctic are rarely afforded the luxury of 
time during emergencies to wait for assistance, especially in Arctic 
conditions.  
Currently, SAR in all parts of Canada must meet the minimum state of 
readiness found in the National SAR Manual:  
 
“The minimum state of readiness for each rescue squadron shall be one 
SAR aircraft of each type, on 30-minute standby during work hours 
and on 2-hour standby during quiet hours and statutory holidays. 
Primary SRUs – Canadian Coast Guard (CCG) primary search and 
rescue (SAR) units (SRUs), when underway, shall be capable of 
responding to SAR taskings immediately or shall otherwise maintain a 
30-minute standby posture."285 
 
Both RCAF aircrafts and CCG vessels maintain a tier-one minimum state of 
readiness across Canada – and this includes Canada’s North. Based on 
program data over the past five years, the DND/CAF has met the response 
posture 92 percent of the time on a national basis.  
 While the minimum state of readiness mandates that SAR units must 
be deployed within 30 minutes, they still have to travel certain distances to 
where the emergency is occurring. For emergencies in Nunavut, aircraft units 
would be dispatched from JRCC Trenton in Southern Ontario. For aircrafts 
travelling to Nunavut from Trenton, that distance can reach up to 4,463km 
and require more than 8 hours of travel time. Regardless of achieving 
deployment within 30 minutes, rescue assistance could still take hours to 
reach their destination. This becomes especially problematic when 
considering the limited refuelling opportunities and harsh environmental 
conditions for those waiting for rescue. Once aircrafts reach their destination, 
 
285 CAMSAR (n 5) Sec. I-2.10 (E) p.2 of 2. 
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they may also only have enough fuel for a limited time during which to carry 
out rescue operations before having to return to base.286  
 In 2011, two Inuit hunters became stranded in Nunavut’s icy waters. 
Search and rescue technician Sgt. Janick Gilbert of the Canadian Armed 
Forces was part of the Search and Rescue Squadron at 8 Wing/CFB Trenton 
that was dispatched to Hecla Strait to search for the missing hunters.287 The 
fixed wing Hercules aircraft reached the hunters within 6 hours of dispatch 
from Trenton. However, due to low fuel and an inability of the fixed wing 
aircraft to hover or land, Sgt. Gilbert along with two other technicians 
parachuted into the water to provide support and lifesaving gear to the 
hunters while waiting for helicopters with winching capabilities to arrive 
from Trenton airbase.288 Tragically, Sgt. Janick Gilbert experienced technical 
difficulties with his survival suit, and drowned as a result from hypothermia 
after water entered his suit. The CH-149 helicopter eventually reached Sgt. 
Gilbert and the remainder of the rescue party four hours after they parachuted 
into the sea.289  
 The long distances and travel time within Canada’s separate search and 
rescue areas of responsibilities were among some of the reasons for the death 
of Sgt. Gilbert. The Northern areas present a significant transit distance and 
risk when completely reliant on rescue support far from their region.290 While 
Coast Guard vessels have a greater chance at arriving faster due to the fact 
that they are usually patrolling or carrying out other activities nearby in the 
Arctic, it is still not guaranteed that any help will be able to arrive within the 
short window of time that people in distress realistically have before 
conditions deteriorate. Indeed, the lack of SAR assets in Canada’s North 
remains one of Canada’s largest critical gap (Figure 13.)
 
286 Crystal Cruises, the Canadian Coast Guard (CCG), Transport Canada (TC), 
and the Department of the Defense (U.S. Air Force), the U.S. Coast Guard 
(USCG), ‘Northwest Passage (NWP 16) 2016 Exercise – After Action Report’,  
 https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=802138. 
287 Canadian Forces Flight Safety Investigation Report (FSIR) 1010-CC130323 
(DFS 2-2_ 12 November 2013.  
288 ibid. 
289 ibid. 
290 Pierre Leblanc, ‘Canada’s Northern People Deserve Better Arctic SAR 
Capabilities (The Maritime Executive, 10 March 2018) <https://www.maritime-
executive.com/editorials/canada-s-northern-people-deserve-better-arctic-sar-
capabilities> accessed 15 May 2019.  
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Figure 17. Distance and Cost of Fixedwing Response Times Across Canada291 
 
 
291 James Clark, Tabish Dylan and Taha Ford, ‘What role can unmanned aerial vehicles play in emergency response in the Arctic: A 
case study from Canada’ (2018) PLoS ONE 13(12).  
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In October 2018, the federal Department of Fisheries and Oceans, along with 
the Canadian Coast Guard, announced the creation of a new administrative 
region focused on the Arctic.292 The new DFO region is to reach from the 
Northwest Territories, through Nunavut, across Northern Quebec to 
Labrador.293 The region would encompass the four regions of Inuit Nunangat, 
the area Inuit traditionally occupied. This new region will be headquartered 
in Rankin Inlet, Nunavut, shifting Nunavut from its previous management 
underneath the “Central and Arctic” region, based in the south of Canada. 
The new standalone Arctic region would “translate into more Inuit-designed 
and Inuit-staffed programs and services, as well as better capacity for search 
and rescue across the North”.294 The Coast Guard will grow from three to 
four operational regions once the new Arctic region is created. The Coast 
Guard is yet to publicise the way in which they intent to build the capacity of 
search and rescue services within the new standalone region. It is worth 
noting that the issue of long distances may be addressed - or at least 
potentially mitigated - by the stationing of SAR assets within this new region, 
rather than only in southern Canada.295 Answering both to local concerns and 
the findings from the Auditor General’s report, the Government of Canada is 
seemingly attempting to address the overall issue of Nunavut’s management, 
including the accessibility of SAR services. No further specifications have 
been provided pertaining to this development, making further analysis a moot 
point. While this announcement seems to indicate Canada’s intent to close 
 
292 Fisheries and Oceans Canada, ‘Current issues: ministerial briefing’ 
(Government of Canada, July 2018) <https://dfo-mpo-gc.ca/transparency-
transparence/mtb-ctm/binder-cahier-1-cimb-easim-eng.htm> accessed 22 July 
2018.   
293 CBC News, ‘DFO, Canadian Coast Guard create new Arctic region’ (CBC 
News, 24 October 2018) <https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/north/dfo-coast-
guard-arctic-region-1.4876369> accessed 22 July 2019.   
294 Sarah Rogers, ‘Ottawa announces new Arctic regions for DFO, Coast Guard’ 
(Nunatsiaq News, 24 October 2018) 
<https://nunatsiaq.com/stories/article/65674ottawa_announces_new_arctic_depart
ments_under_dfo_coast_guard/> accessed 22 July 2019.   
295 At the time of this study, no further clarification or public plans have been 
released by the Department of Fisheries and Oceans and the Canadian Coast 
Guard pertaining to this development.  
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certain gaps in its SAR program, further information is required for any 
further conclusions.   
 
Canada’s Arctic Charting and Mapping  
Though the Canadian Government was discharged from having to 
exhaustively charted its Arctic waters in the Clipper Adventurer case, there 
are still many high-risk areas in the Canadian Arctic where charting is 
limited. Only a small percentage of the region has modern hydrography 
coverage (Figure 14). Canada has itself identified this gap in the Governor 
General audit of 2013, however little work has since been done to 
dramatically increase the amount of charting currently being undertaken by 
the Canadian Hydrographic Department.  
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Figure 18. Canada’s Arctic Charting Deficits 296  
 
 
As per Figure 17 demonstrates, many of the generalised shipping routes that 
re-supply vessels utilise to provision Canada’s Arctic communities 
themselves may be adequately charted, however there is still inadequate 
hydrographic data along these routes and in most of the Canadian Arctic. 
Most of the accidents occurring in the Canadian Arctic pertaining to search 
and rescue are groundings, where vessels find themselves off route and 
founder on uncharted rocks, reefs, banks and shoals. The Canadian 
Hydrographic Survey estimates that about one percent of Canadian Arctic 
waters are surveyed to modern standards, with less than 25 percent of the 
paper charts in the Arctic to be considered “good”.297 While Canada is still 
 
296 2013 Auditor General Report (n 224) Ch. 3. 
297 2013 Auditor General Report (n 224) Ch. 3. 
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making efforts to add to existing charts and hydrographic data, there is still a 
considerable deficit in the amount charting information. While this is 
essential in the prevention of grounding accidents, hydrographic data is 
critical to vessels coming to the aid of distressed vessels. Rescue vessels rely 
on charting and hydrographic data during rescue operations so that they may 
carry out safe rescues as to not further compound the issue by running 
aground themselves. 
Upon the recommendation of the 2013 Auditor General’s report, the 
Canadian government made a commitment to complete an initiative that 
identified important parts of the Arctic region that need to be surveyed and 
charted and prioritise them, in addition to develop a long-term 
implementation plan with cost-estimates, timelines and options that include 
collaboration with partners, alternative service delivery, and the use of 
modern technologies. The target date for which was September 2016. While 
the initiative was completed and delivered, the Canadian Arctic is still far 
behind in regards to its charting and mapping for where Canada ought to be 
for optimal Arctic navigation and SAR operations.  
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7 Concluding Remarks  
 
 
As we turn towards the future, ideas about the Arctic to come are coloured by 
uncertainty. What will our future Arctic look like? What kind of economies 
and industries will emerge? What Arctic specific issues will occur with the 
changing Arctic environment? Certainties such as the decline in sea ice 
extent and the increase in marine traffic have equally uncertain counterparts; 
especially regarding search and rescue. Will the decline in sea ice improve 
accessibility for search and rescue in the Arctic? Will increased marine traffic 
result in more SAR capable vessels in the Arctic?  In trying to determine how 
Canada’s Arctic search and rescue program will fare in the coming decades, 
this thesis set out to answer one simple question: is Canada meeting its 
international legal requirements and obligations to provide search and rescue 
in its Arctic – more specifically Nunavut? Throughout the duration of this 
study, and by examining the many parts that encompass this topic, this author 
has concluded that Canada is meeting its international legal requirements 
based on its limited capacity to do so. This is evidenced through both hard 
law and due diligence efforts.  
The author stresses that this conclusion is made based on important 
mitigating factors. Indeed, Canada is fulfilling its obligations. However, this 
is based on the fact that search and rescue in the Canadian Arctic is 
incredibly difficult. Therefore, this conclusion is made upon the 
consideration that Canada has its own unique standards to meet. Essentially, 
with no other comparative standard, Canada is meeting its obligations to a 
reasonable extent.  
The author further concludes that Canada (1) recognises the difficulties 
and increased activity in its Arctic (2) recognises the need for more Arctic 
SAR services, and (3) takes considerable internal and external action to not 
only achieve the minimum standards for SAR, but to strive to achieve the 
highest standards for Arctic SAR according to Canada’s capabilities and 
limitations.  
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 In saying this, Canada’s Arctic SAR performance is not without its 
gaps and areas for improvement. There are certain critical areas in which 
Canada may address these deficits. One central area is to perhaps assess 
Arctic SAR infrastructure and the distribution of SAR assets. As discussed in 
this thesis, the consolidation of Arctic SAR assets and centralised 
management in the south of Canada creates certain operational issues. Issues 
such as long transit times to emergencies in the North and a general 
disconnect between the events of the North and it’s management by divisions 
in the South. While the federal Department of Fisheries and Oceans, along 
with the Canadian Coast Guard, announced the creation of a new 
administrative region focused on the Arctic, the specifications of which at the 
time of this study are unclear. Will management of Arctic SAR be shifted 
from JRCC Trenton to an Arctic base? Will SAR assets be stationed in this 
new region to cut down on transit times, rather than positioned in the Trenton 
region? How might Indigenous people and knowledge be utilised in this new 
region? While a potential step in the right direction, the effectiveness of this 
development in dealing with these issues is still unclear. Further analysis 
following this development at a later time are required to answer these 
questions. 
Other potential areas for improvement would be better and more 
comprehensive charting of Canada’s Arctic to help in the prevention of future 
emergencies. Although time consuming and expensive, improving marine 
charting is relatively straight forward, and a seemingly good way to reduce 
SAR events with minimal additional effort. 
 Additionally, stricter domestic laws specific to search and rescue 
should also be considered. As there is a serious absence of legal cases and 
legal analysis specific to Arctic SAR in Canada, it is difficult to identify 
specific areas in which stricter laws could lead to improvement. As a 
suggestion, perhaps laws limiting the size of passenger vessels in the Arctic 
could address the potential issues associated with large-scale emergencies; 
such as inundation events and ensuring passengers are delivered to places of 
safety. Or perhaps laws which bolster or support other existing international 
regulations, such as further laws in line with the vessel specifications and 
requirements of the Polar Code. Regulations such as the Polar Code aim to 
create a baseline acceptable to all polar countries. With Canada’s unique 
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Arctic environment, however, this regulation can act as a starting point upon 
which to implement additional laws specific to Canada’s unique situation.  
 The conclusions of this thesis raise a subsequent series of research 
questions. For example,  will Canada’s Arctic SAR requirements change in 
the future? Will Canada continue to fulfil its obligations to an adequate extent 
with regards to the changing Arctic and increased SAR demands? Will 
Canada’s Northwest Passage dispute ever be resolved, and how might that 
affect Arctic search and rescue? These questions illustrate the fact that these 
particular conclusions are at one singular point in time. With future 
developments and further research, these deductions may be highly 
changeable. In knowing this, this thesis may be used as a starting point in 
which to trace the changes and progressions of Canada’s Arctic SAR 
performance, allowing for predictions of how Canada will cope with the 
uncharted waters of the changing Arctic in the decades to come.   
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Appendix A  
 
Additional international treaty articles reflecting the duty to rescue at sea 
principle:  
 
International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (1979)  
Regulation V/33  
1. The master of a ship at sea which is in a position to be able to provide 
assistance on receiving information from any source that persons are in 
distress at sea, is bound to proceed with all speed to their assistance, if 
possible informing them or the search and rescue service that the ship is 
doing so. This obligation to provide assistance applies regardless of the 
nationality or status of such persons or the circumstances in which they 
are found. If the ship receiving the distress alert is unable or, in the 
special circumstances of the case, considers it unreasonable or 
unnecessary to proceed to their assistance, the master must enter in the 
log-book the reason for failing to proceed to the assistance of the persons 
in distress, taking into account the recommendation of the Organization, 
to inform the appropriate search and rescue service accordingly.  
1.1 Contracting Governments shall co-ordinate and co-operate to ensure that 
masters of ships providing assistance by embarking persons in distress at 
sea are released from their obligations with minimum further deviation 
from the ships' intended voyage, provided that releasing the master of the 
ship from the obligations under the current regulation does not further 
endanger the safety of life at sea. The Contracting Government 
responsible for the search and rescue region in which such assistance is 
rendered shall exercise primary responsibility for ensuring such co-
ordination and co-operation occurs, so that survivors assisted are 
disembarked from the assisting ship and delivered to a place of safety, 
taking into account the particular circumstances of the case and 
guidelines developed by the Organization. In these cases the relevant 
Contracting Governments shall arrange for such disembarkation to be 
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effected as soon as reasonably practicable. 
2. The master of a ship in distress or the search and rescue service 
concerned, after consultation, so far as may be possible, with the masters 
of ships which answer the distress alert, has the right to requisition one or 
more of those ships as the master of the ship in distress or the search and 
rescue service considers best able to render assistance, and it shall be the 
duty of the master or masters of the ship or ships requisitioned to comply 
with the requisition by continuing to proceed with all speed to the 
assistance of persons in distress. 
3. Masters of ships shall be released from the obligation imposed by 
paragraph 1 on learning that their ships have not been requisitioned and 
that one or more other ships have been requisitioned and are complying 
with the requisition. This decision shall, if possible be communicated to 
the other requisitioned ships and to the search and rescue service. 
4. The master of a ship shall be released from the obligation imposed by 
paragraph 1 and, if his ship has been requisitioned, from the obligation 
imposed by paragraph 2 on being informed by the persons in distress or 
by the search and rescue service or by the master of another ship which 
has reached such persons that assistance is no longer necessary. 
5. The provisions of this regulation do not prejudice the Convention for the 
Unification of Certain Rules of Law Relating to Assistance and Salvage 
at Sea, signed at Brussels on 23 September 1910, particularly the 
obligation to render assistance imposed by article 11 of that Convention. 
*  
6. Masters of ships who have embarked persons in distress at sea shall treat 
them with humanity, within the capabilities and limitations of the ship. 
 
 
International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue (1979)  
 
Chapter 2 - Organisation and Co-ordination 
 
Art. 2.1.10 Parties shall ensure that assistance be provided to any 
person in distress at sea. They shall do so regardless of the nationality 
or status of such a person or the circumstances in which that person is 
found  
145 
 
 
 
International Convention on Salvage (1989) 
 
Article 10 - Duty to render assistance 
 
1. Every master is bound, so far as he can do so without serious danger 
to his vessel and persons thereon, to render assistance to any person in 
danger of being lost at sea. 
2. The States Parties shall adopt the measures necessary to enforce the 
duty set out in paragraph 1. 
3. The owner of the vessel shall incur no liability for a breach of the 
duty of the master under paragraph  
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Appendix B 
 
In addition, JRCCs will coordinate SAR units (SRUs) response to 
humanitarian incidents in accordance with national and regional policy and 
directives. For this, a rescue centre requires:  
 
• trained staff, capable of controlling and coordinating 
operations; a reference library; 
• a detailed plan formulating the basis of SAR operations; 
specific plans to meet the SAR demands of the region; 
• communications equipment, which will ensure a timely 
alerting procedure and provide an efficient network for 
coordinating and monitoring SAR missions and facilities; and 
• installations and equipment for the efficient coordination and 
control of operations to include, as a minimum, wall charts, 
plotting tables, SAR Mission Management System (SMMS), 
Electronic monitors with VTMIS, VMS feeds, and other 
computer aids. 
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Appendix C 
 
The Competent Authorities, Search and Rescue Agencies, and Rescue 
Coordination Centres as listed in Appendices I through III in the Agreement 
on Cooperation on Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue in the 
Arctic  
 
APPENDIX I Competent Authorities  
The Competent Authorities of the Parties are: 
Canada – Ministry of National Defence; 
Denmark – Danish Maritime Authority; 
Finland –Ministry of the Interior; Finnish Transport Safety Agency;  
Iceland –Ministry of the Interior;  
Norway –Ministry of Justice and the Police;  
Russian Federation – Ministry of Transport of the Russian Federation; 
Ministry of the Russian Federation for Civil Defense, Emergency and 
Elimination of Consequences of Natural Disasters;  
Sweden – Swedish Maritime Administration; and  
United States of America – United States Coast Guard.  
 
APPENDIX II Search and Rescue Agencies  
The search and rescue agencies of the Parties are:  
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Canada – Canadian Forces; Canadian Coast Guard;  
Denmark – Danish Maritime Authority, Danish Transport Authority, 
Ministry of Fisheries – Faroe Islands;  
Finland – Finnish Border Guard;  
Iceland – Icelandic Coast Guard;  
Norway – Joint Rescue Coordination Centre, Northern Norway (JRCC NN 
Bodø);  
Russian Federation – Federal Air Transport Agency; Federal Agency for 
Marine and River Transport;  
Sweden – Swedish Maritime Administration; and  
United States of America – United States Coast Guard; United States 
Department of Defense.  
 
APPENDIX III Rescue Coordination Centers  
The rescue coordination centers of the Parties are:  
Canada – Joint Rescue Coordination Centre, Trenton;  
Denmark – Maritime Rescue Coordination Center Grønnedal (MRCC 
Grønnedal); Rescue Coordination Center Søndrestrøm/Kangerlussuaq (RCC 
Søndrestrøm); Maritime Rescue and Coordination Center Torshavn (MRCC 
Torshavn);  
Finland – Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre Turku (MRCC Turku); 
Aeronautical Rescue Coordination Centre Finland (ARCC Finland);  
Iceland – Joint Rescue Coordination Center Iceland (JRCC Iceland); 
 
Norway – Joint Rescue Coordination Centre, Northern Norway (JRCC NN 
Bodø);  
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Russian Federation – State Maritime Rescue Coordination Center 
(SMRCC); Main Aviation Coordination Center for Search and Rescue 
(MACC);  
Sweden – Joint Rescue Coordination Center Gothenburg (JRCC 
Gothenburg); and  
United States of America – Joint Rescue Coordination Center Juneau 
(JRCC Juneau); Aviation Rescue Coordination Center Elmendorf (ARCC 
Elmendorf).  
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